**民主政府の政治経済**

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　現代の代表民主政では、選挙結果が、政党の対立・妥協や委員会審議、議会運営を媒介に、立法活動や政策転換を齎し、その評価を政府は選挙で受ける。この過程で中位投票者の政策選好はどのような経緯で、どの程度、時系列的に代表されるのであろうか。

　代表民主政のこの根本問題を探究するため、本講では、議員・候補者を分析単位に、再選・役職・政策の３目標を持つ合理的政治家の戦略的行動の結果として、選挙変動や多数党交代、立法活動を通し、民意がどのように政策に反映されるかを説明・実証するアメリカ政治学の研究を中心に、その比較政治や国際政治へ応用を含めて概観・検討する。

　アメリカの代表民主制度（議会・政党）研究は V. O. Key, Schattschneider, Fenno, Kingdon などの詳細な事例記述を端緒に、Shepsle, Weingast, Krehbiel, McCubbins 等の数理モデル化を経て、両研究の知見、含意を時系列的に厳密に実証する研究が、今やAPSR, AJPS, JoP, LSQ 等の学術雑誌の主流となっている。その知見はより普遍的に、Cox の選挙制度分析、Budge や Powell Jr. の政策選好・代表分析、Tsebelis の veto player theory や Huber の agency delegation、Putnum の two level games により、政治過程はもとより、比較政治や国際政治が共有する標準的分析道具になっている。日本でも、最近、制度論に基づく実証研究は普及しはじめているが、議員に関する公開情報が少ない現況では、一層のデーターセット作成や分析手法上の創意工夫が分析者には要求されよう。

　以上を念頭に、概要はこのシラバスの通り。毎週の負担は重いが、それに果敢に挑戦し、基礎的なことでも怖じけず積極的に質問・発言し、課題内容を応用できるまで理解・修得ことが要求かつ歓迎される。参加者はゼミ前日までに、１頁程度の「論点提起メモ」を全員に配布する義務がある。それに基づいて、毎回、文献の内容、その理論的貢献、知見、含意、論争点、それとその応用可能性と限界を議論する。

　代表民主政の分析に必須の制度分析の基本的発想（政策空間理論や契約理論）やアメリカ政治、統計などに関する予備知識は不要であるが、自主的に必要な「補習」をする時間的余裕は必要である。

　単位認定は毎回のゼミ出席と参加による。また、特にオフィスアワーを設けないが、相談のある人はメールでアポイントメントをとっていただきたい。（尚、このシラバスは <http://www.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~hiwatari/> からもダウンロードできるようにする。）尚、受講希望者は出来る限り最初の集まりまでに本講の出発点となる、David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The electoral connection* (Yale University Press, 1974)を概観することが望ましい。

1. **議員と政党**

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**II.議会**

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