Parliamentary Activities, Cabinet Appointment, and Responsible Party Government
―Evidence from Japan―
January 28, 2015 6:30 PM (finished)
Kuniaki Nemoto
(Waseda University)
| Date/Time | January 28, 2015 6:30 PM |
|---|---|
| Location | Room 549 5th floor, Akamon Sogo Kenkyuto Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo [map] |
| Abstract | Which members of parliament actively engage in parliamentary activities, specifically through the initiation of private member's bills (PMBs), and how do these activities affect the functioning of the Japanese legislature? An increase in the number of PMBs, I argue, reflects the rise of responsible party government, whereby parties compete by offering policy platforms and appealing to voters through policymaking credentials and responsiveness. In exchange for policy loyalty and contributions to the party label, party leaders provide backbenchers with selective benefits, such as cabinet positions. However, this positive cycle only exists where voters rely on a party's collective reputation in making voting decisions. I use the case of Japan to test empirically the implications of this model. |
| Bio | Kuniaki Nemoto is a professor in the Organization for Japan-US Studies, Waseda University. He received his PhD in political science from the University of California, San Diego and has published widely in leading international journals on parties and elections. Recent articles include "New Inter-Election Campaigning Tools, in Robert Pekkanen, Steven Reed, and Ethan Scheiner. eds. Japan Decides 2012. New York: Palgrave, 2013. pp.123-38, and (with Ellis S. Krauss, and Robert Pekkanen), "Over-nominating Candidates, Undermining the Party: The Collective Action Problem under SNTV in Japan." Party Politics 20 (5) [2014]: 740-50 |
