Workshop 30:Unexpected Handcuffs: How Open Bargains in Opposition Pre-Electoral Alliances Promote Political Instability and Authoritarian Comebacks
Speaker:Elvin Ong [Assistant Professor of Political Science at National University of Singapore, Visiting scholar in the Institute of Social Science, the University of Tokyo]
Date:May 30, 2024/10:30‐12:00 (JST)
Location:Room 104, Conference Room 2, 1F, Institute of Social Science, Hongo Campus, the University of Tokyo
https://www.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/guide/
Language:English
Target : Open to the public
Moderator:Masaaki Higashijima(UTokyo)
Abstract:Recent analyses of democratization have overwhelmingly focused on how autocratic incumbents and legacies shape democratization's trajectory after electoral turnovers. What about the role of opposition parties after they win? This article argues that inter-elite compromises reached in opposition pre-electoral alliances affect democratization after autocratic defeat in unexpected ways. Specifically, open bargains in opposition pre-electoral alliances in terms of the distribution of political offices and policy compromises constrain the governance flexibility of a newly victorious government post-elections. They restrict political elites from negotiating alternative solutions when new information or new political realities arise. When new governments attempt to deviate from these pre-electoral commitments, a disenchanted public arises. The collapse in public support opens multiple doors for the ex-dominant autocratic incumbent to return to executive power. This paper illustrates the arguments empirically by comparing how opposition victories in similarly unprecedented electoral turnovers in 2018 Malaysia and 1986 Philippines lead to divergent outcomes in political stability and authoritarian comebacks. Tentative findings from the case of DPJ's victory in Japan from 2009-2012 will also be shared.
