Speaker：Tsuyoshi KURATA (Kyushu University)

Date：February. 7, 2023／15:00‐16:40 (JST)

Location：Zoom

Title：Social Ontology and Theory of Team Reasoning

Target : Open to Members only

Abstract： Social Ontology is an inquiry into the nature and the mode of existence of basic entities that constitute social reality, as well as "a study of what the best-explaining social scientific theories need to appeal to in their postulated ontologies (R. Tuomela)." It is a discipline that consists of several subjects with different origins from each other (e.g., "grounding of social facts," "relations between groups and individuals," "conventions and institutions," "social kinds," etc.), but at its core is considered to be the theory of collective intentionality, which takes the analysis of joint action as its starting point.

  The theory of team reasoning, on the other hand, refers to the theory proposed independently by R. Sugden and M. Bacharach within rational choice theory to solve certain puzzles regarding coordination or cooperation in standard game theory. It can be understood as promoting a shift from the questions in the received theory of rational choice: What do I want?, What should I do to achieve this? to the new questions; What do we want?, What should we do to achieve this?, What should I do (as a team member) to play my part in achieving this?

  The theory of team reasoning shares basic ideas with social ontology (theory of collective intentionality), albeit partially, in that it attempts to incorporate the concept of "we" in addition to "I" into the theoretical framework of rational choice. This is because some social ontologists explain joint action by introducing "we-mode" intentional states which are distinguished from "I-mode" states (e.g., "we-intention" vs. "I-intention").

  In this lecture, I will (i) clarify the concerns that the theory of team reasoning shares with social ontology, and then (ii) point out that the concept of team reasoning could contribute to ongoing debates on collective intentionality, and then (iii) argue that these two theories compel us to rethink the methodology of social sciences, especially methodological individualism.