抄録

　標準的なホテリングタイプの立地-価格モデルを用いて, ライセンス契約が企業の製品差別化戦略に与える影響を分析する. ライセンス契約が存在すると, 契約前の企業の費用格差やロイヤリティーの水準によらず最大差別化が実現する. また, 費用削減投資の誘因は総余剰最大化の観点から常に効率的になる. これらの結果は, ライセンス契約が存在しないケースと大きく異なる.

abstract

Using a standard linear city model with two firms, we consider how licensing activities affect the locations of the firms (i.e., the degree of product differentiation) and the incentive for R&D investment. In contrast to recent studies showing that R&D investment results in a large cost differential between firms, thereby leading to firm agglomeration, we find that licensing activities following R&D investment always lead to the maximum differentiation between firms and the mitigation of price competition. We also show that licensing activities induce the socially optimal effort level of R&D activity.