先進諸国の政治経済

2012年度冬学期・水曜２限　　 　　 社会科学研究所

法学政治学研究科・総合法政専攻　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 　 樋渡展洋

総合文化研究科・国際社会専攻 hiwatari@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp

本講は先進諸国の政治経済分析の体系的・包括的理解を目的とする。現在の各国の政治経済の特徴は、政治と経済、政策決定の国際要因と国内要因が交錯することにある。特に、通常「埋め込まれた自由主義」と称される戦後の先進国政治経済では、民主政治の枠内で国内政策による経済発展と社会安定とが確保され、そのような国内条件に立脚して国家間合意による自由で開放的な貿易・資本移動の体制が発展してきたといえる。しかし、７０年代半ば以降、先進諸国の埋め込まれた自由主義は、各国の変動相場制移行と資本移動の自由化、貿易投資の拡大、経済の低成長、社会の高齢化への移行を契機に、国内政策への国際市場の規律・制約が強化されるかたちで変容してきている。それだけではなく、国際開放的な民主政体・市場経済は、９０年代以降、社会主義経済崩壊の結果、規範化され、地球大に普及している。以上のような動きの結果、各国の政治と経済、国際政治経済と国内政治経済の連動関係は、一層強化されたと言えよう。このことは、先進諸国の政治経済・国際政治経済の理解が、該当諸国の分析を超えた汎用的意義があることを意味すると思われる。

そこで、本講では、政治経済分析の最新の理論的・実証的研究の展開を講義・議論する。戦後、先進諸国が国内社会経済・国際開放経済の安定的発展を享受できた政治条件として、特に民主政の重要性に注目し、貿易・投資による経済全体利得の民主的国内配分、および民主国間の安定的信憑性に基づく国際相互依存強化の重要性を強調する。

　具体的には、（１）戦後政治経済の国内的特徴を、基軸のアメリカ自由市場政治経済からの「偏差」として捉え、（２）民主政の下、経済国際化—貿易・投資拡大と資本移動自由化—への国内政策対応の態様とその貿易・投資・通貨政策への影響を、南北関係や地域経済協力を含めて検討し、更に（３）更に、国際資本的移動の増大に伴うディスインフレ的財政金融政策の制約下の政治・政策適応を財政改革や市場改革（生産市場・労働市場改革）、社会福祉改革、対外援助政策を中心に分析する。以上を通して、理論的には、研究分野としての従来の峻別が無意味化している国際政治経済と比較（国内）政治経済の積極的統合、政治経済の先端的理論および実証研究動向の把握、更に特異な日本の事例―日本の国内政治や国際関係分析―への含意発掘の３点をめざす。

本講の進め方は講義とゼミを組み合わせる。参加者はシラバスの番号がついている指定文献を読んでいることを前提する。毎週、IO, APSR, BJPS, AJPS, ISQ, CPSなどの学術雑誌論を４本程度扱う。シラバスの番号がついている指定文献の内容を参加者との質疑や議論を通して確認し、もしくは補足説明をしながら、シラバスの9ポイント字の参考文献に依拠して、最近にいたる議論の学説的背景や問題関心の展開、実証的結果を紹介する。授業では、お互い教材やその含意・意義に関する疑問点や問題点を、自由に討論することで積極的に参加することが奨励される。教材は多くはe-journal でダウンロードできるが、入手が難しいものは、当方でマスターコピーを用意する。

単位認定は (1) 毎回のゼミ出席と(2) ゼミ前日までの（１枚程度の）論点メモ全員への配布、(3)テークホーム試験による。尚、相談のある人はオフィスアワー以外でも、メールでアポイントメントをとっていただきたい。（このシラバスと昨年度の講義資料スライドは <http://www.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~hiwatari/> からもダウンロードできるようにする。）

1. **前提：戦後政治経済の条件**

**第１週　戦後政治経済の国際的・国内的条件**

論点：2008-09大不況後、大恐慌のような国際経済の混乱が怒らなかった理由をどう理解すべきか？

1. Cameron, David. 1978. “The Expansion of the Public Economy.” *American Political Science Review* 72: 1241-1261.
2. Ruggie, John. 1982. “International Regimes Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order.” *International Organization* 31 (4): 379-415.
3. Oneal, J. R., B. Russett, and M. L. Berbaum. 2003. "Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992." *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (3): 371-93.
4. Hays, Jude C., Sean D. Ehrlich and Clint Peinhardt. 2005. “Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in OECD Countries: An Empirical Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis.” *International Organization* 59: 473-494.

**＜現実主義と覇権安定論＞**

* Eichengreen, Barry. 1989. “Hegemonic Stability Theories of the International Monetary System.’ In Richard Cooper et al., *Can Nations Agree? Issues in International Economic Cooperation* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution): 255-298.
* Lake, David. 1993. “Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy.” *International Studies Quarterly*, 37, 459-489.
* Gowa, Joanne. 1989. “Bipolarity, Mutipolarity, and Free Trade.” *American Political Science Review* 83 (4): 135-146.
* Gowa, Joanne and Edward D. Mansfield. 1993. “Power Politics and International Trade.” *American Political Science Review* 87 (2): 408-20.
* Gowa, Joanne and Edward D. Mansfield. 2004. “Alliances, Imperfect Markets, and Major-Power Trade.” *International Organization* 58 (4): 775-805.
* Kranser, Stephen D. 1976. “State Power and the Structure of International Trade.” *World Politics* 28 (3): 317-347
* Krasner, Stephen D. 1991.“Global Communications and National Power.”*World Politics* 43 (3): 336-366.

**＜相互依存論・自由主義制度論＞**

* Keohane, Robert O.1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), chaps. 4-5
* Keohane. Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. 2000. *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd. Edition (London: Longman), Part 1.
* Powell, Robert. 1994. “Anarchy in International Relations Theory.” *International Organization* 48 (2), 311-44.
* Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin and Paul R. Hensel. 2007. “International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements.” *American Journal Political Science* 51 (4): 721-727.
* Estevadeordal, Antoni and Kati Suominen. 2008. “Sequencing Regional Trade Integration and Cooperation Agreements.” *The World Economy* 31 (1): 112-140.
* Hansen, Holley E., Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Stephen C. Nemeth. 2008. “IO Mediation of Interstate Conflicts: Moving Beyond the Global versus Regional Dichotomy.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52 (2): 295-325.

**＜国際自由主義と国際紛争＞**

* Barbieri, Katherine, and Gerald Schnerder 1999. “Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict.” *Journal of Peace Research* 36 (4): 387-404.
* Bearce, David H. 2003. “Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace.” *International Studies Quarterly* 41:347-70.
* Bearce, David. H., and S. Omori. 2005. "How do commercial institutions promote peace?" *Journal of Peace Research* 42 (6): 659-78.
* De Mesquita, Bruce B., J. D. Morrow, R. M. Siverson, and A. Smith. 1999. “An Institutional Explanation of The Democratic Peace.” *American Political Science Review* 93 (4): 791-807.
* De Mesquita, Bruce. B., J. D. Morrow, R. M. Siverson, and A. Smith. 1999. "Policy failure and political survival: The contribution of political institutions." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43 (2): 147-61.
* Gartzke, Eric, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer. 2001. “Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict.” *International Organization* 55 (2): 391-438.
* Gartzke Erik and Quan Li. 2003. “War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization.” *International Studies Quarterly* 47:561-86.
* Gartzke Erik. 2007. “The Capitalist Peace.” *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (1): 166-91.
* Leeds, Brett Ashley. 1999. “Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation.” *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (4): 979-1002.
* Leeds, Brett Ashley and David R. Davis. 1999. “Beneath the Surface: Regime Type and International Interaction, 1953-78.” *Journal of Peace Research* 36 (1): 5-21.
* Oneal, John R. and Bruce M. Russett. 1997. “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985.*” International Studies Quarterly* 41: 267-294.
* Oneal, J. R., and B. Russett. 1999. "The Kantian peace - The Pacific benefits of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations, 1885-1992." *World Politics* 52 (1):1-
* Oneal, J. R., and B. Russett. 2005. "Rule of three, let it be? When more really is better." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22 (4): 293-310.
* Oneal, J. R., B. Russett, and M. L. Berbaum. 2003. "Causes of Peace: Democracy, interdependence, and international organizations, 1885-1992." *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (3): 371-93.

**<国際化と財政規模＞**

* Adsera, Alicia and Carles Boix. 2002. “Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Pubic Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness.” *International Organization* 56 (2): 229-262.
* Katzenstein, Peter J. 1983.“The Small European States in the International Economy: Economic Dependence and Corporatist Politics.” in John Gerald Ruggie (ed.), *The Antinomies of Interdependence: National Welfare and the International Division of Labor* (New York: Columbia University Press), 91-130.
* Rodrik, Dani. 1998. “Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?” *Journal of Political Economy*. 106 (5): 997-1032
* Down, Ian. 2007. “Trade Openness, Country Size and Economic Volatility: The Compensations Hypothesis Revisited.” *Business and Politics* 9 (2), Article 3.

**第２週　戦後民主政治の類型**

論点：民主制度の多様性はなぜ齎され、その動態は政策をどう規定しているのか？

1. Iversen, Torben and Thomas R. Cusack. 2000. “The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Deindustrialization or Globalization?” *World Politics* 52 (3): 313-349.

1. Cusack, Thomas R., Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. 2007. “Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems.” *American Political Science Review* 101-3: 373-391.
2. Chang, E. C. C. 2008. "Electoral Incentives and Budgetary Spending: Rethinking the Role of Political Institutions." *Journal of Politics* 70 (4): 1086-97
3. Kang, Shin-Goo, and G. Bingham Powell Jr. 2010. “Representation and Policy Responsiveness: The median voter, election rules, and redistributive welfare spending.” *The Journal of Politics* 72 (4): 1014-1028

**<政治制度の類型と起源＞**

* Aghion, Phillipe, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi 2004. Endogenous Political Institutions.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119: 565-611.
* Alvarez, R. Michael, Jonathan Nagler and Jennifer R. Willette. 2000. “Measuring the Relative Impact of Issues and the Economy in Democratic Elections.” *Electoral Studies* 19(2-3): 237-53.
* Andrews, J. T., and G. R. Montinola. 2004. "Veto players and the rule of law in emerging democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (1): 55-87.
* Besley, T., and I. Preston. 2007. "Electoral bias and policy choice: Theory and evidence." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 122 (4): 1473-510.
* Boix, Carles. 1999. “Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies.” *American Political Science Review* 93: 609-624.
* Cusack, Thomas R., Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. 2007. “Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems.” *American Political Science Review* 101-3: 373-391.
* Durham, J. B. 1999. “Economic Growth and Political Regimes.*” Journal of Economic Growth* 4: 81-111.
* Dellis, Arnaud. 2007. “Blame-game politics in a coalition government.” *Journal of Public Economics* 91(1-2): 77-96.
* Dow, Jay K. 2001. “A Comparative Spatial Analysis of Majoritarian and Proportional Elections.” *Electoral Studies* 20(1): 109-25.
* Dow, Jay K. 2010. “Party-System Extremism in Majoritarian and Proportional Electoral Systems.” *British Journal of Political Science* 41(2): 341-61.
* Fisher, Stephen D. and Sara B. Hobolt. 2010. “Coalition government and electoral accountability.” *Electoral Studies* 29(3): 358-69.
* Heller, W. B. 2001. “Political Denials: The policy effect of intercarmeral partisan differences in bicameral parliamentary systems.” *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 17: 34-61.
* Ladner, Matthew and Christopher Wlezien. 2007. “Partisan Preferences, Electoral Prospects, and Economic Expectations.” *Comparative Political Studies* 40(5): 571-96.
* Lizzeri, A. and N. Persico. 2001. “The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives.” *American Economic Review*: 91: 225-245.
* McRae, K. D. 1997. "Contrasting styles of democratic decision-making: Adversarial versus consensual politics." *International Political Science Review* 18 (3): 279-95.
* Milesi-Ferretti, G. M., R. Perotti, and M. Rostagno. 2002. "Electoral systems and public spending." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117 (2) :609-57.
* Perotti, R. and Y. Kontopoulos. 2002. “Fragmented Fiscal Policy.” *Journal of Public Economics* 86: 191-222.
* Persson, Torsten. 1998. "Economic policy and special interest politics." *Economic Journal* 108 (447): 310-27.
* Persson, Torsten. 2002. "Do political institutions shape economic policy?" *Econometrica* 70 (3): 883-905.
* Persson, Torsten, G. Roland, and Guido Tabellini. 2000. "Comparative politics and public finance." *Journal of Political Economy* 108 (6): 1121-61.
* Persson, T., and G. Tabellini. 2004. "Constitutional rules and fiscal policy outcomes." *American Economic Review* 94 (1):　25-45.
* Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2004. “Constitutions and Economic Policy.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18 (1): 75-98.
* Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2005. *The Economic Effects of Constitutions* (Cambridge MA: MIT Press).
* Persson, Torsten, G. Roland, and Guido. Tabellini. 2007. "Electoral rules and government spending in parliamentary democracies." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 2 (2): 155-88.
* Powell, G. B. 2004. "Political representation in comparative politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 7:273-96.
* Powell, G. B., and G. S. Vanberg. 2000. "Election laws, disproportionality and median correspondence: Implications for two visions of democracy." *British Journal of Political Science* 30: 383-411.
* Powell, G. B. 2006. "Election laws and representative governments: Beyond votes and seats." *British Journal of Political Science* 36:291-315.
* Soroka, Stuart N. and Christopher Wlezien. 2005. “Opinion–Policy Dynamics: Public Preferences and Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom.” *British Journal of Political Science* 35(4): 665-89.
* Rickard, Stephanie 2009. “Strategic Targeting: The effect of institutions and interests on distributive transfers.” *Comparative Political Studies*.
* Tavits, M. 2004. “The Size of Government in Majoritarian and Consensus Democracies.” *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (3): 340-59.
* Tavits, Margit. 2007. “Principle vs. Pragmatism: Policy Shifts and Political Competition.” *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (1): 151-165.
* Tsebelis, George. 1995. "Decision-Making in Political-Systems: Veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism." *British Journal of Political Science* 25: 289-325
* Tsebelis, George. 1999. "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An empirical analysis." *American Political Science Review* 93 (3):591-608.
* Tsebelis, George 2000. “Veto players and Institutional Analysis.” *Governance* 13 (4): 441-74.
* Volden, Craig and Clifford J. Carrubba. 2004. “The Formation of Oversized Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies.” *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3): 521–37.

**＜政党政治の動態＞**

* Abedi, Amir. 2002. “Challenges to established parties: The effects of party system features on the electoral fortunes of anti-political-establishment parties.” *European Journal of Political Research* 41(4): 551–83.
* Adams, James, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow, and Garrett Glasgow. 2004. “Understanding Change and Stability in Party Ideology: Do Parties Respond to Public Opinion or to Past Election Results.” *British Journal of Political Science* 34: 589-610.
* Adams, James, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow, and Garrett Glasgow. 2006. “Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Different from Mainstream Parties? The Causes and Electoral Consequences of Western European Parties” Policy Shifts, 1976-1998.” *American Journal of Political Studies* 50 (3): 513-529.
* Adams, James and Lawrence Ezrow. 2009. “Who Do European Parties Represent? How Western European Parties Represent the Policy Preferences of Opinion Leaders.” *Journal of Politics* 71 (1): 206-223.
* Adams, James, Andrea B. Haupt, and Heather Stoll. 2009. “What Moves Parties? The Role of Public Opinion and Global Economic Conditions in Western Europe.” *Comparative Political Studies* 42 (5): 611-639.
* Adams, James and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. 2009a. “Moderate Now, Win Votes Later: The Electoral Consequences of Paties’ Policy Shifts in 25 Postwar Democracies.” *Journal of Politics* 71 (2): 678-692.
* Adams, James and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. 2009b. “Policy Adjustment by Parties in Response to Rival Parties’ Policy Shifts: Spatial Theory and the Dynamics of Party Competition in Twenty-Five Post-War Democracies.” *British Journal of Political Science* 39: 825-846.
* Adams, James, Lawrence Ezrow and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. 2011. “Is Anybody Listening? Evidence That Voters Do Not Respond to European Parties’ Policy Statements During Elections.” *American Journal of Political Science* 55(2) 370–82.
* Alvarez, R. Michael and Jonathan Nagler. 2004. “Party System Compactness: Measurement and Consequences.” *Political Analysis* 12(1): 46-62.
* Alvarez, R. Michael, Jonathan Nagler and Jennifer R. Willette. 2000. “Measuring the Relative Impact of Issues and the Economy in Democratic Elections.” *Electoral Studies* 19(2-3): 237-53.
* Andrews, Josephine T. and Robert W. Jackman. 2008. “If Winning Isn’t Everything, Why Do They Keep Score? Consequences of Electoral Performance for Party Leaders.” *British Journal of Political Science* 38(4): 657-75.
* Arceneaux, Kevin. 2003. “The Conditional Impact of Blame Attribution on the Relationship Between Economic Adversity and Turnout.” *Political Research Quarterly* 56(1): 67-75.
* Arceneaux, Kevin. 2008. “Can Partisan Cues Diminish Democratic Accountability?” *Political Behavior* 30(2): 139-60.
* Arceneaux , Kevin and David W. Nickerson. 2010. “Comparing Negative and Positive Campaign Messages: Evidence From Two Field Experiments.” *American Politics Research* 38(1): 54-83.
* Bartle, John, Sebastian Dellepiane and James A. Stimson. 2010. “The Moving Centre: Preferences for Government Activity in Britain, 1950–2005.” British Journal of Political Science 41(2): 259-85.
* Erikson, Robert S. and Christopher Wlezien. 2008. “Are Political Markets Really Superior to Polls as Election Predictors?” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 72(2): 190–215.
* Ezrow, Lawrence. 2008. “On the Inverse Relationship Between Votes and Proximity for Niche Parties.” *European Journal of Political Research* 47(2): 206–20.
* Gerber, Alan S. and Gregory A. Huber. 2009. “Partisanship and Economic Behavior: Do Partisan Differences in Economic Forecasts Predict Real Economic Behavior?” *American Political Science Review* 103(3): 407-26.
* Hobolt, Sara Binzer. 2008. “The Dynamics of Issue Diversity in Party Rhetoric.” *OCSID Working Paper*.
* Hobolt, Sara Binzer. 2007. “Taking Cues on Europe? Voter competence and party endorsements in referendums on European integration.” *European Journal of Political Research* 46(2): 151–182.
* Hobolt, Sara Binzer and Jane Green. 2008. “Owning the Issue Agenda: Party Strategies and Vote Choices in British Elections.” Electoral Studies 27(3): 460-76.
* Hobolt, Sara Binzer and Bjørn Høyland. 2011. “Selection and Sanctioning in European Parliamentary Elections.” *British Journal of Political Science* 41(3): 477-98.
* Hobolt, Sara Binzer and Robert Klemmemsen. 2005. “Responsive Government? Public Opinion and Government Policy Preferences in Britain and Denmark.” *Political Studies* 53(6): 379-402.
* Hobolt, Sara Binzer and Robert Klemmemsen. 2008. “Government Responsiveness and Political Competition in Comparative Perspective.” *Comparative Political Studies* 41(3): 309-37.
* Hobolt, Sara Binzer and Patrick Leblond. 2009. “Is My Crown Better than Your Euro? Exchange Rates and Public Opinion on the European Single Currency.” European Union Politics 10(2): 202-25.
* Hooghe, Liesbet, Ryan Bakker, Anna Brigevich, Catherine de Vries, Erica Edwards, Gary Marks, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Vachudova. 2010. “Reliability and validity of the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill expert surveys on party positioning.” *European Journal of Political Research* 49(5): 687–703.
* Huber, Gregory A. and Kevin Arceneaux. 2007. “Identifying the Persuasive Effects of Presidential Advertising.” *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 957–77.
* Katz, Gabriel, R. Michael Alvarez, Ernesto Calvo, Marcelo Escolar and Julia Pomares. 2011. “Assessing the Impact of Alternative Voting Technologies on Multi-Party Elections: Design Features, Heuristic Processing and Voter Choice.” *Political Behavior* 33(2): 247-70.
* Kollman, Ken, John H. Miller and Scott E. Page. 1998. “Political Parties and Electoral Landscapes.” *British Journal of Political Science* 28(1): 139-58.
* Kumlin, Staffan. 2011. “Claiming Blame and Giving Credit: Unintended Effects of how Government and Opposition Frame the Europeanization of Welfare.” *European Union Politics* 12(4): 575-95.
* Ladner, Matthew and Christopher Wlezien. 2007. “Partisan Preferences, Electoral Prospects, and Economic Expectations.” *Comparative Political Studies* 40(5): 571-96.
* Matthews, John Scott and Richard Johnston. 2010. “The Campaign Dynamics of Economic Voting.” *Electoral Studies* 29(1): 13-24.
* Rudolph, Thomas J. 2006. “Triangulating Political Responsibility: The Motivated Formation of Responsibility Judgments.” *Political Psychology* 27(1): 99-122.
* Soroka, Stuart N. and Christopher Wlezien. 2005. “Opinion–Policy Dynamics: Public Preferences and Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom.” *British Journal of Political Science* 35(4): 665-89.
* Steenbergen, Marco R., Erica E. Edwards and Catherine E. de Vries. 2007. “Who's Cueing Whom? Mass-Elite Linkages and the Future of European Integration.” *European Union Politics* 8(1): 13-35.
* Wittman, Donald A. 1973. “Parties as Utility Maximizers.” *American Political Science Review* 67(2): 490-8.
* Wittman, Donald A. 1983. “Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories.” *American Political Science Review* 77(1): 142-57.
* Wittman, Donald A. 1989. “Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results.” *Journal of Political Economy* 97(6): 1395-424.

**＜経済投票＞**

* Evans, Geoffrey and Robert Andersen. 2006. “The Political Conditioning of Economic Perceptions.” *The Journal of Politics* 68(1) 194–207.
* Evans, Geoffrey and Mark Pickup. 2010. “Reversing the Causal Arrow: The Political Conditioning of Economic Perceptions in the 2000--2004 U.S. Presidential Election Cycle.” *The Journal of Politics* 72(4) 1236–51.
* Gerber, Alan S. and Gregory A. Huber. 2009. “Partisanship and Economic Behavior: Do Partisan Differences in Economic Forecasts Predict Real Economic Behavior?” *American Political Science Review* 103(3): 407-26.
* Nadeau, Richard, Richard G. Niemi and Antoine Yoshinaka. 2002. “Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context Across Time and Nations.” *Electoral Studies* 21(3): 403-23.
* Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. and Guy D. Whitten. 1993. “A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context.” *American Journal of Political Science* 37(2): 391-414.
* Ward, Hugh, Lawrence Ezrow, and Han Dorussen . 2011. “Globalization, Party Positions, and the Median Voter.” *World Politics* 63(3): 509-47.
* Wlezien, Christopher. 2004. “Patterns of Representation: Dynamics of Public Preferences and Policy.” Journal of Politics 66(1): 1–24.
* Wlezien, Christopher and Robert S. Erikson. 2002. “The Timeline of Presidential Election Campaigns.” *The Journal of Politics* 64(4): 969–93.
* Wlezien, Christopher and Robert S. Erikson. 2004. “The Fundamentals, the Polls, and the Presidential Vote.” *PS: Political Science & Politics* 37(4): 747-51.
* Wlezien, Christopher and Robert S. Erikson. 2007. “The Horse Race: What Polls Reveal as the Election Campaign Unfolds.”*International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 19(1): 74-88.

**第３週　戦後政治経済の類型（１）—成長と配分の市場制度**

論点：戦後の市場経済の多様性は経済の成長と経済成果の配分にどのような影響を与え、政府の政策課題をどう規定したのか？

1. Cameron, David R. 1984. “Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence and the Representation of Economic Interests in Advanced Capital Society,” in John Goldthorpe (ed.), *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 143-178.　（訳あり）
2. Hall, Peter A. and Robert J. Franzese, Jr. 1998. “Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Wage Bargaining and the EMU.” *International Organization* 52(3): 505-536
3. Hicks, Alexander and Lane Kenworthy. 1998. “Cooperation and Political Economic Performance in Affluent Democratic Capitalism.” *American Journal of Sociology* 103 (6): 1631-1672.
4. Rajan, Raghuram, and Luigi Zingales. 2001. “Financial Systems, Industrial Structure, and Growth.” *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 17 (4): 467-482.

**＜成長の市場制度＞**

* Beck, Thorsten & Ross Levine. 2002. “Industry Growth and Capital Allocation: Does Having a Market- or Bank-Based System Matter?” NBER Working Paper 8982 (National Bureau of Economic Research).
* Cukierman, Alex, Pantelis Kalaitzidakis, Lawrence H. Summers, and Steven B. Webb. 1993.“Central Bank Independence, Growth, Investment, and Real Rates.” *Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy* 39: 95-140.
* Hall, Peter A. and David Soskice. 2001. “An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism.” in Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (eds.), *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1-68.
* La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance." *Journal of Finance* 52 (3): 1131-50.
* Zysman, John. 1983. *Governments, Markets, and Growth* (Ithaca; Cornell University Press), Chap. 2.

**＜配分の市場制度＞**

* Alvarez, R. Michael, Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange. 1991. “Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance.” *American Political Science Review* 85 (2): 539-556
* Calmfors, Lars & John Driffill.1988. “Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance.” *Economic Policy* 6 :14-61.
* Huber, Evelyne and John D. Stephens. 2001. *Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets* (Chicago: Chicago University Press), Chapters 3-4.
* Iversen, Torben. 2005. *Capitalism, Democracy, and Welfare* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
* Iversen, Torben and John D. Stephens. 2008. “Partisan Politics, the Welfare State, and Three Worlds of Human Capital Formation.” *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (4/5): 600-637.
* Korpi, Walter. 2006. “Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare States and Varieties of Capitalism.” *World Politics* 58: 167-206.
* Mares, Isabela. 2004. “Wage Bargaining in the Presence of Social Services and Transfers.” *World Politics* 57: 99-142.
* Rodrik, Dani. 1999. “Democracies Pay Higher Wages.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114 (3): 707-738.
* Swenson, Peter 1991. “Bringing Capital Back In, or Social Democracy Reconsidered: Employer Power, Cross-Class Alliances, and Centralization of Industrial Relations in Denmark and Sweden.” *World Politics* 43 (4): 512-544.

**第４週　戦後政治経済の類型（２）—成長と配分の政府政策**

論点：市場経済の多様性を前提に、政府の政策（財政規模）の多様性を規定している要因は何か？

1. Blais, Andre, Donald Blake and Stephane Dion. 1993. “Do Parties Make a Difference? Parties and the Size of Government in Liberal Democracies.” *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (1): 40-62.
2. Hicks, Alexander M. and Duane H. Swank. 1992. “Politics, Institutions, and Welfare Spending in Industrialized Democracies, 1960-82.” *American Political Science Review* 86 (3): 658-674.
3. Quinn, Dennis P. & John T. Woolley. 2001. “Democracy and National Economic Performance: The Preference for Stability.” *American Journal of Political Science* 45(3): 634-657.
4. Iversen, Toben, and David Soskice. 2006. "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others." *American Political Science Review* 100 (2): 165-81.

**＜政治制度と再分配・財政規模＞**

* Adsera, Alicia and Carles Boix. 2002. “Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Pubic Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness.” *International Organization* 56 (2): 229-262.
* Besley, T., and I. Preston. 2007. "Electoral bias and policy choice: Theory and evidence." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 122 (4): 1473-510.
* Chang, E. C. C. 2008. "Electoral Incentives and Budgetary Spending: Rethinking the Role of Political Institutions." *Journal of Politics* 70 (4): 1086-97.
* Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), Chapter 2-3.（訳あり）
* Iversen, Torben and Thomas R. Cusack. 2000. “The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Deindustrialization or Globalization?” *World Politics* 52 (3): 313-349.
* Milesi-Ferretti, G. M., R. Perotti, and M. Rostagno. 2002. "Electoral systems and public spending." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117 (2) :609-57.
* Persson, Torsten. 1998. "Economic policy and special interest politics." *Economic Journal* 108 (447): 310-27.
* Persson, Torsten. 2002. "Do political institutions shape economic policy?" *Econometrica* 70 (3): 883-905.
* Persson, Torsten, G. Roland, and Guido Tabellini. 2000. "Comparative politics and public finance." *Journal of Political Economy* 108 (6): 1121-61.
* Persson, T., and G. Tabellini. 2004. "Constitutional rules and fiscal policy outcomes." *American Economic Review* 94 (1):25-45.
* Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2004. “Constitutions and Economic Policy.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18 (1): 75-98.
* Persson, Torsten, G. Roland, and Guido. Tabellini. 2007. "Electoral rules and government spending in parliamentary democracies." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 2 (2): 155-88.
* Rickard, Stephanie 2009. “Strategic Targeting: The effect of institutions and interests on distributive transfers.” *Comparative Political Studies* (forthcoming).
* Roubini, Nouriel and Jeffrey Sachs. 1989. “Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrial Countries” *Economic Policy* 8: 100-132.
* Tsebelis, George. 1999. "Veto Players and Law Production in parliamentary democracies: An empirical analysis." *American Political Science Review* 93 (3):591-608.
* Tsebelis, George. and Eric. C. C. Chang. 2004. "Veto players and the structure of budgets in advanced industrialized countries." *European Journal of Political Research* 43 (3): 449-76.
* Summers, Lawrence, Jonathan Gruber, and Rodrigo Vergara.1993. “Taxation and the Structure of Labor Markets: The Case of Corporatism.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 108(2).
* Swank, Duane H. 1988. “The Political Economy of Government Domestic Expenditure in Affluent Democracies, 1960-80.*” American Journal of Political Science* 32 (4): 1120-1150.
* Swank, Duane. 2002. *Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Chapter 3.

**＜政権党派と財政規模＞**

* Bawn, Kathleen and Frances Rosenbluth 2006. “Short Versus Long Coalitions: Electoral accountability and the size of the public sector.” *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (2): 251-65.
* Crepaz, M. M. L. 2002. "Global, constitutional, and partisan determinants of redistribution in fifteen OECD countries." *Comparative Politics* 34 (2): 169-+.
* Crepaz, M. M. L., and A. W. Moser. 2004. "The impact of collective and competitive veto points on public expenditures in the global age." *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (3): 259-85.
* Edwards, M. S., and F. C. Thames. 2007. "District magnitude, personal votes, and government expenditures." *Electoral Studies* 26 (2): 338-45.
* Hobolt, S. B., and R. Klemmensen. 2008. "Government responsiveness and political competition in comparative perspective." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 309-37.
* Iversen, T., and D. Soskice. 2006. "Electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions: Why some democracies redistribute more than others." *American Political Science Review* 100 (2): 165-81.
* Karp, J. A., and S. A. Banducci. 2002. "Issues and party competition under alternative electoral systems." *Party Politics* 8 (1): 123-41.
* Ladner, M., and C. Wlezien. 2007. "Partisan preferences, electoral prospects, and economic expectations." *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (5): 571-96.
* Mansergh, L., and R. Thomson. 2007. "Election pledges, party competition, and policymaking." *Comparative Politics* 39 (3): 311-\*\*.
* McGillivray, Fiona. 1997. “Party Discipline as a Determinant of Endogenous Tariff Formation,” *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (2): 584-607.
* McRae, K. D. 1997. "Contrasting styles of democratic decision-making: Adversarial versus consensual politics." *International Political Science Review* 18 (3): 279-95.
* Milner, Helen V. and Benjamin Judkins. 2004. “Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left-Right Divide on Trade Policy.” *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (1): 95-119.
* Nelson, Phillip. 1999. "Redistribution and the Income of the Median Voter." *Public Choice* 98 (1-2): 187-94
* Rahat, Gideon, Reuven Y. Hazan and Richard S. Katz. 2008. “Democracy and Political Parties: On the uneasy relationship between participation, competition, and representation.” *Party Politics* 14 (6): 663-683.

**II. 経済国際化の政治経済**

**第５週　貿易・投資拡大の国内要因**

論点：貿易の拡大を誰が、なぜ支持・反対し、それがどのように代表されて政府の政策を規定しているのか？

1. Scheve, Kenneth and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2004. “Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production.” *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (4): 662-74.
2. Ehrlich, Sean D. 2007. “Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies.” *International Organization* 61(3): 571-605.
3. Guisinger, Alexandra. 2009. “Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?.” *International Organization* 63 (Summer): 533-557.
4. Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety.” *International Organization* 63 (Summer): 425-457.

**＜貿易と国内配分・利害対立＞**

* Alt, James E. and Michael Gilligan. 1994. “The Political Economy of Trading States.” *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 2 (2): 165-192.
* Alt, James E., Jeffry Frieden, Michael Gilligan, Dani Rodrik & Ronald Rogowski. 1996. “The Political Economy of International Trade.” *Comparative Political Studies* 29 (6).
* Ehrlich, Sean D. 2010. “The Fair Trade Challenge to Embedded Liberalism.” *International Studies Quarterly* 54:1013-1033.
* Hiscox, Michael. 2001. “Class Verses Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade.” *International Organization* 55 (1): 1-46.
* Ladewig, Jeffrey W. 2006. “Domestic Influences on International Trade Policy: Factor Mobility in the United States, 1963 to 1992.” *International Organization* 60: 69-103.
* Mayda, Anna Maria and Dani Rodrik. 2005. “Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist than Others?” *European Economic Review* 49(6): 1393-1430.
* Milner, Helen V. 1987. “Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the US.” *International Organization* 41 (4): 639-665.
* Milner, Helen V. and David B. Yoffie. 1989. “Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands.” *International Organization* 43 (2):
* Rogowski, Ronald. 1989. *Commerce and Coalitions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
* Takacs, Wendy E. 1981. “Pressures for Protectionism.” *Economic Inquiry* 39:

**＜貿易と市場調整>**

* Aggarwal, Vinod K., Robert O. Keohane and David B. Yoffie. 1987. “The Dynamics of Negotiated　Protectionism.”*American Political Science Review* 81 (2): 252-273.
* Goodman, John B., Debora Spar and David B. Yoffie. 1996.“Foreign Direct Investment and the Demand for Protection in the United States.” *International Organization* 50 (4).
* Hathaway, Oona A. 1998. “Positive Feedback: The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Industry Demands for Protection.” *International Organization* 52 (3): 575-612.

＜**政策規定要因**＞

* Goldstein, Judith. 1988. “Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy.” *International Organization* 42 (1): 179-217
* Goldstein, Judith. 1986. “The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection.” *American Political Science Review* 80: 161-184.
* Goldstein, Judith and Stefanie Ann Lenway. 1989. “Interests or Institutions: An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC Relations.” *International Studies Quarterly* 33 (3): 303-327.
* Hansen, Wendy L.1990. “The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protectionism.” *American Political Science Review* 84 (1): 21-46.
* Hankla, Charles R. 2006. “Party Strength and International Trade: A Cross-National Analysis.” *Comparative Political Studies* 39 (9): 1133-1156.
* Henisz, Witold J. and Edward D. Mansfield. 2000. “Votes and Vetos: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness.” *International Studies Quarterly* 50: 189-211.
* Mansfield, Edward D. and Mark L. Busch. 1995. “The Political Economy of Nontariff Barriers: a Cross-National Analysis.” *International Organization* 49 (4): 723-749.
* Mansfield, Edward D,. Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. “Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade.” *American Political Science Review* 94 (2): 305-321.
* Milner, Helen and Keiko Kubota. 2005. “Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries.” *International Organization* 59 (1): 107-143.
* Milner, Helen V., and Dustin H. Tingley. 2011. “Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy.” *International Organization* 65 (Winter): 37-68.
* Ray, Edward John. 1988. “Changing Patterns of Protectionism: The Rise and Fall in Non-Tariff Barriers.” *Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business* 285.
* Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. “Trade and the Variety of Domestic Institutions” *International Organization* 41 (2): 205-223.
* Souva, Mark, Dale L. Smith and Shawn Rowan .2008. “Promoting Trade: The Importance of Market Protecting Institutions.” *The Journal of Politics* 70 (2): 383-392.

**＜貿易と政治対立＞**

* Nollen, Stanly and Dennis P. Quinn. 1994. “Free Trade, Fair Trade, Strategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-88.” *International Organization* 48 (3).
* Baldwin, Robert and Christopher Magee. 2000. “Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills.” *Public Choice* 105.
* Gawande, Kishore and Bernard Hoekman. 2006. “Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States.” *International Organization* 60: 527-561.
* Karol, David. 2001. “Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Much Ado About Nothing?” *International Organization* 54 (4): 825-845.
* Milner, Helen V. & Benjamin Judkins. 2004. “Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left-Right Divide on Trade Policy.” *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (1): 95-119.
* Thies, Cameron G. and Schuyler Porche. 2007. “The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection.” *The Journal of Politics* 69 (1): 116-127.

**第６週　貿易・投資と政治制度**

論点：だれが、なぜ投資協定・貿易協定を支持・反対し、それが地域経済協力の形成やWTOの運営をどのように規定しているのか？

1. Jensen, Nathan M. 2003.“Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment.” *International Organization* 57 (3): 587-616.
2. Büthe, Tim and Helen Milner. 2008. “The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through Investment Trade Agreements?” *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (4): 741-762.
3. Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2008. “Democracy, Veto Players, and the Depth of Regional Integration.” *The World Economy* 31 (1): 67-96.
4. Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. “Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade.” *International Organization* 61:37-67.

**＜貿易効果と地域貿易協定＞**

* Albertin, Giorgia. 2008. "Regionalism or Multilateralism? A Political Economy Choice." *IMF Working Paper*.
* Bartilow, Horace A., D. Stephen Voss. 2009. “Market Rules: The Incidental Relationship between Democratic Compatibility and International Commerce.” *International Studies Quarterly* 53: 103-24.
* Chase, Kerry A. 2003. “Economic Interests and Regional Trading Arrangements: The Case of NAFTA.” *International Organization* 57: 137-174.
* Dee, Philippa, and Jyothi Gali. 2003. "The Trade and Investment Effects of Preferential Trading Arrangements." In *NBER Working Paper* 10160.
* Duina, Francesco, and Jason Buxbaum. 2008. "Regional Trade Agreements and the Pursuit of State Interests: Institutional Perspectives from NAFTA and Mercosur." *Economy and Society* 37 (2):193-223.
* Edwards, Sebastian. 1998. “Openness, Productivity, and Growth: What Do We Really Know?” *The Economic Journal* 108: 383-398.
* Frankel, Jeffrey and David Romer. 1999. “Does Trade Cause Growth?” *The American Economic Review* 89 (3): 379-399. Fernández, Raquel, and Jonathan Portes. 1998. "Returns to Regionalism: An Analysis of Nontraditional Gains from Regional Trade Agreements." *World Bank Economic Review* 12 (2): 197-220.
* Giavazzi, Francesco and Guido Tabellini. 2004. “Economic and Political Liberalization.” *CESifo Working Paper* 1249.
* Henisz, Witold J. and Edward D. Mansfield. 2000. “Votes and Vetos: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness.” *International Studies Quarterly* 50: 189-211.
* Lee, Ha Yan, Luca Antonio Ricci, Roberto Rigobon. 2004. “Once Again, Is Openness Good for Growth.” *NBER Working Paper* 10749.
* Mansfield, Edward D. 1998. “The Proliferation of Preferential Trading Agreement.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (5): 523-543.
* Mansfield, Edward D. and Helen V. Milner. 1999. “The New Wave of Regionalism.” *International Organization* 53 (3): 589-627.
* Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2007. “Vetoing Co-opertion, The Impact of Veto Players on Preferential Trading Arrangements.” *British Journal of Political Science* 37 (3): 403-432
* Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2008. “Democracy, Veto Players, and the Depth of Regional Integration.” *The World Economy* 31 (1): 67-96.
* Medvedev, Denis. 2006. "Beyond Trade: The Impact of Preferential Trade Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment Inflows." In *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 4065.
* Milner, Helen and Keiko Kubota. 2005. “Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries.” *International Organization* 59 (1): 107-143.
* O'Reilly, Robert F. 2005. "Veto Points Veto Players, and International Trade Policy." *Comparative Political Studies* 38 (6): 652-73.
* Remmer, Karen L. 1998. “Does Democracy Promote Interstate Cooperation? Lessons from the Mercosur Region.” *International Studies Quarterly* 42: 25-52.
* Reuveny, Rafael and Quan Li. 2003. “Economic Openness, Democracy, and Income Inequality: An Empirical Analysis.” *Comparative Political Studies* 36 (5): 575:601.
* Rigohorn, Roberto and Dani Rodrik. 2004. “Rule of Law, Democracy, Openness, and Income: Estimating the International Relationship.” *NBER Working Paper* 10750.
* Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian and Francesco Trabbi. 2004. “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development.” *Journal of Economic Growth* 9: 131-165.
* Scheve, Kenneth and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2004. “Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production.” *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (4): 662-74.
* Souva, Mark, Dale L. Smith and Shawn Rowan. 2008. “Promoting Trade: The Importance of Market Protecting Institutions.” *The Journal of Politics* 70 (2): 383-392

**＜投資規定要因と投資協定＞**

* Alee, Todd, and Cling Peinhardt. 2011. “Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment.” *International Organization* 65 (Summer) 401-432.
* Chase, Kerry A. 2003. “Economic Interests and Regional Trading Arrangements: The Case of NAFTA.” *International Organization* 57: 137-174.
* Campos, Nauro F., and Yuko Kinoshita. 2010. “Structural Reforms, Financial Liberalization, and Foreign Direct Investment.” IMF Staff Papers 57 (2): 2010: 326-365.
* Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons.2006. “Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000.” *International Organization* 60 (4): 811-846.
* Pauly, Louis W. and Simon Reich. 1997.“National Structures and Multinational Corporate Behavior: Enduring Differences in the Age of Globalization.” *International Organization* 51(1)
* Feng, Yi. 2001. "Political Freedom, Political Instability, and Policy Uncertainty." *International Studies Quarterly* 45 (2):271-94.
* Gelos, R. Gaston and Shang-Jin Wei. 2002. “Transparency and International Investment Behavior.” *NBER Working Paper* 9260.
* Harms, Philipp, and Heinrich W. Ursprung. 2002. "Do Civil and Political Repression Really Boost Foreign Direct Investment?" *Economic Inquiry* 40 (4): 651-63.
* Li, Quan and Adam Resnick. 2003. “Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries.” *International Organization* 57 (1): 175-211.
* Tobin, Jennifer, and Susan Rose-Ackerman. 2005. "Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties." In *Yale Law & Economics Research Paper* 293.
* Neumayer, Eric, and Laura Spess. 2005. "Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?" *World Development* 33 (10): 1567-85.
* Jakobsen, Jo, and Indra deSoysa. 2006. "Do Foreign Investors Punish Democracy? Theory and Empirics." *Kyklos: Internationale Zeitschrift fur Sozialwissenschaften* 59 (3): 383-410.
* Blanton, Shannon Lindsey and Robert G. Blanton. 2007. “What Attracts Foreign Investors? An Examination of Human Rights and Foreign Direct Investment.” *American Journal of Political Science* 69 (1):143-155.
* Choi, Seung-Whan, and Yiagadeesen Samy. 2008. "Reexamining the Effect of Democratic Institutions on Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 4 (1): 451-78.

**＜地域貿易協定＞**

* Fernández, Raquel, and Jonathan Portes. 1998. "Returns to Regionalism: An Analysis of Nontraditional Gains from Regional Trade Agreements." *World Bank Economic Review* 12 (2):197-220.
* Mansfield, Edward D. 1998. “The Proliferation of Preferential Trading Agreements.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (5): 523-543.
* Mansfield, Edward D. and Helen V. Milner. 1999. “The New Wave of Regionalism.” *International Organization* 53 (3): 589-627.
* Dee, Philippa, and Jyothi Gali. 2003. "The Trade and Investment Effects of Preferential Trading Arrangements." In *NBER Working Paper* 10160.
* Levy Yeyati, Eduardo, Ernesto Stein, and Christian Daude. 2003. "Regional Integration and the Location of FDI." In *Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper* 462.
* Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. “Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements.” *International Organization* 56 (3): 411-513.
* Genna, Gaspare M., and Taeko Hiroi. 2004. "Power and Preponderance and Domestic Politics: Explaining Regional Economic Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1960-1997." *International Interactions* 30 (2):143-64
* Medvedev, Denis. 2006. "Beyond Trade: The Impact of Preferential Trade Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment Inflows." In *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 4065.
* Albertin, Giorgia. 2008. "Regionalism or Multilateralism? A Political Economy Choice," *IMF Working Paper*.
* Duina, Francesco, and Jason Buxbaum. 2008. "Regional Trade Agreements and the Pursuit of State Interests: Institutional Perspectives from NAFTA and Mercosur." *Economy and Society* 37 (2):193-223.
* Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2007. “Vetoing Co-opertion, The Impact of Veto Players on Preferential Trading Arrangements.” *British Journal of Political Science* 37 (3): 403-432
* Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2008. “Democracy, Veto Players, and the Depth of Regional Integration.” *The World Economy* 31 (1): 67-96.

**＜地域貿易協定と紛争処理＞**

* Busch, Marc L. 2007. “Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade.” *International Organization* 61: 735-761.
* Chase, Kerry A. 2004. “Foreign Direct Investment and Commitment Problems in Regional Trade Arrangements.” Paper delivered to the American Political Science Association Meeting
* Goldstein, Judith. 1996. “International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American ‘Unfair’ Trade Laws.” *International Organization* 50 (4): 541-564.
* Haftel, Yoram Z. 2004. “From the Outside Looking In: The Effect of Trading Blocs on Trade Disputes in the GATT/WTO.” *International Studies Quarterly* 48: 121-142.
* Mansfield, Edward D and Eric Reinhardt. 2003. “Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements.” *International Organization* 57: 829-862.
* Ryan, Michael P. 1995. “USTR's Implementation of 301 Policy in the Pacific.” *International Studies Quarterly* 39 (3): 333-350.
* Smith, James McCall. 2000. “The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts.” *International Organization* 54 (1): 137-180.

**<ＷＴＯと貿易拡大＞**

* Aaronson, Susan Ariel, andM. Rodwan Abouharb. 2011. “Unexpected Bedfellows: The GATT, the WTO and Some Democratic Rights.” *International Studies Quarterly* 55: 1-30.
* Engelbrecht, Hans-Jurgen, and Christopher Pearce. 2007. "The GATT/WTO Has Promoted Trade, But Only in Capital-intensive Commodities!" *Applied Economics* 39:1573-1581.
* Francois, Joseph, Hans van Meijl and Frank van Tongeren. 2005. “Trade Liberalization in the Doha Development Round.” *Economic Policy,* 20 (42): 349-391.
* Gowa, Joanne and Soo Yeon Kim. 2005. “An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of the GATT on Trade, 1950-94.” *World Politics* 57: 453-478.
* Hertel, Thomas W., Roman Keeney, Maros Ivanic and L. Alan Winters. 2007. “Distributional Effects of WTO Agricultural Reforms in Rich and Poor Countries.” *Economic Policy* 50: 289-337.
* Ozden, Caglar and Eric Reinhardt. 2005. “The Perversity of Preferences: GSP and Developing Country Trade Policies, 1976-2000.” *Journal of Development Economics* 78 (1): 1-21.
* Rose, Andrew K. 2004. “Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade?” *American Economic Review* 94 (1): 98-114.
* Rose, Andrew K. 2004. “Do WTO Members Have More Liberal Trade Policy?” *Journal of International Economics* 63: 209-235.
* Rose, Andrew K. 2005. “Does the WTO Make Trade More Stable?” *Open Economies Review* 16: 7-22.
* Subramanian, Arvind and Shang-Jin Wei. 2007. “The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly but Unevenly,” *Journal of International Economics* 73: 151-175.
* Tang, Man-Keung and Shang-Jin Wei. 2008. “The Value of Making Commitments Externally: Evidence from WTO Accessions.” *NBER Working Paper* No. 14582.

**＜ＧＡＴＴ/ＷＴＯと紛争処理＞**

* Busch, Marc L. 2000. “Democracy, Consultation, and the Paneling of Disputes under GATT.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44 (4): 425-446.
* Busch, Mark L. and Eric Reinhardt. 2002. “Testing International Trade Law: Empirical studies of GATT/WTO dispute settlement.” in Daniel L. M. Kennedy and James D. Southwick eds. *The Political Economy of International Trade Law: Essays in honor of Robert E. Hudec* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
* Busch, Marc L. and Eric Reinhardt. 2006. “Three’s a Crowd: Third Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement.” *World Politics* 58: 446-477.
* Goldstein, Judith. 1998. “International Institutions and Domestic Politics: GATT, WTO, and the Liberalization of International Trade.” in Anne O. Krueger, *The WTO as an International Organization* (Chicago: Chicago University Press), 133-152.
* Guzman, Andrew and Beth A, Simmons 2002. “To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organization.” *Journal of Legal Studies* 29: S205-S235.
* Kim, Moonhawk. 2008. “Costly Procedures: Divergent Effects of Legalization in the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures.” *International Studies Quarterly* 52: 657–686.
* Moon, Don. 2006. “Equality and Inequality in the WTO Dispute Settlement (DS) System: Analysis of the GATT/WTO Dispute Data.” *International Interactions* 32: 201-228.
* Reinhardt, Eric. 2001. “Adjudication without Enforcement in GATT Disputes.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45 (2): 174-195.
* Rosendorff, B. Peter. 2005. "Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedure." *American Political Science Review* 99 (3): 389-400.
* Staiger Robert W. and Guido Tabellini. 1999. “Do GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?” *Economics and Politics* 11 (2): 109-144.
* Steinberg, Richard H. 2002. “In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO.” *International Organization* 56 (2): 339-374.

**＜国際合意と国内制度＞**

* Downs, George, David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom. 1996. “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?” *International Organization* 50 (2): 379–406.
* Friman, H. Richard. 1993. “Side-Payments versus Security Cards: Domestic Bargaining Tactics in International Economic Negotiations.” *International Organization* 47 (3): 387-410.
* Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor. 1996. “Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations.” *International Organization*, 50 (1): 109-139
* Kaarbo, Juliet. 2001. “The domestic politics of international negotiations: The effects of state structures and policy making processes.” *International Interactions* 27 (2): 169-205.
* Leeds, B. A., and B. Savun. 2007. Terminating alliances: Why do states abrogate agreements? *Journal of Politics* 69 (4): 1118-1132.
* Lipson, Charles 1991. “Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?” ” *International Organization* 45 (4): 495-538.
* Martin, Lisa L. 2000. *Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and international cooperation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
* Mayer, Frederick W. 1992. “Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side-Payments.*” International Organization*, 46 (4): 793-818.
* McGillivray, Fiona and Alastair Smith. 2004. “The Impact of Leadership Turnover on Trading Relations Between States.” *International Organization* 58 (3): 567-600.
* Mertha, Andrew and Robert Pahre. 2005. “Patently Misleading: Partial Implementation and Bargaining Leverage in Sino-American Negotiation on Intellectual Property Rights.” *International Organization* 59 (4): 695-729.
* Milner, Helen V. 1997. *Interests, institutions, and information: Domestic politics and international relations*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
* Milner, Helen V., and B. Peter Rosendorff. 1996. “Trade Negotiations, Information, and Domestic Politics: The Role of Domestic Groups.” *Economics and Politics* 8 (2): 145-189.
* Milner, Helen V., and B. Peter Rosendorff. 1997. “Democratic politics and international trade negotiations: Elections and divided government as constraints on trade liberalization.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41 (1): 117-46.
* Putnam, Robert. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics.” *International Organization* 42 (3): 427-460.
* Smith, Alastair, and Hayes, David R. 1997. “'The Shadow of the Polls: Electoral Effects on International Agreements.” *International Interactions* 23 (1): 79-108.
* Von Stein, Jana. 2005. “Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance.” *American Political Science Review* 99-4: 611-22.

**第７週　資本自由化・金融市場改革の国際・国内要因**

論点：資本の自由化、金融市場改革を誰が、なぜ支持・反対し、それが政府の政策を規定しているのか？

1. Quinn, Dennis P. and Carla Inclán. 1997. “The Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization.” *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (3): 771-813.
2. Li, Quan and Dale L. Smith. 2003. “The Dilemma of Financial Liberalization: State Autonomy and Societal Demands.” *Journal of Politics* 64 (3): 764-790.
3. Simmons, Beth A., and Zachary Elkins. 2004. "The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy." *American Political Science Review* 98 (1): 171-89.
4. Mukherjee, Bumba, and David Andrew Singer. 2010. “International Institutions and Domestic Compensation: The IMF and the Politics of Capital Account Liberalization.” *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (1): 45-60.

**＜資本自由化の規定要因＞**

* Alesina, Alberto, Vittorio Grilli and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti. 1994. “The Political Economy of Capital Controls.” In Leonardo Leideran and Assaf Razin eds. *Capital Mobility: The Impact on Consumption, Investment and Growth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 289-328.
* Eichengreen, Barry. 2001. “Capital Account Liberalization: What Do Cross-Country Studies Tell Us?” *The World Bank Economic Review*. 15 (3): 341-365.
* Frieden, Jeffry A. 1991. “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance.” *International Organization*. 45 (4): 425-454
* Goodman, John B. and Louis W. Pauly. 1993. “Obsolescence of Capital Controls.” *World Politics* 46 (1): 50-82.
* Kastner, S. L., and C. Rector. 2003. "International Regimes, Domestic Veto-Players, and Capital Controls Policy Stability." *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (1): 1-22.
* Kastner, S. L., and C. Rector. 2005. "Partisanship and the path to financial openness." *Comparative Political Studies* 38 (5): 484-506.
* Leblang David A. 1997. “Domestic and Systemic Determinants of Capital Controls in the Developed and Developing World.” *International Studies Quarterly* 41(3): 435-454.
* Li, Quan and Dale L. Smith. 2003. “The Dilemma of Financial Liberalization: State Autonomy and Societal Demands.” *Journal of Politics* 64 (3).
* Quadrini, V. 2005. "Policy commitment and the welfare gains from capital market liberalization." *European Economic Review* 49 (8): 1927-51.
* Quinn, Dennis P. and Carla Inclán. 1997. “The Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization.” *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (3): 771-813.
* Quinn, Dennis P. 2000. “Democracy and International Financial Liberalization.” ms.
* Quinn, Dennis P. and A. Maria Toyoda. 2007. “Ideology and Voter Preferences as Determinants of Financial Globalization.” *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (2): 344-363.
* Simmons, Beth A., and Zachary Elkins. 2004. "The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy." *American Political Science Review* 98 (1): 171-89.
* Von Hagen, Jürgen and Jizhong Zhou. 2005. “The Determination of Capital Controls: Which Role Do Exchange Rate Regimes Play?” *Journal of Banking and Finance* 29 (1): 227-248.

**＜資本自由化と金融制度改革＞**

* Abiad, Abdul and Ashoka Mody. 2005. “Financial Reform: What Shakes It? What Shapes It?” *The American Economic Review* 95 (1): 66-88.
* Chinn, Menzie and Hiro Ito. 2006. “What Matters for Financial Development? Capital Controls, Institutions, and Interactions.” *Journal of Development Economics* 81: 163-92.
* Culpepper, Pepper D. 2005. “Institutional Change in Contemporary Capitalism: Coordinated Financial Systems Since 1990.” *World Politics* 57: 173-99.
* Deeg, Richard and Sophia Perez. 2000. “International Capital Mobility and Domestic Institutions: Corporate Finance and Governance in Four European Cases.” *Governance* 13 (2): 119-154.
* Edey, Malcom, and Ketil Hviding. 1995. “An Assessment of Financial Reform in OECD Countries.” *OECD Economics Department Working Papers* 154.
* Vives, X. 2006. "Banking and regulation in emerging markets: The role of external discipline." *World Bank Research Observer* 21 (2): 179-206.
* Way, Christopher R. 2005. “Political Insecurity and the Diffusion of Financial Market Regulation.” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. 598: 125-44.

**＜通貨政策の規定要因＞**

* Berger, Helge, Jan-Egbert Strum, Jakob de Haan. 2001. “Capital Controls and Exchange Rate Regimes: An Empirical Investigation.” *CESifo Working Paper* 433.
* Bernhard, William and David Leblang. 1999. “Democratic Institutions and Exchange-rate Commitments.” *International Organization* 53 (1): 71-97.
* Broz, J. Lawrence. 2002. “Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes.” *International Organization*. 56 (4): 169-195.
* Broz, J. Lawrence, Jeffry Frieden, and Stephen Weymouth. 2008. "Exchange Rate Policy Attitudes: Direct Evidence from Survey Data." *Imf Staff Papers* 55 (3):417-44Hausmann, Ricardo, Ugo Panizza, Ernesto Stein. 2000. “Why Do Countries Float the Way they Float?” *Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper* 481.
* Eichengreen, Barry and Raul Razo-Garcia. 2006. “The Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes.” *Economic Policy* (July): 393-422.
* Fritz-Krockow, Berhnard and Emilia Magdalena Jurzyk. 2004. “Will You Buy My Peg? The Credibility of a Fixed Rate Regime as a Determinant of Bilateral Trade.” *IMF Working Paper* 04-065.
* Hallerberg, Mark. 2002. “Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions.” *International Organization* 56 (4): 83-110.
* Klein, Michael W. and Jay C. Shambaugh. 2004. “Fixed Exchange Rates and Trade.” *NBER Working Paper* 10690.
* Shambaugh, George E. 2004.”The Power of Money: Global Capital and Policy Choices in Developing Countries.” American Journal of Political Science 48 (2): 281-95.

**＜通貨統合・通貨協力の規定要因＞**

* Burdekin, Richard C. K., Jilleen R Westbrook and Thomas D. Willett. 1994. “Exchange Rate Pegging as a Disinflationary Strategy: Evidence from the European Monetary System,” in Pierre L. Siklos (eds.), *Varieties of Monetary Reforms: Lessons and Experiences on the Road to Monetary Union* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers), 45-72.
* Cooper, Scott. 2007. “Why Doesn’t Regional Monetary Cooperation Follow Trade Cooperation?” *Review of International Political Economy* 14 (4): 626-652.
* Dyson, Kenneth, Kevin Featherstone and George Michalopoulos. 1995. “Strapped to the Mast: EC Central Bankers Between Global Financial Markets and Regional Integration.” *Journal of European Public Policy* 2 (3): 465-487.
* Eichengreen, Barry and Jeffry Frieden.1994. “The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification: An Analytical Introduction,” in Barry Eichengreen and Jeffry Frieden (eds,), *The Political Economy of European Monetary Integration* (Boulder Co: Westview Press).
* Henning, C. Randall. 1998. “Systemic Conflict and Regional Monetary Integration: The Case of Europe.” *International Organization* 52 (3): 537-573.
* Rose, Andrew K. 2000. “One Money, One Market: The Effect of Common Currencies on Trade.” *Economic Policy* 30 (1): 7-45.
* Rotte, Ralph. “International Commitment and Domestic Politics: The Maastricht Case.” *European Journal of International Relations* 4 (1): 131-142.
* Stasavage, D., and D. Guillaume. 2002. "When are monetary commitments credible? Parallel agreements and the sustainability of currency unions." *British Journal of Political Science* 32:119-46.
* Walsh, James I. 1994.“International Constraints and Domestic Choices.” *Political Studies* 42 (2)

**第８週　通貨政策・金融危機の国内・国際要因**

論点：金融危機発生の政治的要因がIMFの支援の発動や国際金融規制の展開をどのように規定しているのか？

1. Leblang, David and William Bernhard. 2000. “The Politics of Speculative Attacks in Industrialized Democracies.” *International Organization* 54 (2): 291-324.
2. Singer, David Andrew. 2004. “Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics of International Regulatory Harmonization.” *International Organization* 58: 531-565.
3. Nooruddin, Irfan and Joel W. Simmons. 2006. “The Politics of Hard Choices: IMF Programs and Government Spending.” *International Organization* 60 (4): 1001-1033.
4. Keefer, Philip. 2007. “Elections, Special Interests, and Financial Crisis.” *International Organization* 61: 607-641.

**＜資本自由化の帰結＞**

* Arteta, Carlos, Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz. 2001. “When Does Capital Account Liberalization Help More Than it Hurts?” *NBER Working Paper* 8414
* Bekeart, Geert, Campbell R. Harvey and Christian Lundblad. 2001. “Does Liberalization Spur Growth?” *NBER Working Paper* 8245
* Desai, Milir A., C. Fritz Foley and James R. Hines Jr. 2004. “Capital Controls, Liberalizations, and Foreign Direct Investment.” *NBER Working Paper* 10337.
* De Santis, Roberto A. and Paul Ehling. 2007. “Do International Portfolio Investors Follow Firm’s Foreign Investment Decisions?” ECB Working Paper Series, No. 815.
* Edison, Hali J et al. 2002. “Capital Account Liberalization and Economic Performance: Survey and Synthesis.” *NBER Working Paper* 9100
* Edwards, Sebastian. 2001. “Capital Mobility and Economic Performance: Are Emerging Economies Different?” *NBER Working Paper* 8076
* Edwards, Sebastian. 2005. “Capital Controls, Sudden Stops and Current Account Reversals.” *NBER Working Paper* 11170
* Fratzscher, Marcel and Matthieu Bussiere. 2004. “Financial Openness and Growth: Short-run Gain, Long-run Pain.” *European Central Bank Working Paper Series* 348
* Kaminsky, Garciela Laura and Sergio L. Schmukler. 2003. “Short-run Pain, Long-run Gain: The Effects of Financial Liberalization.” *IMF Working Paper* 03-34
* Moore, Will H. and Bumba Mukherjee. 2006. “Coalition Government Formation and Foreign Exchange Markets: Theory and Evidence from Europe.” *International Studies Quarterly* 50: 93–118.
* Quinn, D. P., and A. M. Toyoda. 2008. "Does capital account liberalization lead to growth ?" *Review of Financial Studies* 21 (3): 1403-49.

**＜金融危機の規定要因＞**

* Domaç, Ilker and Maria Soledad Martinez Peria. 2000. “Banking Crises and Exchange Rate Regimes: Is There a Link?” Working Paper No. 2489 (The World Bank).
* Eichengreen, Barry, Andrew K. Rose and Chares Wyposz. 1995. “Exchange Rate Mayhem: The Antecedents and Aftermath of Speculative Attacks.” *Economic Policy* (1995): 251-312.
* Fontaine, Thomson. 2005. “Currency Crisis in Developed and Emerging Market Economies: A Comparative Empirical Treatment.” *IMF Working Paper* 05-03
* Hong, Kiseok and Aaron Tornell. 2005. “Recovery from a Currency Crisis: Some Stylized Facts.” *Journal of Development Economic,* 76 (1): 71-86.
* Irwin, Gregor and David Vines. 2003. “Government Guarantees, Investment, and Vulnerability to Financial Crises.” *Review of International Economics* 11 (5): 860-874.
* Kaminski, Graciela L. and Carmen M. Reinhart. 1999. “The Twin Crises: The Causing of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems.” *American Economic Review* 89 (3): 473-500.
* Kaminsky, Graciela L., Carmen M. Reinhart and Carlos A. Vegh. 2003. “The Unholy Trinity of Financial Contagion.” NBER Working Paper 10061.
* Kaminsk, Graciela L.2006. “Currency Crises: Are They All the Same?” *Journal of International Money and Finance* 25:503-527.
* Keefer, Philip. 2007. “Elections, Special Interests, and Financial Crisis.” *International Organization* 61: 607-641Leblang, David and William Bernhard. 2000. “The Politics of Speculative Attacks in Industrialized Democracies.” *International Organization* 54 (2): 291-324.
* Leaven, Luc, Daniela Klingebiel and Randy Kroszner. 2002. “Financial Crises, Financial Dependence, and Industry Growth.” World Bank Research Working Paper 2855
* Leblang, David and Shanker Satyanath. 2006. “Institutions, Expectations, and Currency Crises.” *International Organization* 60: 245-262.
* Montinola, Gabriella R. 2003. “Who Recovers First? Banking Crises Resolution in Developing Countries.” *Comparative Political Studies* 36 (5): 541-574.
* Rosas, Guillermo. 2006. “Bagehot or Bailout? An Analysis of Government Responses to Banking Crises.” *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (1): 175-191.
* Tornell, Aaron, Frank Westermann and Lorenza Martinez. 2004. “The Positive Link Between Financial Liberalization, Growth and Crises.” *NBER Working Paper* 10293.

**＜金融危機とＩＭＦ＞**

* Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee. 2005. “IMF Programs: Who is Chosen and What Are the Effects?” *Journal of Monetary Economics* 52: 1245-1269
* Bird, Graham, and Dane Rowlands. 2007. "The IMF and the Mobilisation of Foreign Aid." *Journal of Development Studies* 43 (5): 856-70.
* Brune, Nancy, Geoffrey Garrett, and Bruce Kogut.2004. “The International Monetary Fund and the Global Spread of Privatization.” *IMF Staff Papers* 51 (2): 195-219.
* Dreher, Axel and Roland Vaubel.2004. “The Causes and Consequences of IMF Conditionality.” *Emerging Markets Finance and Trade* 40 (3): 26-54.
* Dreher, Axel and Roland Vaubel. 2004. “Do IMF and IBRD Cause Moral Hazard and Political Business Cycles? Evidence from Panel Data.” *Open Economies Review* 15: 5-22.
* Dreher, Axel. 2006. “IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance with Conditionality.” *World Development*  34 (5): 769-788.
* Dreher, Axel and Nathan M. Jensen. 2007. “Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions.” *Journal of Law and Economics* 50:105-124.
* Gould, Erica R. 2003. “Money Talks: Supplementary Financiers and International Monetary Fund Conditionality.” *International Organization* 57: 551-586.
* Grieco, Joseph M. Christopher F. Gelpi, and T. Camber Warren. 2009. “When Preferences and Commitments Collide: The Effect of Relative Partisan Shifts on International Treaty Compliance.” *International Organization* 63 (Spring): 341-355.
* Jensen, Nathan M. 2004.“Crisis, Conditions, and Capital: The Effect of Monetary Fund Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment Inflows” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (2): 194-210.
* Kan, Seonjou. 2007. “Agree to Reform? The Political Economy of Conditionality Variation in International Monetary Fund Lending, 1983-1997.” *European Journal of Political Research*  46: 685-720Jensen, Nathan M. 2004.“Crisis, Conditions, and Capital: The Effect of Monetary Fund Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment Inflows.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (2): 194-210.
* Mayer, Wolfgang, and Alexandros Mourmouras. 2005. "The Political Economy of IMF Conditionality: A Common Agency Model." *Review of Development Economics* 9 (4): 449-66.
* Mody, Ashoka, and Diego Saravia. 2006. "Catalysing Private Capital Flows: Do IMF Programmes Work as Commitment Devices?" *Economic Journal* 116: 843-67.
* Pop-Eleches, Grigore. 2008. “Crisis in the Eye of the Beholder: Economic Crisis and Partisan Politics in Latin America and East European International Monetary Fund Programs.” *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (9): 1179-1211.
* Przeworski, Adam and Jamse Raymond Vreeland 2000. “The Effect of IMF Programs on Economic Growth.” *Journal of Development Economics* 62: 385-421.
* Stone, R. W. 2008. "The Scope of IMF Conditionality." *International Organization* 62 (4): 589-620Thacker, Strom C. 1999.“The High Politics of IMF Lending.” *World Politics* 52: 38-75.
* Vreeland, James Raymond. 2003.“Why Do Governments and the IMF Enter into Agreements? Statistically Selected Cases.” *International Political Science Review* 24 (3): 321-343.

**＜国際金融規制＞**

* Barajas, Adolfo Ralph Chami, and Thomas Cosimano. 2005. “Did the Basel Accord Cause a Credit Slowdown in Latin America.” *IMF Working Paper* WP-05-38
* Bernauer, Thomas, and Vally Koubi. 2006. “On the Interconnectedness of Regulatory Policy and Markets: Lessons from Banking.” *British Journal of Political Science* 36:509-525.
* Decamps, Jean-Paul, Jean-Charles Rochet, and Benoit Roger. 2004. "The Three Pillars of Basel II: Optimizing the Mix." *Journal of Financial Intermediation* 13:132-55.
* Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, Enrica Detragiache, and Thierry Tressel. 2006. "Banking on the Principles: Compliance with Basel Core Principles and Bank Soundness." In *IMF Working Paper*.
* Holdausen, Cornelia and Thomas Rende. 2004. “Cooperation in International Banking Supervision.” *European Central Bank Working Paper* no. 316
* Kapstein, Ethan B. 1989. “Resolving the Regulator’s Dilemma: International Coordination of Banking Regulations.” *International Organization* 43 (2): 454-478.
* Jacques, Kevin T. 2008. "Capital Shocks, Bank Asset Allocation, and the Revised Basel Accord." *Review of Financial Economics* 17 (2): 79-91King, Michael R.and Thimothy J. Sinclair. 2003. "Private Actors and Public Policy: A Requiem for the New Basel Capital Accord." *International Political Science Review* 24 (3): 345-62.
* Oatley, Thomas and Robert Nabors. 1998. “Redistributive Cooperation: Market Failure, Welfare Transfers, and the Basle Accord.” *International Organization* 52 (1): 55-86.
* Posner, Elliot. 2009. “Making Rules for Global Finance: Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation at the Turn of the Millennium.” *International Organization* 63 (Fall): 665-699.
* Pagno, Marco, and Paolo Volpin. 2001. “The Political Economy of Finance.” *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 17 (4): 502-519.
* Quaglia, L. 2007. "The politics of financial services regulation and supervision reform in the European Union." *European Journal of Political Research* 46 (2): 269-90.
* Quaglia, L. 2008. "Explaining the reform of banking supervision in Europe: An integrative approach." *Governance* 21 (3): 439-63.
* Quinn, Dennis. 1997.“The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation.” *American Political Science Review* 91 (3): 531-551.
* Simmons, Beth A. 2000. “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs.” *American Political Science Review* 94 (4): 819-835.
* Simmons, Beth A. 2001. “The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation.” *International Organization* 55 (3): 589-620.
* von Thadden, E. L. 2004. "Bank Capital Adequacy Regulation under the New Basel Accord." *Journal of Financial Intermediation* 13: 90-95.

**III. 経済国際化と国内対応の政治経済**

**第９週　資本移動と財政金融政策**

論点：国際的資本移動が、そのように民主的・党派的経済政策を制約しているのか？

1. Oatley, Thomas. 1999. “How Constraining is Capital Mobility? The Partisan Hypothesis in an Open Economy.” *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (4): 1003-1027.
2. Boix, Carles. 2000. “Partisan Governments, the International Economy, and Macroeconomic Polices in Advanced Nations, 1960-93.” *World Politics* 53 (1): 38-73.
3. Cusack, Thomas R. 2001.“Partisanship in the Setting and Coordination of Fiscal and Monetary Policies.” *European Journal of Political Research*. 40:93-115.
4. Swank, Duane. 2006. “Tax Policy in an Era of Internationalization: Explaining the Spread of Neoliberalism.” *International Organization* 60 (4): 847-882.

**＜資本移動と財政金融政策＞**

* Andrews, David M. 1994. “Capital Mobility and State Autonomy.” *International Studies Quarterly* 38 (2): 193-218.
* Annett A. 2002. “Politics, Government Size, and Fiscal Adjustment in Industrial Countries.” *IMF Working Papers* 02-162.
* Bearce, David. 2002. “Monetary Divergence: Domestic Political Institutions and the Monetary Autonomy-Exchange Rate Stability Trade-Off.” *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (2): 194-220.
* Boltho, A., and A. Glyn. 2006. "Prudence or profligacy: Deficits, debt, and fiscal consolidation." *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 22 (3): 411-25.
* Burdekin, Richard C. K., Jilleen R Westbrook and Thomas D. Willett. 1994. “Exchange Rate Pegging as a Disinflationary Strategy: Evidence from the European Monetary System.” in Pierre L. Siklos (eds.), *Varieties of Monetary Reforms: Lessons and Experiences on the Road to Monetary Union* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers), 45-72.
* Clark, William Robert et.al. 1998. “International and Domestic Constraints on Political Business Cycles in OECD Economies.” *International Organization* 51 (1): 87-120.
* Clark, William Robert and Mark Hallerberg. 2000. “Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electoral Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy.” *American Political Science Review* 94 (2): 323-346.
* Corsetti, Giancarlo and Gernot J. Muller. 2006. “Twin Deficits: Squaring Theory, Evidence and Common Sense.” *Economic Policy* 48:597-638.
* Crepaz, M. M. L., and A. W. Moser. 2004. "The impact of collective and competitive veto points on public expenditures in the global age." Comparative Political Studies 37 (3): 259-85.
* Cusack, Thomas R. 1999. “Partisan Politics and Fiscal Policy.” *Comparative Political Studies*. 32 (4): 464-484.
* Dreher, A., J. E. Sturm, and H. W. Ursprung. 2008. "The impact of globalization on the composition of government expenditures: Evidence from panel data." *Public Choice* 134 (3-4): 263-92.
* Eichengreen, Barry and Charles Wypolz. 1998. “The Stability Pact: More than a Minor Nuisance?” *Economic Policy* 26: 65-113.
* Frankel, Jeffrey A. 2004. “Managing Macroeconomic Crises.” *NBER Working Paper* 10907.
* Hallerberg, Mark. 2004. *Domestic Budgets in a United Europe: Fiscal governance from the end of Bretton Woods to EMU* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press)
* Kumar, Manmahon S. Kumar, Daniel Leigh, and Alexander Plekhanov. 2007. “Fiscal Adjustments: Determinants and Macroeconomic Consequences.” *IMF Working Paper* 07-178.
* Li, Quan. 2001. “Commitment Compliance in G-7 Summit Macroeconomic Policy Coordination.” *Political Research Quarterly* 54 (2): 355-378.
* Satyanath, Shanker and Arvind Subramanian. 2004. “What Determines Long-ran Macroeconomic Stability? Democratic Institutions.” IMF Working Paper 04-215
* Way, Christopher. 2000. “Central Banks, Partisan Politics, and Macroeconomic Outcomes.” *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (2): 196-224.
* Webb, Michael C. 1991. “International Economic Structures, Government Interests, and International Coordination of Macroeconomic Adjustment Policies.” *International Organization* 45 (3): 309-342.
* Weber, Axel A.1996. “Foreign Exchange Intervention and International Policy Coordination: Comparing the G3 and EMS Expernience.” in Matthew B. Canzoneri et al. (eds,), *The Transatlantic Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
* Zohlnhofer, Reimut, Herbert Obinger, and Frieder Wolf. 2008.“Partisan Politics, Globalization, and the Determinants of Privatization Proceeds in Advanced Democracies (1990-2000).” *Governance* 21 (1): 95-122.

**＜資本移動と税制改革＞**

* Bretschger, Lucas, and Frank Hettich. 2002. “Globalisation, Capital Mobility and Tax Competition: Theory and evidence for OECD countries.” *European Journal of Political Economy* 18: 695-716.
* Cusack, Thomas R., and Pablo Beramendi. 2006. “Taxing Work.” *European Journal of Political Research* 45: 43-73.
* Daveri, Francsco and Guido Tabellini. 2000. “Unemployment, Growth and Taxation in Industrial Countires.” *Economic Policy* 30: 49-104.
* Devereux, Michael P., Rachel Griffith, and Alexander Klemm. 2002. “Corporate Income Tax Reforms and International Tax Competition.” *Economic Policy* 35: 451-495.
* Garrett, Geoffrey and Deborah Mitchell. 2001. “Globalization, Government Spending and Taxation in the OECD.” *European Journal of Political Research* 39: 145-177.
* Griffith, Rachel, and Alexander Klemm. 2004. “What Has Been the Tax Competition Experience of the Last 20 Years.” *IFS Working Paper* 04-05.
* Hallerberg, Mark and Scott Basinger. 1998. “Internationalization and Changes in Tax Policy in OECD Countries: The Importance of Domestic Veto Players.” *Comparative Political Studies*. 31 (3): 321-352
* Mosley, Layna. 2000. “Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States.” *International Organization* 54 (4): 737-73.
* Swank, Duane. 1998. “Funding the Welfare State: Globalization and the Taxation of Business in Advanced Market Economies.” *Political Studies* 46: 671-692.
* Swank, Duane. 2006. “Tax Policy in an Era of Internationalization: Explaining the Spread of Neoliberalism.” *International Organization* 60 (4): 847-882.

**第10週　緊縮的財政金融政策の国内影響（１）—構造改革**

論点：国際的資本移動が、なぜ、どの程度、生産市場や労働市場の規制緩和に帰結しているのか？

1. Garrett, Geoffry and Christopher Way. 1999. “Public Sector Unions, Corporatism, and Macroeconomic Performance.” *Comparative Political Studies* 32 (4): 411-433.
2. Pontusson, Jonas, David Rueda & Christopher R. Way 2002. “Comparative Political Economy of Wage Distribution: The Role of Partisanship and Labour Market Institutions.” *British Journal of Political Science* 32: 281-308.
3. Duval, Romain. 2008. “Is There a Role for Macroeconomic Policy in Fostering Structural Reforms? Panel evidence from OECD countries over the past two decades.” *European Journal of Political Economy* 24: 491-502.
4. Gehlbach, Scott and Edmund J. Malesky. 2010. “The Contribution of Veto Players to Economic Reform.” *Journal of Politics* 72 (4): 957-975.

 **＜賃金と雇用＞**

* Ayala, L., R. Martinez, et al. 2002. "Institutional determinants of the unemployment-earnings inequality trade-off." *Applied Economics* 34(2): 179-195.
* Esping-Andersen, Gøsta and Mario Regini (eds.) 2000.*Why Deregulate Labour Markets?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
* Garrett, Geoffrey and Peter Lange. 1995. “Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change.” *International Organization* 49 (4): 627-656.
* Iversen,Torben. 1996. “Power, Flexibility, and the Breakdown of Centralized Wage Bargaining.” *Comparative Politics* 27 (4):399-436.
* Iversen, Torben and Anne Wren. 1998. “Equality, Employment, and Budgetary Restraint: The Trilemma of the Service Economy.” *World Politics* 50 (4): 507-546.
* Kenworthy, Lane. 2003. “Do Affluent Countries Face an Incomes-Jobs Trade-Off?” *Comparative Political Studies* 36 (10) : 1180-1209.
* Kenworthy, Lane. 2004. *Egalitarian Capitalism: Jobs, Incomes, and Growth in Affluent* Countries (New York: Russell Sage Foudation).
* Kenworthy, Lane. 2008. *Jobs with Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
* Mahler, Vincent A. 2004. “Economic Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Income Inequality in the Developed Countries.” *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (9):1025-1053.
* Mares, Isabela. 2006. *Taxation, Wage Bargaining, and Unemployment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
* Mosley, Layna. 2008. “Workers’ Rights in Open Economies: Global Production and Domestic Institutions in the Developing World.” *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (4/5): 674-71
* Pontusson, Jonas. 2005. *Inequality and Prosperity; Social Europe vs. liberal America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press)
* Rueda, David and Jonas Pontusson. 2000. “Wage Inequality and Varieties of Capitalism.” *World Politics* 52 : 350-383.
* Rueda, David. 2006. “Social Democracy and Active Labor-Market Policies: Insiders, Outsiders and the Politics of Employment Protection” *British Journal of Political Science* 36 (3): 385-406.
* Schmidt, Manfred G. 1988.“The Politics of Labor Market Policy,” in F. G. Castles, F. Lehner & M. G. Schmidt, *Managing Mixed Economies* (Berlin: Water de Gruyter), 4-53.

**＜労働市場改革＞**

* Baccaro, L. and D. Rei. 2007. "Institutional Determinants of Unemployment in OECD Countries: Does the Deregulatory View Hold Water?" *International Organization* 61(3): 527-569.
* Belot, M. and J. C. van Ours 2004. "Does The Recent Success of Some OECD Countries In Lowering Their Unemployment Rates Lie in The Clever Design Of Their Labor Market Reforms?" *Oxford Economic Papers-New Series* 56 (4): 621-642.
* Bertola, Giuseppe, Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn. 2001. “Comparative Analysis of Labor Market Outcomes: Lessons for the US from International Long-run Evidence.” *NBER Working Paper Series*. 8526.
* Blanchard, O. and J. Wolfers.2000. "The Role Of Shocks And Institutions In The Rise of European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence." *Economic Journal* 110 (462): C1-C33.
* Blanchard, O. 2006. “European Unemployment: The evolution of Facts and Ideas.” *Economic Policy* 45: 5-59.
* Boeri, Tito. 2005. “Reforming Labor and Product Markets: Some Lessons from Two Decades of Experiments in Europe.” *IMF Working Paper* 05-97.
* Bradley, D. H. and J. D. Stephens. 2007. “Employment Performance In OECD Countries: A Test Of Neoliberal and Institutionalist Hypotheses.” *Comparative Political Studies* 40(12): 1486-1510.
* Elmeskov, Jørgen, John P. Martin, and Stefano Scarpetta.1998. “Key Lessons for Labour Market Reforms: Evidence from OECD Countries’ Experience.” *Swedish Economic Policy Review* 5:505-252.
* Faggio, Giulia and Stephen Nickell. 2007. “Patterns of Work Across the OECD.” *The Economic Journal*. 117: F416-F440.
* Fitoussi, Jean-Paul, David Jestaz, Edmund S. Phelps and Gylfi Zoega. 2000. “Roots of the Recent Recoveries: Labor Reforms or Private Sector Forces?” *Brookings Papers on Economic Activities* 1: 237-311.
* Howell, D. R., Ed. 2005. *Fighting Unemployment: The Limits of Free Market Orthodoxy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
* Mosley, Layna. 2008. “Workers’ Rights in Open Economies: Global Production and Domestic Institutions in the Developing World.” *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (4/5): 674-71
* Nickell, Stephen, Luca Nunziata and Wolfgang Ochel. 2005 “Unemployment in the OECD Since the 1960s, What Do We Know?” *The Economic Journal* 115: 1-27.
* Saint-Paul, G. 2004. "Why Are European Countries Diverging in Their Unemployment Experience?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18(4): 49-68.
* Scarpetta, S. 1996. "Assessing the Role of Labour Market Policies and Institutional Settings on Unemployment: A Cross-country Study." *OECD Economic Studies* 26: 43-98.

**＜構造改革＞**

* Alesina, Alberto, Silvia Ardagna, and Vincenzo Galasso. “The Euro and Structural Reforms.” *NBER Working Paper Series* 14479.
* Belke, Ansgar, Bernhard Herz, and Lukas Vogel. 2007. “Reforms, Exchange Rates and Monetary Commitment: A Panel Analysis for OECD Countries.” *Oxford Economic Review* 18: 369-88.
* Brooks, Sarah M., and Marcus J. Kurtz. 2007. “Capital, Trade, and the Political Economy.” *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (4): 703–720
* Desai, Raj M. 2006. “Political Constraints and Pubic Support for Market Reform.” *IMF Staff Papers* 53 (Special issue): 92-114.
* Duval, Romain. Jørgem Elmeskov. 2005. “The Effects of EMU on Structural Reforms in Labor and Product Markets.” *OECD Economics Department Working Papers* 438.
* Duval, Romain, and Lukas Vogel. 2008. “Economic Resilience to Shocks: The Role of Structural Policies.” *OECD Economic Studies* 44-1: 1-38.
* Fiori, Giuseppe, Giuseppe Nicoletti, Stefano Scarpetta, and Fabio Schiantarelli. 2007. “Employment Outcomes and the Interaction between Product and Labor Market Deregulation: Are they substitutes or complements?” *IZA Discussion Paper Series* 2770.
* Griffith, Rachel, Rupert Harrison, and Gareth Macartney. 2007. “Product Market Reforms, Labor Market Institutions and Unemployment.” 2007. “*The Economic Journal* 117 (March): C142-C166.
* Henisz, Witold J., Bennet A. Zelner, and Mauro F. Guillén. 2005. “The Worldwide Diffusion of Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reform, 1977-1999.” *American Sociological Review* 70 (December): 871-97.
* Høj, Jens, Vincenzo Galasso, Giuseppe Nicoletti, and Thai-Thanh Dang. 2006. “The Political Economy of Structural Reform.” *OECD Economics Department Working Papers* 501.
* Kennedy, Mike, and Torsten Sløk. 2005. “Structural Policy Reforms and External Imbalances.” *OECD Economics Department Working Papers* 415.
* Nicoletti, Giuseppe, Stave Golub, Dana Hajkova, Daniel Mirza, and Kwang-Yeol Yoo. 2003. “Politics and International Integration: Influences on Trade and Foreign Direct Investment.” *OECD Economics Department Working Papers* 359.
* Pitlik, Hans, and Steffen Writh. 2003. “Do Crisis Promote the Extent of Economic Liberalization? An Empirical Test.” *European Journal of Political Economy* 19: 565-81.
* Pitlik, Hans. 2007. “A Race to Liberalization? Diffusion of economic policy reform among OECD economies.” *Public Choice* 132: 159-178.
* Uprelainen, Johannes. 2010. “Regulation under Economic Globalization.” *International Studies Quarterly* 54: 1099-1121.

**第11週　緊縮的財政金融政策の国内影響（２）—社会福祉改革**

論点：国際的資本移動による財政政策が、なぜ、どの程度、社会保障政策の再編に帰結しているのか？

1. Korpi, Walter and Joakim Palme 2003. “New Politics and Class Politics in the Context of Austerity and Globalization: Welfare State Regress in 18 Countries, 1975-95.” *American Political Science Review* 97 (3): 425-446.
2. Allan, James P. and Lyle Scruggs. 2004. “Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in Advanced Industrial Societies.” *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (3): 496-512.
3. Hicks, Alexander, and Christopher Zorn 2005. “Economic Globalization, the Macro Economy, and Reversals of Welfare: Expansion in Affluent Democracies, 1978-94.” *International Organization* 59 (3): 631-662.
4. Lupu, Noam, and Jonas Pontusson. 2011. “The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution.” *American Political Science Review* 105 (2): 316- 336.
* Alesina, Alberto and Silvia Ardagna. 1998. “Tales of Fiscal Adjustment.” *European Policy* 489-545
* Bradley, David, Evelyne Huber, Stephanie Moller, François Nielsen, and John D. Stephens. 2003. “Distribution and Redistribution in Postindustrial Democracies.” *World Politics* 55: 193-228.
* Castles, Francis G. 2002.“Developing New Measures of Welfare State Change.” *European Journal of Political Research* 41:613-641.
* Clayton, Richard and Jonas Pontusson. 1998. “Welfare-State Retrenchement Revisited.” *World Politics* 51 (1): 67-98
* Huber, Evelyne and John D. Stephens. 2001.*Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets* (Chicago: Chicago University Press), Chapters 6-7.
* Kittle, Bernhard and Herbert Oblinger. 2003. “Political Parties, Institutions, and the Dynamics of Social Expenditure in Times of Austerity.” *Journal of European Public Policy* 10 (1): 20-45.
* Martin, Cathie Jo. 2004. “Reinventing Welfare Regimes.” *World Politics* 57: 39-69.
* Mosley, Layna. 2000. “Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States.” *International Organization* 54 (4): 737-773.
* Pierson, Paul. 1996. “The New Politics of the Welfare State.” *World Politics* 48 (2) :143-179.
* Pierson, Paul. 1998. “Irresistible Forces, Immovable Objects: Post-industrial Welfare States Confront Permanent Austerity.’ *Journal of European Public Policy* 5 (4):539-560.
* Pierson, Paul. 2001. “Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies.” in Paul Pierson (eds.), *The New Politics of the Welfare State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 410-456.
* Sharpf, Fritz W. 2000.“The Viability of Advanced Welfare States in the International Economy: Vulnerabilities and Options.” *Journal of European Public Policy* 7 (2) : 190-228.
* Swank, Duane. 1998. “Funding the Welfare State: Globalization and the Taxation of Business in Advanced Market Economies.” *Political Studies* 46: 671-692.
* Swank, Duane and Cathie Jo Martin.2001. “Employers and the Welfare State: The Political Economic Organization of Firms and Social Policy in Contemporary Capitalist Democracies.” *Comparative Political Studies* 34 (8): 889-923.
* Timmons, Jeffrey F. 2010. “Does Democracy Reduce Economic Inequality?” *British Journal of Political Science* 40: 741-757.
* Zeitlin, Jonathan and David M. Trubek eds. 2003.*Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy: European and American Experiments* (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

**IV　国際化対応の政治的帰結**

**第12週　経済改革と政権存続**

論点：国際的資本移動による経済改革要請が民主的統治にどのような影響を与えているのか？

1. Hellwig, Timothy. 2008. “Globalization, Policy Constraints, and Vote Choice.” *Journal of Politics* 79 (4): 1128-1141.
2. Buti, Marco, Alessandro Turrini, Paul Vand den Noord and Pietro Biroli. 2010. “Reforms and Reelections” *Economic Policy* (January): 61-116.
3. Haupt, Andrea B. 2010. "Parties' Responses to Economic Globalization: What is Left for the Left and Right for the Right?" *Party Politics* 16(1): 5-27.
4. Ward, Hugh, Lawrence Ezrow, and Han Dorussen. 2011. “Globalization, Party Positions, and the Median Voter.” *World Politics* 63 (3): 509-547.
* Alesina, Alberto, Carloni, and Lecce. 2011. “The Electoral Consequences of Large Fiscal Adjustments.” *NBER Working Paper Series* 17655.
* Alesina, Alberto, Silvia Ardagna, and Vincenzo Galasso 2008. “The Euro and Structural Reforms.” *NBER Working Paper Series* 14479.
* Brender, Adi, and Allan Drazen. 2007. “Electoral Fiscal Policy in New, Old and Fragile Democracies.” *Comparative Economic Studies* 49: 446–466.
* Brender, Adi, and Allan Drazen. 2007. “Consolidation of New Democracy, Mass Attitudes, and Clientelism.” *American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 99* (2): 304-309.
* Brender, Adi, and Allan Drazen. 2008. How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries.” *American Economic Review 98* (5): 2203-2220.
* Duch, Raymond M. and Randolph T. Stevenson. 2010. “The Global Economy, Competency, and the Economic Vote.” *The Journal of Politics* 72-1: 105-123.
* Ezrow, Lawrence, Catherine De Vries, Marco Steenbergen, Erica Edwards. 2010. “Mean Voter Representation and Partisan Constituency: Do Parties Respond to the Mean Voter Position or to Their Supporters.” *Party Politics* 17(3): 275-301.
* Ezrow, Lawrence and Timothy Hellwig. 2011. “*Globalization and Party Responsiveness in Established Democracies*.” Paper prepared European Consortium for Political Research General Conference, Reykjavik.
* Galasso, Vincenzo. 2010. “The Role of Political Partisanship During Economic Crisis” *CEPR Discussion Paper* 7834.
* Hellwig, Timothy. 2001. “Interdependence, Government Constraints, and Economic Voting.” *Journal of Politics* 63(4): 1141-1162.
* Hellwig, Timothy. 2007. “Globalization and Perceptions of Policymaker Competence: Evidence from France.” *Political Research Quarterly* 60(1): 146-58.
* Hellwig, Timothy and David Samuels. 2010. “Elections and Accountability for the. Economy: A Conceptual and Empirical Reassessment.” *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties* 20(4): 393-419.
* Hicken, Allen, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti 2005. “Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Effects of Accountablity and Obstacles to Policy Change.” *American Journal of Political Science* 49-4: 897-907.
* Li, Quan, and Rafael Reueny. 2003. “Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis.” *British Journal of Political Science* 33: 29-54.
* Murillo, Maria Victoria, and Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo. 2007. “Political Competition and Policy Adoption: Market Reforms in Latin American Public Utilities.” *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (1): 120–139
* Quinn, Dennis P. 2000. “Democracy and International Financial Liberalization.” ms.
* Shi, M., and J. Svensson. 2006. "Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?" *Journal of Public Economics* 90 (8-9): 1367-89
* Singer, Matthew M. 2011. “Who Says ‘It's the Economy’? Cross-National and Cross-Individual Variation in the Salience of Economic Performance.” *Comparative Political Studies* 44 (3): 384-312
* Soroka, Stuart N. and Christoper Wlezien. 2010. *Degrees of Democracy: Politics, public opinion, and policy* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press).
* Steenbergen, Marco R., Erica E. Edwards, and Catherine E. de Vries. 2007. “Who’s Cueing Whom? Mass-Elite Linkages and the Future of European Integration.” *European Union Politics* 8 (1): 13-35.
* Tilley, James and Sara B. Hobolt. 2011. “Is the Government to Blame? An Experimental Test of How Partisanship Shapes Perceptions of Performance and Responsibility.” *The Journal of Politics* 73 (2): 1-15

**V　経済国際化と経済外交**

**第13週　経済援助の政治経済**

1. Alesina, Alberto and David Dollar. 2000. “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” *Journal of Economic Growth* 5: 33-63.
2. Berthelemy, Jean-Claude. 2006. Bilateral Donors’ Interest vs. Recipients’ Development Motives in Aid Allocation: Do All Donors Behave the Same?” *Review of Development Economics* 10(2): 179-194.
3. Dollar, David and Victoria Levin. 2006. “The Increasing Selectivity of Foreign Aid, 1984-2003.” *World Development* 24 (12): 2034-2046.
4. Younas, J. 2008. "Motivation for bilateral aid allocation: Altruism or trade benefits." *European Journal of Political Economy* 24 (3): 661-74.

**＜援助効果＞**

* + Arvin, B. M., and F. Barillas. 2002. "Foreign aid, poverty reduction, and democracy." *Applied Economics* 34 (17): 2151-6.
	+ Agenor, P. R., N. Bayraktar, and K. El Aynaoui. 2008. "Roads out of poverty? Assessing the links between aid, public investment, growth, and poverty reduction." *Journal of Development Economics* 86 (2): 277-95.
	+ Banerjee, S. G., and D. A. Rondinelli. 2003. "Does foreign aid promote privatization? Empirical evidence from developing countries." *World Development* 31 (9): 1527-48.
* Boschini, Anne and Anders Olofsgård. 2007. “Foreign Aid: An Instrument for Fighting Communism?” *Journal of Developmental Studies* 43 (4): 622-648.
	+ Bulir, A., and A. J. Hamann. 2003. "Aid volatility: An empirical assessment." *Imf Staff Papers* 50 (1): 64-89.
	+ Burhop, C. 2005. "Foreign assistance and economic development: a re-evaluation." *Economics Letters* 86 (1): 57-61.
* Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar. 2000. "Aid, Policies, and Growth." *American Economic Review* 90 (4): 847-415.
	+ Cassimon, D., and B. Van Campenhout. 2007. "Aid effectiveness, debt relief and public finance response: Evidence from a panel of HIPC countries." *Review of World Economics* 143 (4): 742-63.
	+ Collier, P., and D. Dollar. 2001. "Can the world cut poverty in half? How policy reform and effective aid can meet international development goals." *World Development* 29 (11): 1787-802.
	+ Collier, P., and D. Dollar. 2002. "Aid allocation and poverty reduction." *European Economic Review* 46 (8): 1475-500.
	+ Collier, P., and D. Dollar. 2004. "Development effectiveness: What have we learnt?" *Economic Journal* 114 (496): F244-F71.
	+ Collier, P., and A. Hoeffler. 2007. "Unintended consequences: Does aid promote arms races?" *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 69 (1): 1-27.
	+ Cordella, T., and G. Dell'Ariccia. 2002. "Limits of conditionality in poverty reduction programs." *Imf Staff Papers* 49: 68-86.
	+ Dalgaard, C. J., and H. Hansen. 2001. "On aid, growth and good policies." *Journal of Development Studies* 37 (6): 17-+.Fayissa, B., and M. I. El-Kaissy. 1999. "Foreign aid and the economic growth of developing countries (LDCs): Further evidence." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 34 (3): 37-50.
	+ Dalgaard, C. J., H. Hansen, and F. Tarp. 2004. "On the empirics of foreign aid and growth." *Economic Journal* 114 (496): F191-F216.
	+ Dalgaard, C. J. 2008. "Donor policy rules and aid effectiveness." *Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control* 32 (6): 1895-920.
	+ Easterly, W. 2002. "How did heavily indebted poor countries become heavily indebted? Reviewing two decades of debt relief." *World Development* 30 (10): 1677-96.
	+ Easterly, W. 2003. "Can foreign aid buy growth?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17 (3): 23-48.
* Easterly, William, Ross Levine, and David Roodman. 2003. "New Data, New Doubts: Revisiting 'Aid, Policies, and Growth'." In *World Bank Working Paper* 26.
	+ Economides, G., S. Kalyvitis, and A. Philippopoulos. 2008. "Does foreign aid distort incentives and hurt growth? Theory and evidence from 75 aid-recipient countries." *Public Choice* 134 (3-4): 463-88.
	+ Elbadawi, I. A., L. Kaltani, and K. Schmidt-Hebbel. 2008. "Foreign aid, the real exchange rate, and economic growth in the aftermath of civil wars." *World Bank Economic Review* 22 (1): 113-40.
* Finkel, Steven E., Aníbal Pérez-Linán, and Mitchella A. Seligson. 2007. “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2003.” *World Politics* 59: 404-439.
	+ Guillaumont, P., and L. Chauvet. 2001. "Aid and performance: A reassessment." *Journal of Development Studies* 37 (6): 66-+.
* Heckelman, Jac C. and Stephen Knack. 2008. “Foreign Aid and Market-Liberalizing Reform.” *Economica* 75:524-548.
	+ Hansen, H., and F. Tarp. 2001. "Aid and growth regressions." *Journal of Development Economics* 64 (2): 547-70.
	+ Harms, P., and M. Lutz. 2006. "Aid, governance and private foreign investment: Some puzzling findings for the 1990s." *Economic Journal* 116 (513): 773-90.
	+ Islam, M. N. 2005. "Regime changes, economic policies and the effect of aid on growth." *Journal of Development Studies* 41 (8): 1467-92.
	+ Jain, S. 2007. "Project assistance versus budget support: An incentive-theoretic analysis of aid conditionality." *Review of World Economics* 143 (4): 694-719.
* Knack, Stephen. 2004. “Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?” *International Studies Quarterly* 48: 251-266.
	+ Kosack, S. 2003. "Effective aid: How democracy allows development aid to improve the quality of life." *World Development* 31 (1): 1-22.
	+ Kosack, S., and J. Tobin. 2006. "Funding self-sustaining development: The role of aid, FDI and government in economic success." *International Organization* 60 (1): 205-43.
	+ Masud, Nadia, and Boriana Yontcheva. 2005. “Does Foreign Aid Reduce Poverty? Empirical Evidence from Nongovernmental and Bilateral Aid.” IMF Working Paper, WP-05-100.
	+ Mavrotas, G. 2002. "Foreign aid and fiscal response: Does aid disaggregation matter?" *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv-Review of World Economics* 138 (3): 534-59.
	+ Mourmouras, A., and P. Rangazas. 2007. "Foreign aid policy and sources of poverty: A quantitative framework." *Imf Staff Papers* 54 (1): 59-90.
	+ Ouattara, B. 2006. "Foreign aid and government fiscal behaviour in developing countries: Panel data evidence." *Economic Modelling* 23 (3): 506-14.
	+ Rajan, R. G., and A. Subramanian. 2008. "Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-country Evidence Really Show?" *Review of Economics and Statistics* 90 (4): 643-65.
	+ Remmer, K. L. 2004. "Does foreign aid promote the expansion of government?" *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (1): 77-92.
* Roodman, David. 2007. “The Anarchy of Numbers: Aid, Development and Cross-Country Empirics.” *The World Bank Economic Review* 21 (2): 255-277.
	+ Schwalbenberg, H. M. 1998. "Does foreign aid cause the adoption of harmful economic policies?" *Journal of Policy Modeling* 20 (5): 669-75.

**＜受入国要因＞**

* + Akram, T. 2003. "The international foreign aid regime: who gets foreign aid and how much?" *Applied Economics* 35 (11): 1351-6.
* Alesina, Alberto and Beatrice Weder. 2002. “Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Aid?” *The American Economic Review* 92 (4): 1126-1137.
	+ Amprou, Jacky, Patrick Guillaumont, and Sylviane Guillaumont Jeanneney. 2007. “Aid Selectivity According to Augmented Criteria.” *The World Economy*  30(5): 733-763.
	+ Arellano, C., A. Bulir, T. Lane, and L. Lipschitz. 2009. "The dynamic implications of foreign aid and its variability." *Journal of Development Economics* 88 (1): 87-102.
	+ Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu, and Howard J. Wall. 2007. “The Determinants of Aid in the Post-Cold War Era.” *Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review* Nov/Dec 2007: 533-547.
	+ Balla, Eliana, and Gina Yannitell Reinhardt. 2008. “Giving and Receiving Foreign Aid: Does Conflict Count?” *World Development* 36(12): 2566-2585.
	+ Carment, D., Y. Samy, and S. Prest. 2008. "State Fragility and Implications for Aid Allocation: An Empirical Analysis." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25 (4): 349-73.
	+ Chauvet, Lisa. 2002. “Socio-Political Instability and the Allocation of International Aid by Donors,” *European Journal of Political Economy* 19(1): 33-59.
	+ Czaika, M. 2008. "Cheap talk in the UN arenas? Some evidence on the impact of UN speeches on aid allocation decisions." *Applied Economics Letters* 15 (3): 187-91.
	+ Cui, X. Y., and L. T. Gong. 2008. "Foreign aid, domestic capital accumulation, and foreign borrowing." *Journal of Macroeconomics* 30 (3): 1269-84.
* Dollar, David and Victoria Levin. 2006. “The Increasing Selectivity of Foreign Aid, 1984-2003.” *World Development* 24 (12): 2034-2046.
	+ Dunning, T. 2004. "Conditioning the effects of aid: Cold War politics, donor credibility, and democracy in Africa." *International Organization* 58 (2): 409-23.
	+ Feeny, S., and M. McGillivray. 2008. "What determines bilateral aid allocations? Evidence from time series data." *Review of Development Economics* 12 (3): 515-29.
	+ Feyzioglu, T., V. Swaroop, and M. Zhu. 1998. "A panel data analysis of the fungibility of foreign aid." *World Bank Economic Review* 12 (1): 29-58.
	+ Hess, Peter N. 1989. “Force Ratios, Arms Imports and Foreign Aid Receipts in the Developing Nations.” *Journal of Peace Research* 26(4): 399-412.
	+ Kang, S. J., and J. Meernik. 2004. "Determinants of post-conflict economic assistance." *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (2): 149-66.
	+ Knack, S., and A. Rahman. 2007. "Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients." *Journal of Development Economics* 83 (1): 176-97.
	+ Neumayer, E. 2002. "Is good governance rewarded? A cross-national analysis of debt forgiveness." *World Development* 30 (6): 913-30.
* Neumayer, Eric.2003. “Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation? A Qualitative Analysis of 21 Donor Countries.” Social Science Quarterly 84 (3): 650-666.
	+ Neumayer, Eric. 2003. "Is respect for human rights rewarded? An analysis of total bilateral and multilateral aid flows." *Human Rights Quarterly* 25 (2): 510-27Palmer, G., S. B. Wohlander, and T. C. Morgan. 2002. "Give or take: Foreign aid and foreign policy substitutability." *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (1): 5-26.
	+ Schudel, C. J. W. 2008. "Corruption and bilateral aid: A dyadic approach." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52 (4): 507-26.
	+ Svensson, J. 2000. "When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality." *Journal of Development Economics* 61 (1): 61-84.
	+ Svensson, J. 2000. “Foreign Aid and Rent-seeking.” *Journal of International Economics* 51: 437-461.
	+ Svensson, J. 2003. "Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?" *Journal of Development Economics* 70 (2): 381-402.
	+ Tavares, J. 2003. "Does foreign aid corrupt?" *Economics Letters* 79 (1): 99-106.
	+ Wagner, D. 2003. "Aid and trade - an empirical study." *Journal of the Japanese and International Economies* 17 (2): 153-73.

**＜支援国要因＞**

* Alesina, Alberto and David Dollar. 2000. “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” *Journal of Economic Growth* 5: 33-63.
	+ Berthelemy, Jean-Claude, and Ariane Tichit. 2004. “Bilateral Donors’ Aid Allocation Decisions: A Three-dimensional Panel Analysis.” *International Review of Economics and Fianance* 13: 253-274.
* Berthelemy, Jean-Claude. 2006. Bilateral Donors’ Interest vs. Recipients’ Development Motives in Aid Allocation: Do All Donors Behave the Same?” *Review of Development Economics* 10(2): 179-194.
	+ CashelCordo, P., and S. G. Craig. 1997. "Donor preferences and recipient fiscal behavior: A simultaneous analysis of foreign aid." *Economic Inquiry* 35 (3): 653-71.
	+ Chauvet, Lisa. 2002. “Socio-Political Instability and the Allocation of International Aid by Donors,” *European Journal of Political Economy* 19(1): 33-59.
	+ Chong, A., and M. Gradstein. 2008. "What determines foreign aid? The donors' perspective." *Journal of Development Economics* 87 (1): 1-13.
	+ Czaika, M. 2008. "Cheap talk in the UN arenas? Some evidence on the impact of UN speeches on aid allocation decisions." *Applied Economics Letters* 15 (3): 187-91.
	+ Dewald, M., and R. Weder. 1996. "Comparative advantage and bilateral foreign aid policy." *World Development* 24 (3): 549-56.
	+ Faust, J. 2008. "Are more democratic donor countries more development oriented? Domestic institutions and external development promotion in OECD countries." *World Development* 36 (3): 383-98.
	+ Gupta, S., C. Pattillo, and S. Wagh. 2006. "Are donor countries giving more or less aid?" *Review of Development Economics* 10 (3): 535-52.
	+ Hermes, N., and R. Lensink. 2001. "Changing the conditions for development aid: A new paradigm?" *Journal of Development* Noel, Alain, and Jean-Philippe Therien. 1995. “From Domestic to International Justice: The Welfare State and Foreign Aid.” *International Organization* 49(3): 523-553.
	+ Kuziemko, I., and E. Werker. 2006. "How much is a seat on the security council worth? Foreign aid and bribery at the United Nations." *Journal of Political Economy* 114 (5): 905-30.
* Lundsgaarde, Erik, Christian Breunig, Aseem Prakash. 2007. “Trade Versus Aid: Donor Generosity in an Era of Globalization.” *Policy Studies* 40:157-179.
* Neumayer, Eric.2003. “Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation? A Qualitative Analysis of 21 Donor Countries.” Social Science Quarterly 84 (3): 650-666.
	+ Neumayer, Eric. 2005. "Is the allocation of food aid free from donor interest bias?" *Journal of Development Studies* 41 (3): 394-411.
	+ Noel, Alain, and Jean-Philippe Therien. 1995. “From Domestic to International Justice: The Welfare State and Foreign Aid.” *International Organization* 49(3): 523-553.
	+ Schraeder, P. J., S. W. Hook, and B. Taylor. 1998. "Clarifying the foreign aid puzzle - A comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish aid flows." *World Politics* 50 (2): 294-+.
	+ Seiglie, C. 1999. "Altruism, foreign aid and humanitarian military intervention." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 17 (2): 207-23.
	+ Therien, Jean-Philippe, and Alain Noel. 2000. “Political Parties and Foreign Aid.” *American Political Science Review* 94(1): 151-162.
	+ Thiele, R., P. Nunnenkamp, and A. Dreher. 2007. "Do donors target aid in line with the Millennium Development Goals? A sector perspective of aid allocation." *Review of World Economics* 143 (4): 596-630.
	+ Trumbull, William N. and Howard J. Wall. 1994. “Estimating Aid-allocation Criteria with Panel Data.” *Economic Journal* 104(July): 876-882.
* Woods, Ngaire. 2005. “The Shifting Politics of Foreign Aid.” *International Affairs* 81 (2): 393-409.
	+ Younas, J. 2008. "Motivation for bilateral aid allocation: Altruism or trade benefits." *European Journal of Political Economy* 24 (3): 661-74.

**＜アメリカの援助＞**

* + Apodaca, C., and M. Stohl. 1999. "United States human rights policy and foreign assistance." *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1): 185-98.
	+ Derouen, K., and U. Heo. 2004. "Reward, punishment or inducement? US economic and military aid, 1946-1996." *Defence and Peace Economics* 15 (5): 453-70.
	+ Diven, P. J. 2001. "The domestic determinants of US food aid policy." *Food Policy* 26 (5): 455-74.
	+ Dreher, A., P. Nunnenkamp, and R. Thiele. 2008. "Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis." *Public Choice* 136 (1-2): 139-64.
	+ Drury, A. C., R. S. Olson, and D. A. Van Belle. 2005. "The politics of humanitarian aid: US foreign disaster assistance, 1964-1995." *Journal of Politics* 67 (2): 454-73.
	+ Finkel, Steven E., Aníbal Pérez-Linán, and Mitchella A. Seligson. 2007. “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2003.” *World Politics* 59: 404-439.
	+ Fleck, R. K., and C. Kilby. 2001. "Foreign aid and domestic politics: Voting in Congress and the allocation of USAID contracts across congressional districts." *Southern Economic Journal* 67 (3): 598-617.
	+ Goldstein, M. P., and T. J. Moss. 2005. "Compassionate conservatives or conservative compassionates? US political parties and bilateral foreign assistance to Africa." *Journal of Development Studies* 41 (7): 1288-302.
	+ Khilji, N. M., and E. M. Zampelli. 1994. "The Fungibility of United-States Military and Nonmilitary Assistance and the Impacts on Expenditures of Major Aid Recipients." *Journal of Development Economics* 43 (2): 345-62.
	+ Lai, B. 2003. "Examining the goals of US foreign assistance in the post-Cold War period, 1991-96." *Journal of Peace Research* 40 (1): 103-28.
	+ Lai, Brian, and Daniel S. Morey. 2006. “Impact of Regime Type on the Influence of U.S. Foreign Aid.” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2: 385-404.
	+ Meernik, J., and S. C. Poe. 1996. "US foreign aid in the domestic and international environments." *International Interactions* 22 (1): 21-40.
	+ Meernik, J., E. L. Krueger, and S. C. Poe. 1998. "Testing models of US foreign policy: Foreign aid during and after the Cold War." *Journal of Politics* 60 (1): 63-85.
	+ Poe, S. C., and R. Sirirangsi. 1993. "Human-rights and US Economic-aid to Africa." *International Interactions* 18 (4): 309-22.
	+ Poe, S. C., and J. Meernik. 1995. "US Military Aid in the 1980s: A Global Analysis." *Journal of Peace Research* 32 (4): 399-411.
	+ Regan, P. M. 1995. "United-States Economic-aid and Political Repression: An Empirical Evaluation of United States Foreign Policy." *Political Research Quarterly* 48 (3): 613-28.
	+ Sullivan, D. J. 1996. "The failure of US foreign aid: An examination of causes and a call for reform." *Global Governance* 2 (3): 401-15.
	+ Travis, R., and N. Zahariadis. 2002. "A multiple streams model of US foreign aid policy." *Policy Studies Journal* 30 (4): 495-514.
	+ Van Belle, D. A., and S. W. Hook. 2000. "Greasing the squeaky wheel: News media coverage and US development aid, 1977-1992." *International Interactions* 26 (3): 321-46.
	+ Wang, T. Y. 1999. "US foreign aid and UN voting: An analysis of important issues." *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1): 199-210.
	+ Zeuli, K. A., and V. W. Ruttan. 1996. "US assistance to the former Soviet empire: Toward a rationale for foreign aid." *Journal of Developing Areas* 30 (4): 493-524.

**＜国際機関援助＞**

* + Akram, T. 2003. "The international foreign aid regime: who gets foreign aid and how much?" *Applied Economics* 35 (11): 1351-6.
* Andersen, Thomas Barnebeck, Henrik Hansen, and Thomas Markussen. 2006. "US Politics and World Bank IDA-Lending." *Journal of Development Studies* 42 (5): 772-94.
	+ Bird, G., and D. Rowlands. 2007. "The IMF and the mobilisation of foreign aid." *Journal of Development Studies* 43 (5): 856-70.
	+ Butkiewicz, J. L., and H. Yanikkaya. 2005. "The effects of IMF and World Bank lending on long-run economic growth: An empirical analysis." *World Development* 33 (3): 371-91.
	+ Claessens, Stijn, Danny Cassimon, and Bjorn Van Campenhout. 2007. “Empirical Evidence on the New International Aid Architechture.” *IMF Working Paper* WP-07-277.
	+ Cordella, T., and G. Dell'Ariccia. 2002. "Limits of conditionality in poverty reduction programs." *Imf Staff Papers* 49: 68-86.
	+ Dalgaard, C. J. 2008. "Donor policy rules and aid effectiveness." *Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control* 32 (6): 1895-920.
	+ Dreher, Axel, and Roland Vaubel. 2004. “Do IMF and IBRD Cause Moral Hazard and Political Business Cycles? Evidence from Panel Data.” *Open Economies Review* 15: 5–22.
	+ Dreher, Axel. 2006. “IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance with Conditionality.” World Development 34 (5):769-88..
	+ Dreher, A., J. E. Sturm, and J. R. Vreeland. 2009. "Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?" *Journal of Development Economics* 88 (1): 1-18.
	+ Easterly, William. 2007. “Are Aid Agencies Improving?” *Economic Policy* 22(52): 633-678.
* Fleck, Robert K. and Christopher Kilby. 2006. “World Bank Independence: A Model and Statistical Analysis of US Influence.” *Review of Development Economics* 10 (2): 224-240.
	+ Neumayer, Eric.. 2003. "The determinants of aid allocation by regional multilateral development banks and United Nations agencies." *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (1): 101-22.
	+ Rodrik, D. 2006. "Goodbye Washington consensus? Hello Washington confusion? A review of the World Bank's economic growth in the 1990s: Learning from a decade of reform." *Journal of Economic Literature* 44 (4): 973-87.
	+ Svensson, J. 2000. "When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality." *Journal of Development Economics* 61 (1): 61-84.
	+ Svensson, J. 2003. "Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?" *Journal of Development Economics* 70 (2): 381-402.
	+ Sanford, J. 1997. "Alternative ways to fund the International Development Association (IDA)." *World Development* 25 (3): 297-310.
	+ Thiele, R., P. Nunnenkamp, and A. Dreher. 2007. "Do donors target aid in line with the Millennium Development Goals? A sector perspective of aid allocation." *Review of World Economics* 143 (4): 596-630.

**第14週　経済制裁の政治経済**

1. McGillivray, Fiona and Alastair Smith. 2000. “Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-Specific Punishments.” International Organization 54 (4)] 809-24.
2. McGillivray, Fiona and Allan C. Stam. 2004. “Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (2): 154-172.
3. Cox, Dan G. and A. Cooper Drury. 2006. “Democratic Sanctions: Connecting the Democratic Peace and Economic Sanctions.” *Journal of Peace Research* 43 (6): 709-722.
4. Lektzian, David and Mark Souva. 2007.“An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51 (6): 848-871.

**＜経済制裁＞**

* Allen, Susan Hanna. 2005. “The Determinants of Economic Sanctions’ Success and Failure.” *International Interactions* 31: 117-138.
* Blanchard, Jean-Marc F. and Norrin M. Ripsman. 1999. “Asking the Right Question: *When* Do Economic Sanctions Work?” *Security Studies* 9: 228-264.
* Blanchard, Jean-Marc F. and Norrin M. Ripsman. 2008. “A Political Theory of Economic Statecraft.” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 4: 371-398.
* Bolks, Sean M. and Dina Al-Sowayel. 2000. “How Long Do Economic Sanctions Last? Examining the Sanctioning Process Through Duration.” *Political Research Quarterly* 53: 241-265.
* Brooks, Risa. 2004. “Sanctions and Regime Type: What Works, and When.” *Security Studies* 11: 1-50.
* Cox, Dan G. and A. Cooper Drury. 2006. “Democratic Sanctions: Connecting the Democratic Peace and Economic Sanctions.” *Journal of Peace Research* 43 (6): 709-722.
* Dashti-Gibson, Haleh, Patricia Davis, and Benjamin Radcliff. 1997. “On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis.” *American Journal of Political Science* 41: 608-618.
* Dorussen, Han, and Jongryn Mo. 2001. “Ending Economic Sanctions: Audience Costs and Rent-Seeking as Commitment Strategies.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 (4): 395-426.
* Drezner, Daniel W. 2000. “Bargaining, Enforcements, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?” *International Organization* 54 (1): 73-102.
* Drezner, Daniel W. 2003. “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion.” *International Organization* 57 (4): 643-659.
* Drury, A. Cooper. 1998. “Economic Sanctions Reconsidered.” *Journal of Peace Research* 35: 497-509.
* Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., and Alexander H. Montgomery. 2008. "Power or Plenty: How Do International Trade Institutions Affect Economic Sanctions?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52 (2): 213-342.
* Hart, Robert A. 2000 “Democracy and the Successful Use of Economic Sanctions.” *Political Research Quarterly* 53 (2):267-284.
* Hoelscher, Christoph, and Hans-Michael Wolffgang. 1998. “The Wassenaar-Arrangement between International Trade, Non-Proliferation, and Export Controls.” *Journal of World Trade* 32(1) :45-63.
* Hovi, Jon, Robert Huseby, and Detlef Sprinz. 2005. “When do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?” *World Politics* 57: 479-499.
* Lektzian, David and Mark Souva. 2001. “Institutions and International Cooperation: A Duration Analysis of the Effects of Sanctions.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 (1): 61-79.
* Lektzian, David and Mark Souva. 2007.“An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51 (6): 848-871.
* Major, Solomon and Anthony McGann. 2005. “Caught in the Crossfire: ‘Innocent Bystanders’ as Optimal Targets of Economic Sanctions.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49: 337-359.
* Marinov, Nikolay. 2005. “Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?” *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (3): 564-576.
* McGillivray, Fiona and Allan C. Stam. 2004. “Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (2): 154-172.
* Pape, Robert.1997. “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work.” *International Security* 22: 90-136.
* Smith, Alastair. 1997. “The Success and Use of Economic Sanctions.” *International Interactions* 21: 229-245.
* Weiss, Thomas G. 1999. “Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses.” *Journal of Peace Research* 36(5): 499-509.