抄録

日本の違憲審査制の現実の運用の特徴として違憲判決が極めて少ないことはよく知られている.その原因についてはさまざまな指摘があるが,その1つとして,内閣法制局による厳格な事前審査の存在があげられることがある.それによれば,内閣法制局による法律の厳格な事前審査の存在が裁判所の事後的な司法審査の機能領域を小さなものにしている.本稿は,この説明の妥当性を比較法社会学的な手法を用いて検証し,厳格な事前審査の存在が直ちに事後的な司法審査の機能領域を縮小させるのではなく,裁判所が自らの役割について一定の選択をしているという媒介要因(司法の役割観judicial role conception)が重要であることを主張する.

abstract

It is well known that the Japanese Supreme Court is extremely passive in using its power to determine the constitutionality of a statute. Among the various reasons for this which have been pointed out, the existence of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau's strict preliminary review system is often raised. According to this explanation, since the Cabinet Legislation Bureau conducts a strict preliminary review in the legal drafting stage, there is little necessity for the Supreme Court to perform judicial examination ex post facto. However, looking at other countries, even countries which, like Japan, have strict preliminary review systems in place, we can see cases where the courts aggressively exercise their power to determine the constitutionality of statute-in a show of judicial activism. In this paper I argue, through a comparative socio-legal examination of the validity of the argument that the Cabinet Legislation Bureau's preliminary review system causes the passivism of the Supreme Court in Japan, that the existence of a strict preliminary review system is not directly responsible for reducing the Court's functional domain of ex post facto judicial review. Rather, I maintain that the Japanese Supreme Court exercises strict self-control with regards to intervention in politics, and that this conception of the judiciary's role as apolitical is a key mediating factor between the Cabinet Legislation Bureau's preliminary review system and the Japanese Supreme Court's passivism.