日時：2023年6月13日（火）15時～16時40分

場所：オンライン（Zoom）

参加方法：所外の方はこちらのお申込フォームからお申込ください。前日にZoomのURLを送付いたします。

(申込締切日：6月12日 16:00)

報告要旨

Corruption takes many forms. One of them is nepotism, or favoritism by political connection, a phenomenon widely documented across time, culture and different political institutions. While a growing literature offers overwhelming evidence of such favoritism and looks into its efficiency implications, there is surprisingly little analysis with regard to why nepotism is supplied in the first place, in particular, for reasons that are distinctive from other forms of corruption. This paper provides a model of strategic communication for understanding how nepotism may emerge as a result of a socially benevolent government official seeking information to maximize social welfare, only to fall to the prey of his confidant with social welfare undermined in the end. The framework of our paper is extended for a comparison between a lobbyist and a confidant, where we show that, while both parties peddle influences, a lobbyist offers a better chance to enhance social welfare whereas the presence of a confidant can lead to the exact opposite. A rich set of implications emerges from our comparative statics. Our paper suggests that the usual policy instruments designed to align private interests of a government official with the public interest are insufficient in dealing with nepotism.