国際政治経済 II

**(International Political Economy II)**

公共政策大学院　 　社会科学研究所　樋渡展洋

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現在の国際政治経済の特徴は政治と経済、政策決定の国際要因と国内要因が交錯することにある。戦後の西側先進諸国の政治経済は国家間合意による自由な貿易・資本移動の体制を、「埋め込まれた自由主義」と称され、民主政治の枠内で国内政策による経済発展と社会安定に立脚した発展させてきた。近年では、社会主義の崩壊により、民主政体と市場経済の拡大・規範化がもたらされ、政治と経済、政策の国際要因と国内要因の連動関係が一層強化されたといえる。

国際政治経済とは、政府の対外経済政策や国家間の経済関係を説明する際に、経済的要因を前提に、国際・国内政治の影響を理解する学問で、その分析枠組は―

対外経済政策・国際経済関係 = 政治的独立諸変数 + 経済的制御諸変数

と表現でき、制御変数に関しては経済学の基礎理論に立脚し、独立変数に関しては国際政治や政治学の知見を応用する。

講義では、このような国際経済関係の政治的側面の理解に必要な理論枠組近の展開、および最新の実証成果を概観する。特に、（１）システムレベル分析の限界、即ち、国家間合意による自由貿易や資本移動が拡大した要因として、貿易・投資拡大に伴う経済利得が民主政府で、民意に基づき安定的に配分されたこと（「埋め込まれた自由主義」）の重要性。（２）通貨・金融や貿易・投資をめぐる国際的制度化に際しての国内民主制度や国内市場制度整備の重要性。（３）資本移動や貿易拡大が国際・国内の市場統合を媒介に、各国政府に迫る国際市場と国内市場を横断した政策適応や政策規律・政策制約問題。（４）各国が国内政体や市場制度の脆弱性を補完し、国内政策対応・規律の国際的信認を強化する手段としての投資、貿易、通貨協定や国際経済機関への参加、などに焦点をあてる。最終の２回では、冷戦後の先進国および国際機関の援助や制裁の規定要因を概観して、国際政治経済と外交政策分析の架橋とする。

このように、国際経済関係の規定要因としての国内制度や国際協定に焦点を当てることは、経済危機の世界的伝播の原因究明のみならず、各国の国内対策と国際連携の特徴を理解する上でも重要であろう。そして、経済の国際化に伴い、経済運営と政権維持の両立に迫られた政府の選択肢がどう制約・規定され、それら政府の対立・連携の結果、地域・国際経済関係がどう展開・変容しているかを理解することは、行動主体としての国家・政府が経済政策的合理性と国内政治的妥当性をどう調整するかを考察することであり、それが本講の政策実践的含意であるとともに、本講と国際経済、国際政治、国際経済法科目との補完的相違点である。

授業は以下の形態をとる。まず、テキストは学部学生を念頭においているので、参加者はシラバスで指定された週はテキストの指定箇所（１章程度）を読んで来てＡ４用紙１ページ程度のレジュメを提出する義務がある（全部で７回、計10章）。教室では、最初の５分程度はテキストの内容を確認・復習し、質問点・疑問点を議論した後、講義形式で現状の展開や最近の問題関心に沿った理論枠組や実証研究を紹介して、テキストの内容を敷衍・補足するが、その際も、質問点・疑問点に随時議論できるようにする。

国際政治経済Iの受講や国際経済、国際政治、統計の予備知識は必要でない。講義は公共政策大学院生が対象のため、教科書の理論を更に展開し、かつ最新の実証結果を紹介する高度な内容を準備する予定であるが、それに怯まず挑戦し、基礎的なことでも怖じけず積極的に授業中、質問・発言し、納得することが要求かつ歓迎される。

単位認定は出席、レジュメ（9回分）と筆記試験による。（尚、このシラバスおよび昨年の授業の資料スライドは <http://www.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~hiwatari/> からもダウンロードできるようにする。）

Text Book and References

テキストは公共政策事務室でコピーできる。他に法学部研究室図書館や経済学部図書館で閲覧できる。

それ以外文献は学内の端末からe-ジャーナルでダウンロードできる。入手困難な文献については、適宜メール等で連絡のこと.

Text Book

Oatley, Thomas. 2008. *International Political Economy: Interests and Institutions in the Global Economy, 4th Edition* (New York: Pearson/Longman　2010)

Related Readings

* Gilpin, Robert. 1987. *The Political Economy of International Relations*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
* Gilpin, Robert. 2001. *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
* Spero, Joan Edelman and Jeffrey A. Hart. 1997. *The Politics of International Economic Relations*, 5th Edition (London: Routledge).
* Grieco, Joseph M. and G. John Ikenberry. 2003. *State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company).
* Stubbs, Richard and Underhill, Geoffrey R. D. 1999. *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order Global Power,* 2nd Edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press).
* Ravenhill, John. 2005. *Global Political Economy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
* F**rieden, Jeffry A. and David A. Lake eds. 2009. *International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, 5th Edition* (New York: St. Martin’s)**

**Introductory readings**

* Oatley, Chapter 1
* Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. *Theory of International Politics* (McGrew Hill), Chap 1.

# I. Beyond System-level Analysis: The Second-image Revived

**Week 1: System-level Analysis: Structural realism and liberal institutionalism**

*Puzzle of the week: What is system-level analysis and why is it inadequate?*

**Structural Realism and Hegemonic Stability Theory**

* Kranser, Stephen D. 1976. “State Power and the Structure of International Trade.” *World Politics* 28 (3): 317-347. **(Frieden and Lake, Chapter 1)**
* Eichengreen, Barry. 1989. “Hegemonic Stability Theories of the International Monetary System.’ In Richard Cooper et al., *Can Nations Agree? Issues in International Economic Cooperation* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution): 255-298. **(Frieden and Lake, Chapter 15)**
* Gowa, Joanne. 1989. “Bipolarity, Mutipolarity, and Free Trade.” *American Political Science Review* 83 (4): 135-146.
* Lake, David. 1993. “Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy.” *International Studies Quarterly*, 37, 459-489.
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* Gowa, Joanne and Edward D. Mansfield. 2004. “Alliances, Imperfect Markets, and Major-Power Trade.” *International Organization* 58 (4): 775-805.

**Complex Interdependence and Liberal Institutionalism**

* Keohane, Robert O.1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), chaps. 4-5
* Keohane. Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. 2000. *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd. Edition (London: Longman), Part 1.
* Krasner, Stephen D. 1991.“Global Communications and National Power.”*World Politics* 43 (3): 336-366.
* Powell, Robert. 1994. “Anarchy in International Relations Theory.” *International Organization* 48 (2), 311-44.
* Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin and Paul R. Hensel. 2007. “International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements.” *American Journal Political Science* 51 (4): 721-727.
* Estevadeordal, Antoni and Kati Suominen. 2008. “Sequencing Regional Trade Integration and Cooperation Agreements.” *The World Economy* 31 (1): 112-140.
* Hansen, Holley E., Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Stephen C. Nemeth. 2008. “IO Mediation of Interstate Conflicts: Moving Beyond the Global versus Regional Dichotomy.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52 (2): 295-325.

**Week 2: System-level Analysis and Political Regimes**

*Puzzle of the week: Does political regimes and institutions explain economic policy differences (and, if so, why)?*

**Democratic Peace and Commercial Peace**

* Barbieri, Katherine, and Gerald Schnerder 1999. “Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict.” *Journal of Peace Research* 36 (4): 387-404.
* Bearce David H. 2003. “Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace.” *International Studies Quarterly* 41:347-70.
* Gartzke, Eric, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer. 2001. “Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict.” *International Organization* 55 (2): 391-438.
* Gartzke Erik and Quan Li. 2003. “War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization.” *International Studies Quarterly* 47:561-86.
* Gartzke Erik. 2007. “The Capitalist Peace.” *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (1): 166-91.
* Mansfield, Edward D. and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2000. “Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict.” *International Organization* 54 (4): 775-808.
* Oneal, John R. and Bruce M. Russett. 1997. “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985.” *International Studies Quarterly* 41: 267-294.
* Oneal, J. R., and B. Russett. 1999. "The Kantian peace - The Pacific benefits of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations, 1885-1992." *World Politics* 52 (1):1-
* Oneal, J. R., and B. Russett. 2005. "Rule of three, let it be? When more really is better." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22 (4): 293-310.
* Oneal, J. R., B. Russett, and M. L. Berbaum. 2003. "Causes of peace: Democracy, interdependence, and international organizations, 1885-1992." *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (3): 371-93.
* Russett, Bruce M., John R. Oneal, and David R. Davis. 1998. “The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-85.” *International Organization* 52 (3): 441-467
* Pevehouse Jon C., and Bruce Russett. “Democratic International Governmental Organizations Promote Peace.” *International Organization* 60 (Fall): 969–1000.
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* Weeks, Jessica. 2008. “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve.” *International Organization* 62 (1): 35-64.

**Regime Types and Selectorate Theory**

* De Mesquita, Bruce B., J. D. Morrow, R. M. Siverson, and A. Smith. 1999. “An Institutional Explanation of The Democratic Peace.” *American Political Science Review* 93 (4): 791-807.
* De Mesquita, Bruce. B., J. D. Morrow, R. M. Siverson, and A. Smith. 1999. "Policy failure and political survival - The contribution of political institutions." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43 (2): 147-61.
* De Mesquita, B. B., J. D. Morrow, R. M. Siverson, and A. Smith. 2002. "Political institutions, policy choice and the survival of leaders." *British Journal of Political Science* 32:559-590.
* Epstein, David L., Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and Sharyn O’Halloran. 2006. “Democratic Transitions.” *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (3): 551–569.
* McGuire, Martin C. and Mancur Olson Jr. 1996. “The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force.” *Journal of Economic Literature* 34: 72-96.
* Weeks, Jessica. 2008. “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve.” *International Organization* 62 (1): 35-64.

**Economic Consequences of Political Regimes**

* Adsera, Alicia and Carles Boix. 2002. “Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Pubic Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness.” *International Organization* 56 (2): 229-262.
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* Deacon, Robert T. 2009. “Public Good Provision under Dictatorship and Democracy.” *Public Choice* 139:241-262.
* Durham, J. B. 1999. “Economic Growth and Political Regimes.*” Journal of Economic Growth* 4: 81-111.
* Down, Ian. 2007. “Trade Openness, Country Size and Economic Volatility: The Compensations Hypothesis Revisited.” *Business and Politics* 9 (2), Article 3.
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* Hays, Jude C., Sean D. Ehrlich and Clint Peinhardt. 2005. “Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in OECD Countries: An Empirical Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis.” *International Organization* 59 (2): 473-494.
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**Political Consequences of Globalization**

* Eichengreen, Barry, and David Leblang. 2008. “Democracy and Globalization.” *Economics and Politics* 20 (3): 289-334
* Giavazzi, Francesco and Guido Tabellini. 2004. “Economic and Political Liberalization.” *CESifo Working Paper* 1249.
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**Week 3: Political Regimes and International Negotiations/Agreements**

*Puzzle of the week: Does political regimes and institutions explain differences international negotiations/agreements (and, if so, why)?*

**Commitment, Credibility, and Regimes**

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* Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor. 1996. “Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations.” *International Organization* 50 (1): 109-139.
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**Negotiations and Domestic Institutions**

* Andrews, J. T., and G. R. Montinola. 2004. "Veto players and the rule of law in emerging democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (1): 55-87.
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* Tsebelis, George. 1999. "Veto Players and Law Production in parliamentary democracies: An empirical analysis." *American Political Science Review* 93 (3):591-608.
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**International Organizations and Regimes**

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**II. Political Economy of International Trade and Investment**

**Week 4: Domestic Interests and International Trade and Investment**

*Puzzle of the week: Who wants (opposes) open trade and investment (and why)?*

1. **Oatley, Chapter 4 (pp. 71-82), Chapter 5**

**Trade and Growth**

* Lee, Ha Yan, Luca Antonio Ricci, Roberto Rigobon. 2004. “Once Again, Is Openness Good for Growth.” *NBER Working Paper* 10749.
* Nicoletti, Giuseppe, Stave Golub, Dana Hajkova, Daniel Mirza, and Kwang-Yeol Yoo. 2003. “Politics and International Integration: Influences on Trade and Foreign Direct Investment.” *OECD Economics Department Working Papers* 359.

**Trade and Domestic Conflict**

* Alt, James E. and Michael Gilligan. 1994. “The Political Economy of Trading States.” *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 2 (2): 165-192. **(Frieden and Lake, Chapter 21)**
* Alt, James E., Jeffry Frieden, Michael Gilligan, Dani Rodrik and Ronald Rogowski. 1996. “The Political Economy of International Trade.” *Comparative Political Studies* 29 (6): 689-717.
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**Trade and Domestic Adjustment**

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**Week 5: Domestic Politics and International Trade and Investment**

1. **Oatley, Chapter 4 (pp. 82-93)**

*Puzzle of the week: How are trade and investment preferences represented into policy?*

**Trade and Democratic Institutions**

* Ehrlich, Sean D. 2007. “Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies.” *International Organization* 61: 571-605.
* Ehrlich, Sean D. 2010. “The Fair Trade Challenge to Embedded Liberalism.” *International Studies Quarterly* 54:1013-1033.
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* Goldstein, Judith. 1986. “The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection.” *American Political Science Review* 80: 161-184.
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**Week 6: Trade and Investment Agreements**

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**Week 7: International and Regional Trade Regimes**

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**III. The Political Economy of International Finance**

**Week 8: Capital Liberalization, Financial Market Reforms, and Exchange Rate Policy**

*Puzzle of the week: Who wants (opposes) capital liberalization, why, and how are their preferences represented?*

1. **Oatley, Chapter 11 & 12**

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**Capital Liberalization and Financial Market Reform**

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**Week 9: Financial Crisis**

1. **Oatley, Chapter 15**

*Puzzle of the week: What the political cause of financial crisis, and who gets assistance when it breaks out?*

**The Conserquences of Capital Liberalization**

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**Financial Crisis and IMF Loans**

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**Week 11: Capital Mobility and Economic Reforms**

1. **Oatley, Chapter 13**

*Puzzle of the week: Why (and who undertakes) neo-liberal reforms?*

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**III. The Political Economy of Economic Diplomacy**

**Week 12: The Political Economy of Foreign Aid**

*Puzzle of the week: Who receives (provides) foreign aid from (to) whom, and why?*

**The Effects of Aid**

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**Week 13: The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions**

*Puzzle of the week: Who initiates (is targeted by) economic sanctions, and what determines their effectiveness?*

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