国際政治経済と国内制度

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　民主政体の共有、経済関係の深化、国際制度の参加が国際武力紛争の抑制要因となることの計量的実証がBruce Russett等によってなされてから久しいが、この三つの独立変数の相互関係についての理論化と検証は、現在も進行中である。

　翻って、現実世界では、国際開放経済の進展と社会主義経済の崩壊以降、民主政治・市場経済の拡散・規範化、国際・地域制度の増加・充実により、この三者関係の学問的解明の緊要性は一層、高まっている。実際、各国の国内制度―民主統治、行政能力、人権保障、市場制度（所有権・法の支配）の確立度―が、貿易や投資、資本移動の拡大はもとより、地域貿易協定や投資協定、地域通貨協力、国際経済組織、援助・制裁などでの各国の政策の規定要因になっていることは、広く理解・検証されている。当初は民主制度に限定されていた国際経済関係や国際協調行動の国内要因も、現在の理論的最前線では、（１）国際経済関係や国際経済制度の参加・運営を規定する具体的国内制度の精査や（２） 国際経済変動や国際制度参加の政治制度や経済政策（構造改革）への影響、と議論が展開され、洗練されてきている。



 本講では、政治制度の政策分析を理論的基礎に、国際政治経済の活発な研究領域である、国内制度と国際経済制度や国際経済関係・国内経済政策の関係に関する、IO, APSR, AJPS, ISQ などの学術雑誌の最新研究を、上記の図の要領で概観する。即ち、従来から、自由主義制度論で議論されてきた経済的相互依存と国際機関・国際制度の関係への、各国の国内制度の影響を見るため、まず、経済国際化の下で国内制度が齎す政策的差異に関する分析を概観し、次いで、国内制度が経済的相互依存にどのような影響を与えるかを検討し、最後に国内制度が国際機関の決定や国際協定の締結にどのような影響を与えるかを理解する。この結果、全政治経済・国際政治経済を横断する統一的分析視角としての国内制度を基礎とした実証的国際政治経済分析の可能性を明確にすることが目的である。換言すれば、本講が想定する国際政治経済の分析枠組は、下記にようになろう。

国際経済関係・対外経済政策 = 国内制度（自国・相手国） + 国際制度・協定 + 経済制御変数

　本講での課題文献は以下の通りである。毎週分担してそこにある論文数本を読む予定なので負担は軽くはない。国際政治経済、アメリカ政治、統計の知識は履修要件ではないが、必要に応じて各自補習する積極さは要求される。受講者は前日までに内容に関する疑問点等をA4要旨１頁程度に纏めたメモを全員に配布する義務がある。それに基づいて、毎回、文献の内容、その理論的貢献、知見、含意などを議論する。政治制度分析に不案内の学生は Kenneth A. Sepsle, *Analyzing Politics*, *2nd edition* (W.W. Norton, 2010)などを随時参照のこと。

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**I.　政治制度と政策帰結**

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**II. 政治制度と国際経済関係**

**第６週　政治制度と貿易・投資**

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