1.国際政治対立の理論―射程と限界

テキストの要点

1. 現実主義（realism）の構成要素
   ―anarchy, self-help, unitary actor, security dilemma, relative gains
2. 覇権安定論
   ―定義と構成
   ―開放的安定的国際経済秩序の要件
   ―覇権国の能力と意思（覇権国の類型）問題
3. 覇権安定論の問題と覇権国アメリカの現在

1.1　国際政治構造の基礎

- 構造的現実主義の理論構成
  - ー第3イメージ
  - ー全体構造と構成単位
  - ーハイラーキーとアナーキ
- 国家目的とsecurity dilemma
  - ー単一合理的主体

1.2　国際政治構造と国際経済政策

- 国際金融の覇権安定論（Kindleberger）
  - ―国際金融の安定条件（「近隣窮乏化政策」）
  - ―覇権国=国際公共財の提供
  - ―問題点
- 国際貿易の覇権安定論（Krasner）
  - ―国際システムの定義
  - ―自由貿易と国益
  - ―国際システムと自由貿易の便益
  - ―理論的貢献と検証

- 自由貿易と同盟関係（Gowa）
  ーsecurity externalities
  ー国際政治構造（極構造）とsecurity externalities
- 利得論争
  ー相対利得と絶対利得
  ー利得論争と現実主義
- 現実主義的国際政治経済の射程と限界
  ー構造還元論と単一主体
  ー歴史的妥当性
    アメリカの衰退ー＞相互依存論・自由主義制度論
    冷戦の終焉ー＞民主協力論

State power and the structure of international trade

Goals	Predicted effects of openness according to (direction of relationship)	
	Larger relative size of country	Higher level of development of country
Political power	+	+
National income	−	system
Economic growth	system	system
Social stability	+	+

Probability of an Open Trading Structure with Different Distributions of Potential Economic Power

		Size of States		
		RELATIVELY EQUAL		VERY UNEQUAL
Level of Development of States		SMALL	LARGE	
	EQUAL	Moderate-High	Low-Moderate	High
	UNEQUAL	Moderate	Low	Moderate-High

2.国際経済協力の理論ー射程と限界

テキストの要点

1. 自由主義（liberalism）の視角と系譜
   - ー古典的自由主義（Smith, Ricardo）
   - ー修正自由主義（Keynesian, embedded liberalism)
   - ー新自由主義（Hayek, Friedman)
2. 自由主義国際政治経済ー現実主義批判
   - ー相互依存論（interdependence）
   - ー制度と協力
3. 自由主義国際政治経済の限界
   - ー配分問題
   - ー国内過程

2.1　国際政治構造と国際経済協力

- 相互依存論（Nye and Keohane ）

  ―現実主義の批判

  ―論理構成

  ―分析特徴（争点過程分析）

- 自由主義制度論（Keohane）

  ―現実主義の超克

  ―論理構成（囚人のジレンマ、公共財、市場の失敗）

  ―実証問題（覇権以降の国際制度・レジーム）

2.2　国際制度と配分問題

国際制度協力の限界

- 現実主義の国際制度批判（Krasner）

ー協力問題と調整問題
ー国際制度と調整問題
ー調整問題と利得問題
ー問題点と含意（国際経済政策選好の基礎）

３　国際政治経済の国内条件
国際システム分析の限界

３.１　国際開放経済と国内配分問題

- 戦後政治経済（Embedded liberalism）の特質
  - 民主政治・市場経済・多角的国際開放経済
  - 民主政での国際開放経済と国内配分問題の解決
- 戦後政治経済の歴史的位相
  - 第一次大戦前　　国際機関不在　国内要因の不在　民主政の拡大
  - 戦間期　　国際機関不在　国内要因の台頭　民主政の定着・動揺
  - 第二次大戦後　　国際機関存在　国内要因の優越　民主政の定着

3.2　国際政治経済の国内的基礎

- 国際開放経済の国内的基礎
  - 開放経済と国内配分
    - 理論（Katzenstein)
    - 実証（Cameron, Rodrik)
  - 民主政治と開放経済・国内配分（Adsera and Boix）
  - 民主政治と経済成長（Quinn and Woolley）
  - 民主政治と国際貿易
    - 民主政と貿易の安定性（McGillivray and Smith）
    - 民主政と貿易の拡大（Mansfield et al.）

- 国際制度協力の国内的基礎
  - 国際・国内連携の分析枠組
    - 二層ゲーム（Two-level games)（Putnum)
    - 拒否権者構造（veto player) (Tsebelis)
  - 国際制度協力の国内的基礎
    - 国際協定と国内政治
    - 国際制度協力と国内政治
    - 国際貿易協定と国内政治



Figure 1. The Partisan Composition of Government and the Expansion of the Public Economy

Figure 2. The Openness of the Economy and the Expansion of the Public Economy

Openness and the fiscal size of the state: Evidence (Cameron 1978)



Figure 3. The Domestic Consequences of an Open Economy

Openness and the fiscal size of the state: An explanation (Cameron 1978)



FIG. 1.—Relationship between openness and government expenditures

Openness and the fiscal size of the state: Evidence (Rodrik 1998)

TABLE 1

OPENNESS AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING

	DEPENDENT VARIABLE					
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	Log CGAVG9092 (1)	Log CGAVG8589 (2)	Log GIAVG9092 (3)	Log GIAVG8589 (4)	DGOV6092 (5)	DOPEN6092 (6)
Constant	3.289*	3.786*	−1.778***	−4.708	6.426	4.439
	(.536)	(.383)	(.990)	(2.872)	(.936)	(.852)
Log GDP per capita	−.030	−.105***	−.413*	−.013	−.151	−.194
	(.084)	(.063)	(.143)	(.448)	(.133)	(.121)
Log dependency ratio	.642*	.630*	.372	−.304	.387	.146
	(.241)	(.193)	(.499)	(1.457)	(.388)	(.353)
Log urbanization	−.203**	−.136***	−.006	−.556	−.381*	.080
	(.093)	(.075)	(.185)	(.537)	(.123)	(.112)
Socialist	.169	.092	−.559	−1.631***	.924*	.260
	(.130)	(.100)	(.413)	(.909)	(.227)	(.207)
OECD	−.007	−.014	−.051	−.080	.040	.384
	(.144)	(.122)	(.246)	(.851)	(.254)	(.231)
Latin America	−.171	−.218**	−.564**	.122	−.072	−.041
	(.113)	(.094)	(.221)	(.661)	(.191)	(.174)
East Asia	−.206	−.338**	−.193	−.206	−.693	.836
	(.140)	(.130)	(.267)	(.913)	(.228)	(.208)
Sub-Saharan Africa	−.107	−.239**	−.161	.002	−.100	.041
	(.118)	(.101)	(.232)	(.732)	(.194)	(.177)
Log CGAVG6064					−1.308*	−.019
					(.119)	(.108)
Log OPENAVG8089	**.223***		**.534***			
	(.064)		**(.134)**			
Log OPENAVG7584		**.205***		**.835****		
		(.057)		**(.401)**		
Log OPENAVG6064					**.272***	−.510*
					(.094)	(.086)
Adjusted R^2	.428	.458	.456	.013	.664	.360
Standard error	.317	.313	.558	1.931	.512	.466
Observations	103	125	75	98	99	99

* Significant at the 99 percent level.
** Significant at the 95 percent level.
*** Significant at the 90 percent level.

Openness and the fiscal size of the state: Evidence (Rodrik 1998)

TABLE 4

THE IMPORTANCE OF EXTERNAL RISK

	DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG OF REAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP (Log CGAVG9092)					
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
OPENAVG8089	.003**	.000	−.003	−.004	−.005	−.004
	(.001)	(.002)	(.002)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
CI90		−.661		.429		
		(.366)		(.594)		
OPENAVG8089 × CI90		**.011****		**−.004**		
		(.005)		(.008)		
TOTDLOGSTD			−3.053*	−4.155**	−3.284*	−2.640**
			(1.087)	(1.833)	(1.122)	(1.118)
OPENAVG8089 × TOTDLOGSTD			**.053***	**.064****	**.058***	**.043****
			(.017)	(.027)	(.018)	(.020)
OPENAVG8089 × GDPSH589					2.27E-07	
					(2.68E-07)	
OPENAVG8089 × PRIMSHR90						.003
						(.003)
Observations	103	94	97	92	97	96
Adjusted R^2	.397	.417	.438	.436	.437	.446

NOTE.—Same as table 2.

Openness, vulnerability and the fiscal size of the state (Rodrik 1998)



FIGURE 2. *Public revenue as a function of trade openness and political regime*

Openness and the fiscal size of the state (Adsera and Boix 2002)

FIGURE 4. TILI Outcomes with Liberal and Protectionist Autocrats



PROPOSITION: *Aggregate trade barriers are lower within democratic pairs than within pairs composed of an autocracy and a democracy.*

COROLLARY. *Irrespective of which country makes the first offer, as the legislatures become more protectionist, the aggregate level of barriers on which a pair of democracies agree is unchanged.*

Democracy and Trade: The model (Mansfield et al. 2000)

TABLE 1. Regression of Trade on GDP, Population, Distance, Regime Type, Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements, Major Power, GATT, Prior Colonial Ties, Command Economies, and War, 1960–90, Using Different Measures of Regime Type

	Measure of Regime Type			
	Jaggers and Gurr (1995)		Alvarez et al. (1996)	
Variable	(1)	(1A)	(2)	(2A)
log β_0	17.274***	17.688***	22.550***	23.263***
	(3.058)	(3.057)	(3.166)	(3.175)
$\log(GDP_i \times GDP_j)$	.512***	.512***	.580***	.582***
	(.039)	(.039)	(.044)	(.044)
$\log(POP_i \times POP_j)$	−.937***	−.943***	−1.211***	−1.232***
	(.080)	(.080)	(.083)	(.084)
$\log(DIST_{ij})$	−.759***	−.758***	−.778***	−.777***
	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)
$MIXED_{ij}$	−.188***	−.233***	−.111***	−.134***
	(.035)	(.039)	(.025)	(.027)
AUT_{ij}	.098	.036	−.053	−.075
	(.065)	(.069)	(.051)	(.052)
$OTHER_{ij}$	−.088*	−.141***	—	—
	(.039)	(.043)		
$DEMZ_{ij}$	—	−.142**	—	−.120**
		(.053)		(.043)
$ALLY_{ij}$	.119*	.115*	.184***	.180***
	(.052)	(.052)	(.051)	(.051)
PTA_{ij}	.527***	.521***	.473***	.470***
	(.039)	(.039)	(.040)	(.040)
MP_{ij}	.548***	.548***	.618***	.620***
	(.136)	(.135)	(.136)	(.137)
$ALLY_{ij} \times PTA_{ij}$	.535***	.537***	.618***	.620***
	(.066)	(.067)	(.066)	(.066)
$ALLY_{ij} \times MP_{ij}$	.179**	.182**	.052	.050
	(.068)	(.068)	(.067)	(.067)
$PTA_{ij} \times MP_{ij}$	−.476***	−.483***	−.518***	−.522***
	(.068)	(.068)	(.068)	(.068)
$GATT_{ij}$	.074	.072	.126**	.125**
	(.038)	(.038)	(.040)	(.040)
COL_{ij}	1.682***	1.684***	1.780***	1.787***
	(.085)	(.085)	(.087)	(.087)
COM_{ij}	1.033***	1.031***	.855***	.847***
	(.095)	(.095)	(.117)	(.117)
WAR_{ij}	−6.463***	−6.447***	−6.556***	−6.562***
	(.107)	(.107)	(.110)	(.110)
lagged log (X_{ij})	.855***	.855***	.946***	.946***
	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)
$\bar{R}^2$	.53	.53	.55	.55
N	33,116	33,116	30,480	30,480

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. Figures in parentheses are White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. One-tailed tests are conducted for the regression coefficient of $MIXED_{ij}$, since its sign is specified by the model. Two-tailed tests are conducted for the remaining coefficients. Regressions include dummy variables for country-specific and year-specific fixed effects. *$p \leq .05$, **$p \leq .01$, ***$p \leq .001$.

Democracy and Trade: The results (Mansfield et al. 2000)

Table 1. Regime Type and International Cooperation,1953–1978
Unit of Analysis: Dyad-Year

Independent Variable	Model 1 Average Level of Cooperation	Model 2 Cooperation (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	Model 3 Average Level of Cooperation if Cooperation > 0
Jointly Democratic Dyad	3.108** (0.408)	0.606** (0.101)	2.847** (0.237)
Jointly Autocratic Dyad	3.062** (0.275)	0.410** (0.077)	1.335** (0.166)
Mixed Regime Type Dyad	2.180** (0.255)	0.311** (0.059)	0.563** (0.174)
Jointly Wealthy Dyad	0.890* (0.394)	0.225* (0.098)	0.616** (0.192)
Jointly Stable Dyad	0.728** (0.167)	0.187** (0.034)	0.271* (0.130)
Shared Alliance	4.553** (0.361)	0.542** (0.082)	1.541** (0.159)
Constant	3.523	–0.455	10.847
N	22,320	22,320	11,815

Note: Each cell contains the estimated coefficient with its associated standard error listed in parentheses below. **indicates statistical significance at the .001 level. *indicates statistical significance at the .05 level.

Regime type and international cooperation (Leeds 19999)



FIGURE 1. *Average alliance density per decade, 1816–1965*

Regime type and alliance density (Gaubatz 1996)



FIGURE 2. *Alliance survival functions (Kaplan–Meier estimates) for alliances by treaty (reduced model 1)*

Regime type and alliance survival (Gaubatz 1996)

TABLE 1. *Effects of regime type, GDP, the change in GDP, trade, military disputes, colonial relations, alliances, distance, the GATT, and hegemony on PTA formation, 1951–1992*

Variable	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*
Intercept	7.315**	7.223**	6.847**	7.212**
	(11.85)	(11.64)	(11.82)	(11.54)
REG_i	0.038**	0.038**	0.035**	0.038**
	(8.89)	(8.80)	(8.84)	(8.93)
REG_j	0.035**	0.035**	0.032**	0.035**
	(8.47)	(8.40)	(8.15)	(8.51)
GDP_i	-4.84×10^{-10}**	-3.29×10^{-10}**	-7.75×10^{-10}**	-4.89×10^{-10}**
	(−3.29)	(−3.47)	(−4.26)	(−3.34)
GDP_j	-3.84×10^{-10}*	-2.26×10^{-10}*	-6.94×10^{-10}**	-3.88×10^{-10}*
	(−2.39)	(−2.16)	(−4.17)	(−2.43)
ΔGDP_i	4.72×10^{-9}		6.41×10^{-9}	4.63×10^{-9}
	(1.28)		(1.55)	(1.26)
ΔGDP_j	4.85×10^{-9}		6.88×10^{-9}*	4.77×10^{-9}
	(1.71)		(2.04)	(1.69)
$TRADE_{ij}$	-1.21×10^{-7}	-1.23×10^{-7}		-1.18×10^{-7}
	(−1.53)	(−1.56)		(−1.52)
$DISPUTE_{ij}$	−0.740	−0.734	−0.620	
	(−1.91)	(−1.89)	(−1.64)	
COL_{ij}	1.338**	1.327**	1.356**	1.324**
	(8.74)	(8.73)	(8.62)	(8.45)
$ALLY_{ij}$	0.665**	0.663**	0.645**	0.673**
	(9.70)	(9.69)	(9.34)	(9.73)
$DISTANCE_{ij}$	−0.731**	−0.730**	−0.681**	−0.717**
	(−17.51)	(−17.47)	(−20.20)	(−16.62)
$GATT_{ij}$	0.391**	0.389**	0.376**	0.396**
	(6.05)	(6.03)	(5.79)	(6.12)
HEGEMONY	−53.75**	−53.07**	−52.29**	−53.84**
	(−14.92)	(−14.73)	(−14.68)	(−14.93)
χ^2	1915.28**	1906.12**	1866.84**	1911.48**
Log likelihood	−7146.54	−7147.73	−7173.51	−7149.97

Note: These parameters are estimated using logistic regression, after including a natural spline function with three knots. Figures in parentheses are asymptotic z-statistics computed using Huber standard errors. In each model, $N = 223{,}568$.

**$p \leq .001$. Two-tailed tests are conducted for all estimates.

*$p \leq .05$. Two-tailed tests are conducted for all estimates.

Democracy and trade agreements: The results (Mansfield et al. 2000)

4.貿易・投資政策の国内要因—経済主体の利害と選好

テキストの要点

1. 完全市場モデル

—生産要素モデル（Stolper-Samuelson）

・モデルの特徴と理論構成

・ モデルの配分的帰結

—生産部門モデル（Ricardo-Viner）

・モデルの特徴と理論構成

・ モデルの配分的帰結

2. 寡占企業モデル

—理論的特徴と政策的含意

・開発国家の理論（幼稚産業育成論）

・先端産業の理論（戦略的貿易理論）

4.1　貿易拡大と国内選好

階級・産業・企業の利害対立と政策選好

- 貿易拡大と階級対立
  - 三要素モデル（Rogowski）
- 貿易拡大と産業対立
  - 生産要素モデルと産業部門モデルの両立（Hiscox）
- 貿易拡大と企業対立
  - 多国籍企業・国内企業対立と反保護要求（Milner）
  - 戦略的貿易理論と市場開放要求（Yoffie and Milner）
- 貿易拡大と個人選好

4.2　貿易拡大と国内調整–産業調整と多国籍企業

- 輸入増大と保護政策要求
  - 産業調整と保護政策の継続
    - 参入・退出障壁（Aggarwal et al.）
    - 保護政策の弛緩（Hathaway）
  - 産業調整と雇用調整
    - 福祉財政規模の規定要因
    - （補論）日本の産業調整政策と雇用調整政策
  - 景気循環と保護要求
- 投資増大と保護政策要求（Goodman et al.)

Figure 1. Four Main Types of Factor Endowments

	Land-Labor Ratio: High	Land-Labor Ratio: Low
Advanced Economy	Abundant: Capital, Land Scarce: Labor	Abundant: Capital, Labor Scarce: Land
Backward Economy	Abundant: Land Scarce: Capital, Labor	Abundant: Labor Scarce: Capital, Land

Figure 2. Predicted Effects of Expanding Exposure to Trade

	Land-Labor Ratio: High	Land-Labor Ratio: Low
Advanced Economy	Class cleavage: Land and capital free-trading, assertive Labor defensive, protectionist	Urban-rural cleavage: Capital and labor free-trading, assertive Land defensive, protectionist (Radicalism)
Backward Economy	Urban-rural cleavage: Land free-trading, assertive Labor and capital defensive, protectionist (U.S. Populism)	Class cleavage: Labor free-trading, assertive Land and capital defensive, protectionist (Socialism)

Figure 3. Predicted Effects of Declining Exposure to Trade

	Land-Labor Ratio: High	Land-Labor Ratio: Low
Advanced Economy	Class cleavage: Labor gains power. Land and capital lose. (U.S. New Deal)	Urban-rural cleavage: Land gains power. Labor and capital lose. (Western European Fascism)
Backward Economy	Urban-rural cleavage: Labor and capital gain power. Land loses. (South American Populism)	Class cleavage: Land and capital gain power. Labor loses. (Asian & Eastern European Fascism)

Factor Model (Rogowski 1987)



FIGURE 1. *Effects of changing market conditions and government policy on corporate trade demands*

Strategic trade policy and market opening demands (Milner and Yoffie 1989)

Figure 1. Protectionist Patterns with Low Barriers to Entry



Figure 2. Protectionist Patterns with High Barriers to Entry



Protection and adjustment (Aggarwarl et al. 1987)

Table 1. Summary of Evidence

Industry	Protectionist Policies	Import Penetration[a] (%)	Pattern
Textiles & apparel	1956 (VER, Japan 1957)	2[b]	
	1960 (STA/LTA, 1961–62)	6[b]	
	1970 (VERs 1971)	9	
	1973 (MFA 1974)	9	Institutionalized
	1976 (MFA 2, 1977)	11	
	1980 (MFA 3, 1981)	12	
	1985 (MFA 4, 1986)	23	
Footwear	1976 (OMA, Taiwan & Korea 1977)	48	
	1981 OMAs dropped	50	
	1984 Protection rejected	70	
	1985 Protection rejected	76	
Televisions	1975	18	Temporary
	1976 (OMA, Japan 1977)	33	
	1978 (OMA, Korea & Taiwan 1979)	26	
	1980 OMA dropped (Japan)	12[c]	
	1982 OMAs dropped (Korea & Taiwan)	19[c]	
Steel	1968 (VER, Japan & EEC 1969)	17	
	1970	14	
	1971 (VER, Japan & EEC 1972)	18	
	1974 VERs dropped	13	
	1977 (TPM in 1978)	18	Sporadic
	1981 (VERs, Japan & EEC 1982)	19	
	1984 (VERs 1985)	26	
Autos	1980 (VER, Japan 1981)	27	
	1985 VER dropped	32	

[a]All import penetration based on quantity (weight for textiles & apparel).

[b]Import penetration for cotton products only.

[c]The drop in import penetration masks the movement offshore of U.S. firms and the direct investment in assembly by foreign producers. Total value-added of TVs manufactured in the U.S. was only 45%–47%.

[d]Annualized rates based on 11 months.

[e]To establish levels of import penetration prior to the conclusion of protectionist agreements, we have gathered data for the years immediately preceding the dates of such agreements. Parentheses are used to indicate that the years for which data are recorded and the years in which agreements were concluded are not identical.

Sources. Textiles. Unpublished chart 4 (Cotton textiles: U.S. Import Trends: Ratio of Imports to Apparent Domestic Markets), Office of Textiles, Market Analysis Division, Department of Commerce, February 1971; United States International Trade Commission (USITC), 1984, A-6. *Footwear.* USITC, 1985, A-15. *TVs.* USITC, 1980, D-6 for 1975–78; USITC, 1984, A-37 and A-105 for 1980–82. *Steel.* American Iron & Steel Institute, 1968–1980. *Autos. Ward's Automotive Report,* 1982, 1; "Imported Cars at 32.6% as Domestic Sales Fall," *New York Times,* 5 December 1985, D-1, City Edition. Data also received by telephone from the ITC and American Iron and Steel Institute.

Protection and adjustment: Evidence
(Aggarwal et al. 1987)

5.貿易・投資の政策決定ー政府・政治要因

テキストの要点

1．政策要求―集合行動と組織利益

2．貿易政策の政治ーアメリカの事例

- 貿易政策の推移
- 貿易政策の体系
- 貿易政策の実施

5.1 貿易政策の規定要因

アメリカ貿易政策の事例

- アメリカ貿易政策の体系ー政策変更と政策実施
- アメリカ貿易政策の展開
  - 貿易政策と政党関係（Keech and Pak 1995）
  - 貿易政策と大統領（執政府）・議会（立法府）
- アメリカ貿易政策決定の規定要因
  - 大統領・議会関係、選挙区党派特性、景気（Lohmann and O’halloran 1994、Karol 2000 ）
  - 利益団体
- アメリカ貿易政策実施の規定要因

5.2　貿易拡大の国内政府要因

拒否権者構造の比較分析

- 拒否権者理論
  - 政策変化と拒否権者の数、距離、凝集度
- 貿易と国内拒否権者構造
  - 貿易と選挙制度
    - 選挙区規模、選挙制度、政党集権度
  - 貿易と政党対立
  - 貿易と政治構造

（補論　農業政策の国内政治）



FIGURE 1. *A model of industry decision making*

Industry and protection (Hathaway 1998)

FIGURE 1

TARIFF RATES BY PARTISAN CONTROL



Source: *Historical Statistics of the United States.*

U.S. Tariff rates (Keech and Pak 1995)



FIGURE 1. *Time sequence of events*

Congress, the President and levels of protection (Lohmann and O'Halloran 1994)

TABLE 7. *Eight models of U.S. trade policy, 1949–90*[a]

	Model							
Independent variable	*I*	*II*	*III*	*IV*	*V*	*VI*	*VII*	*VIII*
Constant	−0.06 (−1.18)	−0.07 (−1.26)	−0.06 (−1.16)	−0.07 (−1.27)	−0.07 (−1.24)	−0.07 (−1.23)	−0.07 (−1.22)	−0.06 (−1.18)
Δ*INFLATE*	−1.78 (−1.54)*	−1.81 (−1.59)*	−1.75 (−1.52)*	−1.83 (−1.56)*	−2.67 (−2.28)**	−2.76 (−2.04)**	−2.67 (−2.21)**	−2.80 (−2.09)**
Δ*UNEMPLOY*	0.08 (1.87)**	0.078 (1.78)**	0.085 (1.88)**	0.08 (1.72)**	0.05 (1.24)	0.05 (1.14)	0.06 (1.23)	0.05 (1.16)
Δ*PRESIDENT*	—	0.15 (3.53)**	—	0.16 (2.78)**	—	−0.03 (−0.23)	—	−0.05 (−0.58)
Δ*CONGRESS*	—	—	0.025 (0.43)	−0.012 (−0.17)	—	—	0.015 (0.41)	0.02 (0.98)
Δ*DIVIDED*	—	—	—	—	0.12 (3.12)**	0.13 (2.00)**	0.12 (3.04)**	0.14 (2.39)**
No. of observations	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42
R^2	0.13	0.15	0.13	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18
Wald test ~ χ^2 (Zero slopes)	9.14**	24.65**	9.81**	25.21**	25.02**	27.22**	26.00**	39.83**
Durbin-Watson test statistic	1.56	1.43	1.56	1.42	1.40	1.41	1.39	1.41
Wald test ~ χ^2 (nested)	—	12.49**	0.18	13.13**	9.76**	0.16	0.05	1.61

*$\alpha \leq .10$.
**$\alpha \leq .05$.
[a]Listed by coefficient with *t*-test statistics within parentheses; the dependent variable is Δ*TARIFF*.

PROPOSITION 5 (TRADE POLICY OUTCOMES UNDER UNIFIED AND DIVIDED GOVERNMENT). *U.S. trade policy tends to be more protectionist under divided than under unified government if the cross-district external effects in the congressional dominance game (γ) are not too severe and the size of the majority party in Congress (m) is not too large.*

Trade and divided government (Lohmann and O'Halloran 1994)

TABLE 2[a]

SUMMARY OF PROBIT RESULTS OF MAJOR TRADE VOTES

Dependent Variable	PID Dummy	SOUDEM Dummy	% of Votes for Liberal Positions	Chi-square
1951 vote	−3.1749***	.6647	42.6%	311.3(12)
(n = 392)	(−11.31)	(1.55)		
1955 vote	−1.0234***	.2138	50.9%	79.2(12)
(n = 405)	(−6.10)	(.64)		
1958 vote	−.8322***	−.2484	64.7%	58.2(12)
(n = 414)	(−4.78)	(−.78)		
1962 vote	−2.4012***	−1.1109***	59.7%	220.7(12)
(n = 424)	(−11.06)	(−3.07)		
1970 vote[b]	.1049	.3098	45.4%	165.2(12)
(n = 379)	(.61)	(.77)		
1973 vote	1.5801***	.9564***	61.1%	127.3(12)
(n = 377)	(9.03)	(3.06)		
1986 votes[c]	2.1018***	.3295***	36.1%	1195.0(12)
(n = 2,480)	(26.88)	(2.75)		
1987/8 votes[d]	2.3818***	.1538	59.6%	1286.3(12)
(n = 2,125)	(26.26)	(1.07)		
1991/3 votes[e]	1.6750***	1.1519***	51.4%	280.5(12)
(n = 855)	(13.91)	(6.84)		

[a] t-statistic in parentheses: *, **, *** denote significant at .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively.
[b] President Nixon remained neutral to this vote.
[c] Six votes on HR 4800. See appendix.
[d] Five votes on HR 3. See appendix.
[e] Two votes on H Res. 101 and HR 3450.

Partisan control and trade bills (Keech and Pak 1995)

Table 2. Coefficient estimates of empirical model

Labor contributions equation Variables	Adjusted coefficients
Constant	–56.6434
AFL-CIO rating	1.1438***
Labor committee	32.0348***
Terms in office	–0.8721
Democrat	17.5141
Sigma (scale parameter	38.4257

Business contributions equation Variables	Adjusted coefficients
Constant	–4.9062
COC rating	1.2419***
Ways and means committee	83.9211***
Terms in office	9.4320***
Democrat	47.0700

Voting equations variables	Adjusted coefficients NAFTA	Adjusted coefficients GATT	Adjusted coefficients MFN93
Constant	5.0047**	8.7638**	1.2114
Labor contributions	–0.0052***	–0.0027***	0.0002
Business contributions	0.0012**	0.0005*	0.0001
ACU rating	–0.0290***	–0.0285***	–0.0119***
AFL-CIO rating	–0.0174***	–0.0114***	–0.0060***
NSI rating	0.0071***	0.0093***	0.0017*
COC rating	0.0047	0.0040**	0.0021
LCV rating	–0.0016	–0.0009	–0.0048***
Percent hispanic	0.0093***		
Union	–3.0821***	–0.1409	0.0562
Democrat	–0.1438	–0.1375	0.1695*
Export ratio	0.2771***	0.1524***	0.0482**
No high school degree	–2.3108***	0.7321	0.2300
HS, no college degree	0.1755	–0.2236	0.6019
Unemployment rate	0.0423	–0.0288**	0.0328**
Per-capita income	–0.0121	0.0039	0.0082

Trade bills and interest groups (Baldwin and Magee 2000)

Table 2. Adjustment Assistance Cases: 1963–1981

Year	Number of Petitions		Yearly Average		Acceptance Rate	
	Commerce Department[a]	Labor Department	Commerce Department	Labor Department	Commerce Department	Labor Department
1963–1974	62	233	5	19	.37	.30
1975–1978	338	3529	85	882	.91	.45
1979–1981	1245	6213	623	2071	.81	.28

[a]Prescreened at regional offices, Commerce Department data only for 1979 and 1980.

Source: See Appendix.

Table 3. Escape Clause Cases: 1958–1981

Year[a]	Number of Petitions	Average Per Year	Number ITC Approved[b]	Number President Approved[c]	Acceptance Rate ITC	Acceptance Rate of President[d]	Acceptance Rate With ITC Remedy
1958–1962	56	11	15	8	.27	.14	.07
1963–1974	31	3	10	4	.33	.13	.03
1975–1978	40	10	24	9	.60	.23 (.20)	.03
1979–1981	13	4	8	5	.62	.38 (.23)	.08

[a]Organized by legislative periods.

[b]Includes Split Votes.

[c]An award of adjustment assistance alone is not considered aid.

[d]Number in parentheses indicates acceptance rate for industries not already covered by escape clause actions.

Source: See Appendix.

Administered protection 1 (Goldstein 1986)

Table 4. Unfair Trade Cases (Section 337 of 1930 Tariff Act): 1958–1982

Year	Number of Petitions	Petitions Per Year	Number Settled	Number Accepted	Rate of	
					Settlement	Acceptance
1958–1962	6	1	0	0	0	0
1963–1974	53	4	5	7	.09	.13
1975–1978	47	12	13	13	.28	.28
1979–1982	69	17	31	15	.45	.22

Source: See Appendix.

Table 5. Countervailing Duty Cases: 1958–1982

Year	Number of Petitions	Average Per Year	Number of Positive	Acceptance Rate
1958–1962	4	1	4	1.0
1963–1974	16	1	15	.93
1975–1978	149	37	45[a]	.30[b]
1979–1982	101	25	30	.30

[a]Thirty-three cases were waived.

[b]Eight percent if waived cases counted as negative.

Source: See Appendix.

Administered protection 2 (Goldstein 1986)

Table 1. Coefficient Estimates for the Nested Logit Model

Variable	Determinants of ITC Decisions[a]		Determinants of Industry Decisions[b]	
	Coefficient	t-Statistic	Coefficient	t-Statistic
Constant	-3.68	-2.47*	-2.12	-9.47*
Elasticity of demand	-.31	-.96	—	—
Industry employment	1.14	.67**	—	—
Ways and Means Democrats	-.12	-.98	—	—
Ways and Means Republicans	.20	.64**	—	—
Trade subcommittee Democrats	.61	3.15*	—	—
Trade subcommittee Republicans	-.75	-1.93*	—	—
Ways and Means chair	1.28	2.74*	—	—
Ways and Means ranking member	.09	.14	—	—
Trade subcommittee chair	-.25	-.50	—	—
Trade subcommittee ranking member	-.11	-.19	—	—
Capacity utilization	.95	.62	—	—
U.S. trade deficit	1.38	2.46*	—	—
Industry concentration ratios	-.48	-.05	-3.81	-1.07
Percentage change in industry employment	-2.07	-1.12**	-1.27	-1.82*
Percentage change in market share	7.60	1.74*	-.90	-2.81*
Tariff rate	1.89	1.45	-1.19	-2.58*
Inclusive value	—	—	.18	3.29*
Number of cases	205		2,903	
Percentage correctly predicted	72		92.97	

[a]The dependent variable is the ITC decision: 1 = *protection*, 0 = *no protection*. There were 80 positive decisions and 125 negative decisions by the ITC.

[b]The dependent variable is the industry decision: 1 = *apply*, 0 = *not apply*. There were 205 industry applicants and 2,698 nonapplicants.

*$p \leq .05$, two-tailed test.

**Indicates $p \leq .05$ when the number of congressional representatives for each industry is replaced by a dummy variable.

ITC and administered protection (Hansen 1990)

Table 4
Results of the First Model
(dependent variable = Trade Openness; N = 1,018; R^2 = .4943)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Independent Variable	Coefficient
Party Nomination 1	**1.575**	Average regional IDCR	–0.5833***
	(3.248)		(0.1550)
Party Nomination 2	**–15.41****	Population	–15.21***
	(7.759)		(1.705)
Electoral volatility	**–4.271***	GDP per capita	2.818*
	(2.585)		(1.711)
Electoral district size	**2.028***	Δ GDP	10.31
	(1.147)		(6.711)
Executive constraint	–1.565	Δ Exchange rate	5.870***
	(1.200)		(0.8260)
Parliamentary dummy	1.570	EU dummy	5.334**
	(1.994)		(2.481)
Divided government	1.889**	World Bank / IMF dummy	0.5188
	(0.7818)		(1.031)
Leftist government (developed)	0.8529	WTO / GATT dummy	–0.4530
	(1.003)		(1.809)
Leftist government (developing)	1.184	Constant	280.3***
	(1.447)		(29.67)

Note: IDCR = import duty coverage ratio; EU = European Union; IMF = International Monetary Fund; WTO = World Trade Organization. Random effects regression with AR(1) autocorrelation correction. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Primary independent variables are in boldface. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. All tests are 2-tailed.

Table 5
Results of the Second Model
(dependent variable = Import Duty Coverage Ratio;
n = 847; R^2 = .6233)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Independent Variable	Coefficient
Party Nomination 1	**0.3673**	Average regional IDCR	0.2427***
	(0.9173)		(0.0449)
Party Nomination 2	**2.285***	Population	0.3519
	(1.336)		(0.3452)
Electoral volatility	**0.0141**	GDP per capita	–2.858***
	(0.8151)		(0.4156)
Electoral district size	**–0.5162***	Δ GDP	0.9009
	(0.3102)		(2.210)
Executive constraint	–0.4926	Δ Exchange rate	–1.249***
	(0.3683)		(0.2643)
Parliamentary dummy	0.9919	EU dummy	–1.514**
	(0.7207)		(0.7444)
Divided government	–0.1575	World Bank / IMF dummy	–0.4743
	(0.2427)		(0.3434)
Leftist government (developed)	–0.1769	WTO / GATT dummy	0.3572
	(0.3023)		(0.6321)
Leftist government	–0.9193*	Constant	32.24***
(developing)	(0.5028)		(6.278)

Note: IDCR = import duty coverage ratio; EU = European Union; IMF = International Monetary Fund; WTO = World Trade Organization. Random effects regression with AR(1) autocorrelation correction. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Primary independent variables are in boldface. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. All tests are 2-tailed.

Party strength and international trade (Hankla 2007)



FIG. 1. Left and Right Trade Policy Positions (• is left; ▲ is right)



FIG. 3. Extent of Divergence Among Parties on Trade, 1945–1998

Party platforms on trade (Milner and Judkins 2004)

TABLE 2. Regression Results on a Party's Trade Manifesto Position (FT)

	Party Position on Trade Policy			*Country FE*	
Dependent Variable:	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*
Left-Right	**0.291*** **	**0.305*** **	**0.270*** **	**1.060*** **	**0.259*** **
	(0.043)	(0.035)	(0.049)	(0.073)	(0.067)
YEAR	**0.031*** **	**0.040*** **	**0.035*** **	0.008	**0.027** **
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.011)
LNPOP	**0.567*** **	−0.037	−0.037	**1.007** **	0.023
	(0.195)	(0.345)	(0.347)	(0.490)	(0.369)
LNRDGPC	**−1.309*** **	**−1.792*** **	**−1.629*** **	**−1.214***	**−1.450*** **
	(0.261)	(0.363)	(0.385)	(0.686)	(0.416)
OPEN		**0.016*** **	**0.014*** **	**0.016** **	**0.013*** **
		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)
TC		**−4.605*** **	**−5.263*** **	−0.313	**−6.197*** **
		(1.748)	(1.890)	(3.916)	(1.947)
HEGEMONY		**23.259*** **	**21.999*** **	**19.764*** **	**19.147*** **
		(3.736)	(3.974)	(6.009)	(4.178)
SEATS		**0.007*** **	**0.006*** **	0.000	**0.006*** **
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
PRESIDENT			**1.484*** **	**1.118** **	**1.373*** **
			(0.355)	(0.441)	(0.381)
ERULE			−0.007	**0.578** **	0.053
			(0.329)	(0.247)	(0.353)
EU					0.313
					(0.713)
EU*LR					**−0.032** ^^
					(0.097)
Constant	**−55.75*** **	**−63.25*** **	**−53.79*** **	−22.55	**−39.264***
	(10.751)	(17.035)	(18.625)	(32.712)	(20.390)
Observations	1574	1535	1530	1530	1530
# of parties	186	183	183	183	183
Log likelihood	−3384.95	−3389.77	−3368.97	−3795.24	−3370.50
Wald chi2	449562	38968	32425	355	36995
Prob>chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
rho	0.018	0.021	0.017	0.266	0.020

Estimated with feasible GLS (XTGLS in STATA 8), party fixed effects except #4 where country FE, heteroscedastic panels, AR1 correction.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; ^^jointly significant at 5% with L/R.

Determinants of party platforms on trade (Milner and Judkins 2004)

TABLE 2. Effects of Unemployment and Veto Points on Trade Policy, 1980–2000

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
N	731	587	144	723	583	140
# countries	58	44	26	58	45	25
R^2	0.72	0.39	0.90	0.72	0.38	0.90
Sample	All	Stable democracies	Other countries	All	Stable democracies	Other countries
Source of democracy data		Polity ≥ 6	Polity <6		Polity ≥ 6	Polity <6
Level of import penetration	−0.007	−0.009	−0.013	−0.007	−0.010	−0.012
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Veto points	−0.136	−0.273	−0.055	−0.048	−0.061	−0.015
	0.014	0.000	0.628	0.047	0.060	0.751
Unemployment rate	−0.005	−0.023	−0.001	−0.005	−0.010	0.005
	0.087	0.001	0.749	0.160	0.086	0.433
Veto points ×	0.012	0.034	−0.013	0.006	0.009	−0.008
unemployment rate	0.007	0.000	0.235	0.029	0.019	0.231
Real effective exchange rate	0.000	−0.001	0.000	0.000	−0.001	0.000
	0.000	0.164	0.000	0.000	0.067	0.000
Change in real effective	−0.031	−0.102	0.027	−0.034	−0.104	0.018
exchange rate	0.450	0.117	0.586	0.416	0.118	0.731
Change in terms of trade	0.721	0.626	1.247	0.662	0.636	1.500
	0.001	0.007	0.004	0.002	0.007	0.010
Gross private capital	0.001	0.001	−0.002	0.001	0.001	−0.002
formation/GDP	0.013	0.026	0.479	0.009	0.012	0.412
Gross international	0.014	0.012	0.026	0.012	0.010	0.027
reserves/imports	0.000	0.001	0.003	0.000	0.003	0.002

Notes: Entries are ordinary least-squares coefficient estimates above corresponding p-values, based on panel-corrected standard errors. Coefficient estimates for PTA, country, and year indicator variables are not reported to conserve space. As we included PTA, country, and year indicator variables, we do not include a constant term.

Veto points, unemployment and trade openness (Henisz and Mansfield 2006)



FIG. 1. How Political Constraints Moderate Societal Pressures for Protectionism

Veto points and trade openness (Henisz and Mansfield 2006)

6. 貿易・投資協定の政治経済

テキストの要点

- 海外投資・多国籍企業
  - 資源投資（所有）、消費市場投資（市場）、生産効率投資（内部化）
  - 特殊財産・垂直統合と知的財産・水平統合
- 多国籍企業規制
  - 所有権保護
    - 内国待遇、公有化・接収、補償（十分、効果的、迅速ーHull Rule (1938))、本国救済（<--Calvo doctrine (1868))
  - 輸入代替戦略　　国内規制　　投資保証vs国内規制
  - 輸出新興戦略　　国内整備　　TRIMs (GATT), MAI (OECD)

6.1 貿易協定の規定要因

- 民主化と貿易自由化
- 貿易協定と国内利害
  - 規模の経済（輸出・国内の生産部門対）
  - 生産の分業（多国籍企業と労資対立）
- 貿易協定と紛争処理
  - 紛争処理制度設計の規定要因
  - 紛争処理設計の政治過程
- 貿易協定と民主政・拒否権
  - 貿易協定と民主政（前出）
  - 貿易協定と拒否権

6.2 投資協定の規定要因

- 直接投資の政治的規定要因
  - 民主政 vs 財産権保護
    - プラス=政策信頼性
      - 拒否権、観衆コスト、継続性
    - マイナス=投資環境整備
      - 寡占規制、財政・税制支援、国内労資保護
  - 人権、人的資源と直接投資
- 投資協定の規定要因
  - 資本誘致競争と国内制度整備

TABLE 2. *Tariff rates*

Dependent variable	*Tariff rates*					
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*
POLITY	−0.264***	−0.247**	−0.262***	−0.262***	−0.251***	−0.249***
	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.101)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.096)
GDP PC	0.000**	0.001***	0.001***	0.000**	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
LN POP	36.24***	32.50***	34.99***	36.37***	36.61***	36.72***
	(5.106)	(5.433)	(6.222)	(5.162)	(4.976)	(5.084)
EC CRISIS		−0.777				
		(0.670)				
BP CRISIS			0.709			
			(0.672)			
IMF				0.248		
				(0.375)		
US HEG					21.515	
					(15.769)	
FIVE OPEN						−1.646
						(1.523)
Constant	2,781***	2,762***	2,821***	2,798***	2,830***	2,581***
	(203.9)	(194.9)	(239.2)	(209.3)	(195.7)	(304.3)
Observations	774	765	738	765	774	734
Countries	101	100	98	101	101	101
R^2	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.80
Wald chi^2	3724	4996	1312	1454	635	767
Prob > chi^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: OLS with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed effects, AR1 correction, and time trend are included but are not shown. All right-hand-side variables are lagged one period.
*** significant at 1%; two-tailed tests.
** significant at 5%; two-tailed tests.
* significant at 10%; two-tailed tests.

Democratization and tariff rates (Milner and Kubota 2005)

TABLE 3. *Tariff rates*

Dependent variable	*Tariff rates*					
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*
REGIME	−0.347***	−0.317***	−0.331***			−0.302***
	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.110)			(0.117)
DEM				−1.369		
				(1.374)		
DICTATOR					−0.880***	
					(0.245)	
SGL PARTY						−4.629**
						(2.020)
MILITARY						1.740
						(1.571)
LN POP	31.08***	35.02***	31.74***	25.71***	26.27***	32.37***
	(6.278)	(6.447)	(7.255)	(7.181)	(6.955)	(7.120)
GDP PC	0.001**	0.001***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
EC CRISIS	−0.623	−0.469	−0.688	−0.661	−0.663	−0.703
	(0.686)	(0.688)	(0.755)	(0.712)	(0.720)	(0.744)
BP CRISIS	0.823	0.775	0.434	0.652	0.559	0.436
	(0.719)	(0.719)	(0.710)	(0.702)	(0.673)	(0.704)
IMF	0.139	0.140	0.141	−0.018	−0.156	0.131
	(0.375)	(0.372)	(0.393)	(0.403)	(0.392)	(0.388)
OFFICE	−0.185***	−0.183***	−0.199***	−0.134**	−0.207***	−0.179***
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.061)
AV TARIFF	.091**		0.128***	0.131***	0.111**	0.123***
	(.042)		(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
GATT		2.275**	2.395**	2.810**	2.356**	2.424**
		(1.159)	(1.174)	(1.088)	(1.088)	(1.163)
FDI			0.418**	0.414**	0.402**	0.400**
			(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.169)	(0.173)
FIVE OPEN		−1.566				
		(1.585)				
US HEG		22.537				
		(18.177)				
Constant	2,538***	2,665***	2,902***	2,957***	2,903***	3,007***
	(246.82)	(338.3)	(315.6)	(284.5)	(277.5)	(306.9)
Observations	694	694	649	681	681	649
Country	97	97	89	98	98	89
R^2	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.79	0.80	0.80
Wald chi^2	4430	791	4255	15024	2161	783
Prob > chi^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: OLS with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed effects, AR1 correction, and time trend are included but are not shown. All right-hand-side variables are lagged one period.
*** significant at 1%; two-tailed tests.
** significant at 5%; two-tailed tests.
* significant at 10%; two-tailed tests.

TABLE 5. *Sachs-Warner trade liberalization*

Dependent variable	*Sachs-Warner openness*			
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*
REGIME	0.332***	0.332***	0.367***	0.521***
	(0.104)	(0.118)	(0.129)	(0.147)
LN POP	43.425***	49.808***	69.062***	29.559**
	(8.802)	(10.545)	(15.040)	(14.293)
GDP PC	−0.000	−0.001	−0.000	−0.004*
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
EC CRISIS	−0.652	−0.496	−0.531	−1.563
	(0.987)	(1.050)	(1.108)	(1.423)
BP CRISIS	−0.271	−0.395	−0.019	−0.505
	(0.653)	(0.715)	(0.775)	(0.957)
IMF		−0.465	−0.780	−0.197
		(0.614)	(0.641)	(0.773)
OFFICE		−0.078	−0.083	−0.050
		(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.095)
GATT		−4.771***	−4.900***	−5.111***
		(1.675)	(1.650)	(1.746)
US HEG			−55.151**	−18.073
			(24.594)	(28.659)
AV OPEN				39.132***
				(14.251)
FDI				−0.038
				(0.408)
FIVE OPEN			−2.632	
			(1.826)	
Observations	982	872	872	829
LR chi^2	955	862	869	834
Prob > chi^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Log likelihood	−43.85	−37.93	−34.33	−27.74

Note: Conditional logit with country fixed effects and decade fixed effects. A natural spline function with three knots was estimated, as was the time since last opening occurred; all these were used to correct for serial dependence. All right-hand-side variables are lagged one period. Asymptotic z-statistics are in parentheses.
*** significant at 1%; two-tailed tests.
** significant at 5%; two-tailed tests.
* significant at 10%; two-tailed tests.

TABLE 6. *Sachs-Warner trade liberalization*

Dependent variable	*Sachs-Warner openness*			
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*
REGIME	0.523***			0.558***
	(0.143)			(0.156)
DEM		5.820***		
		(1.579)		
DICTATOR			0.864***	
			(0.259)	
SGL PARTY				−10.074
				(129)
MILITARY				2.268
				(2.030)
LN POP	27.296**	31.539**	25.071**	31.670**
	(11.563)	(13.183)	(12.465)	(12.758)
GDP PC	−0.001	−0.002	−0.002	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
EC CRISIS	−1.639	−2.847**	−2.518**	−1.386
	(1.411)	(1.339)	(1.265)	(1.371)
BP CRISIS	−0.309	−0.955	−0.974	−0.123
	(0.905)	(0.988)	(0.966)	(0.891)
IMF	−0.016	−0.806	−0.732	0.090
	(0.740)	(0.724)	(0.698)	(0.750)
OFFICE	−0.062	−0.082	−0.068	−0.088
	(0.103)	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.139)
GATT	−5.060***	−6.950***	−6.623***	−5.246***
	(1.661)	(1.948)	(1.888)	(1.731)
AV OPEN	38.688***	41.083***	40.566***	35.492***
	(12.093)	(12.324)	(12.381)	(12.237)
Observations	872	913	913	872
LR chi^2	879	931	927	881
Prob > chi^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Log likelihood	−29.22	−29.84	−31.63	−28.52

Note: Conditional logit with country fixed effects and decade fixed effects. A natural spline function with three knots was estimated as was the time since last opening occurred; all these were used to correct for serial dependence. All right-hand-side variables are lagged one period. Asymptotic z-statistics are in parentheses.
*** significant at 1%; two-tailed tests.
** significant at 5%; two-tailed tests.
* significant at 10%; two-tailed tests.

Democratization and openness (Milner and Kubota 2005)

TABLE 3. *Definition of variables for NAFTA lobbying*

Variable	*Measurement*	*Sign*
NAFTA LOBBYING	1 if lobbied in support 0 if did not lobby −1 if lobbied in opposition	DV
ECONOMIES OF SCALE	Elasticity of value added per worker with respect to plant size	+
REGIONAL INTRAFIRM TRADE	Intrafirm trade of U.S. corporations with affiliates in Mexico and Canada divided by U.S. sales	+
OFFSHORE ASSEMBLY	Foreign content of imports from Mexico and Canada under HTS Chapter 9802 divided by U.S. sales	+
IMPORT COMPETITION	Imports divided by U.S. consumption	−
LABOR INTENSITY	Wages divided by value added	−
EXPORT DEPENDENCE	Exports divided by U.S. sales	+
INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE	Index of intra-industry trade	+

Regional production sharing

Returns to Scale	High	Low
Large	(1) **Intense** lobbying for trading blocs Support: 61.1% Oppose: 5.1%	(2) **Moderate** lobbying for trading blocs Support: 40.6% Oppose: 13.2%
Small	(4) **Moderate** lobbying for trading blocs Support: 28.3% Oppose: 21.8%	(3) **No** lobbying for trading blocs Support: 13.7% Oppose: 39.8%

Note: Cell entries are predicted probabilities from Model 3, Table 4, minus and plus one standard deviation of economies of scale and offshore assembly, holding all other independent variables constant at their mean values.

FIGURE 2. *Business group lobbying for trading blocs: hypotheses and results*

TABLE 4. *Ordered probit estimates for NAFTA lobbying*

Variable	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*
ECONOMIES OF SCALE		4.177***	4.228***
		(1.193)	(1.197)
REGIONAL INTRAFIRM TRADE		10.787*	
		(4.299)	
OFFSHORE ASSEMBLY			39.792**
			(15.104)
IMPORT COMPETITION	−2.217*	−2.465**	−2.579**
	(0.889)	(0.949)	(0.953)
LABOR INTENSITY	−3.267**	−2.006	−2.497*
	(1.090)	(1.152)	(1.162)
EXPORT DEPENDENCE	4.339**	3.791*	4.164*
	(1.660)	(1.755)	(1.728)
INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE	0.224	0.362	0.392
	(0.463)	(0.484)	(0.485)
THRESHOLD 1	−1.894***	−1.215*	−1.476*
	(0.498)	(0.577)	(0.586)
THRESHOLD 2	−0.665	0.110	−0.122
	(0.481)	(0.567)	(0.573)
Log likelihood	−128.28	−119.75	−118.03
Model χ^2	34.10***	51.17***	54.59***
Pseudo R^2	0.117	0.176	0.188

Note: Cell entries are maximum likelihood estimates obtained using ordered probit analysis. Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. $N = 134$.
***$p < .001$.
**$p < .01$.
*$p < .05$.

Market interests and NAFTA lobbying (Chase 2003)

TABLE 6. *OLS regression results for NAFTA tariff phasing*

Variable	*Model 1*	*Model 2*
ECONOMIES OF SCALE	−0.606*	−0.620*
	(0.253)	(0.256)
REGIONAL INTRAFIRM TRADE	−2.766***	
	(0.841)	
OFFSHORE ASSEMBLY		−5.280*
		(2.534)
IMPORT COMPETITION	0.704***	0.670***
	(0.200)	(0.202)
LABOR INTENSITY	0.165	0.206
	(0.274)	(0.279)
EXPORT DEPENDENCE	−0.854*	−0.976*
	(0.382)	(0.382)
INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE	−0.152	−0.171
	(0.105)	(0.106)
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION	0.398**	0.351*
	(0.141)	(0.140)
GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION	0.435	0.449
	(0.231)	(0.235)
Constant	−0.312	−0.317
	(0.199)	(0.203)
F-ratio	9.24***	8.62***
Adjusted R^2	0.332	0.314

Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. N = 134.
***$p < .005$.
**$p < .01$.
*$p < .05$.

Market interests and NAFTA tariff phasing (Chase 2003)

TABLE 1. *Institutional options in dispute settlement design*

	Spectrum of legalism		
Treaty provision	*More diplomatic* <——————————>		*More legalistic*
Third-party review	None	Access controlled by political body	Automatic right to review
Third-party ruling	Recommendation	Binding if approved by political body	Directly binding obligation
Judges	Ad hoc arbitrators	Ad hoc panelists drawn from roster	Standing tribunal of justices
Standing	States only	States and treaty organs	States, treaty organs, and individuals
Remedy	None	Retaliatory sanctions	Direct effect in domestic law

TABLE 9. *Ordered probit regression of legalism*

Variable	*Coefficient*	*Standard error*
Proposed integration	3.203**	0.682
Economic asymmetry	1.067*	0.484
Interaction	−5.604**	1.483
Number of observations	63	
Log likelihood	−49.59	
Chi-squared	26.16	
Significance	0.000	

**$p < .01$, two-tailed test.
*$p < .05$, two-tailed test.

PTAs and dispute settlement design (Smith 2000)



FIGURE 1. *Obtaining antidumping and countervailing duty relief*

CUSFTA and dispute settlement (Goldstein 1996)

TABLE 2 *The Effects of Veto Players on PTA Formation, 1950–99*

Variable	Base Model	Includes Hub and Spokes	FTAs/CUs/ CMs/EUs	CUs/CMs/EUs
Veto Players$_i$	−1.608** (0.244)	−0.718** (0.174)	−1.538** (0.252)	−1.965** (0.331)
Veto Players$_j$	−1.698** (0.244)	−0.724** (0.170)	−1.657** (0.250)	−2.381** (0.320)
Regime Type$_i$	0.049** (0.006)	0.044** (0.005)	0.050** (0.006)	0.055** (0.008)
Regime Type$_j$	0.040** (0.006)	0.041** (0.004)	0.042** (0.006)	0.051** (0.007)
Trade$_{ij}$	−0.006 (0.008)	0.047** (0.006)	−0.007 (0.008)	−0.012 (0.009)
GDP$_i$	−0.208** (0.020)	−0.201** (0.015)	−0.215** (0.020)	−0.286** (0.024)
GDP$_j$	−0.183** (0.019)	−0.179** (0.015)	−0.199** (0.020)	−0.241** (0.024)
ΔGDP$_i$	6.94×10^{-10} (1.14×10^{-9})	-1.63×10^{-9} (8.87×10^{-10})	9.11×10^{-10} (1.14×10^{-9})	-6.94×10^{-9}** (2.26×10^{-9})
ΔGDP$_j$	3.64×10^{-10} (1.01×10^{-9})	-2.15×10^{-9}** (7.97×10^{-10})	9.42×10^{-10} (9.56×10^{-10})	-6.08×10^{-9}** (1.47×10^{-9})
Dispute$_{ij}$	−0.484 (0.274)	−0.377 (0.248)	−0.444 (0.281)	−0.732* (0.337)
Ally$_{ij}$	1.269** (0.083)	0.726** (0.063)	1.210** (0.087)	1.203** (0.100)
Former Colony$_{ij}$	−0.813 (0.717)	0.660** (0.192)	–†	–†
Contiguity$_{ij}$	−0.170 (0.119)	−0.383** (0.101)	−0.231 (0.124)	−0.193 (0.143)
Distance$_{ij}$	−0.910** (0.050)	−0.819** (0.036)	−0.934** (0.053)	−0.903** (0.061)
Hegemony	−18.033** (1.989)	−18.199** (1.361)	−17.852** (2.103)	−16.016** (2.253)
GATT$_{ij}$	0.326** (0.057)	0.387** (0.042)	0.389** (0.058)	0.626** (0.065)
Constant	11.404** (0.842)	12.064** (0.605)	11.768** (0.884)	12.601** (0.952)
Log-likelihood	−11,389.03	−16,869.78	−10,824.14	−7,662.21
N	339,910	341,073	339,774	339,091

Note: Parameters are estimated using logistic regression, after including a cubic spline function with no knots. Entries in parentheses are Huber standard errors clustered on the dyad.
**$p \leq 0.01$; *$p \leq 0.05$. All tests of statistical significance are two-tailed.
†There is no case where states with a former colonial relationship formed a reciprocal FTA, CU, common market or economic union.

Veto points and trade agreements
(Mansfield et al. 2007)

TABLE 2. *The economic and political determinants of FDI (cross-section)*

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
MARKET SIZE	0.200	0.183	0.268*	0.259
	(1.463)	(1.198)	(1.705)	(1.629)
DEVELOPMENT LEVEL	0.088	−0.124	−0.358	−0.336
	(0.351)	(−0.340)	(−0.945)	(−0.874)
GROWTH	−0.2857***	−0.266**	−0.321***	−0.317***
	(−2.857)	(−2.465)	(−3.243)	(−3.176)
TRADE	0.030***	0.031***	0.034***	0.034***
	(7.151)	(6.673)	(10.048)	(8.883)
NATURAL RESOURCES	6.623***	6.365***	5.217***	5.234***
	(3.114)	(2.792)	(2.701)	(2.731)
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION	−0.076**	−0.091***	−0.044	−0.043
	(−2.441)	(−2.797)	(−1.189)	(−1.145)
BUDGET DEFICIT	−0.116**	−0.125**	−0.117**	−0.118**
	(−2.111)	(−2.267)	(−2.428)	(−2.399)
DEMOCRACY	0.057**	0.053*	0.060**	0.100
	(2.208)	(1.902)	(2.156)	(0.804)
HUMAN CAPITAL		0.149	0.203*	0.205*
		(1.289)	(1.893)	(1.880)
DEMOCRACY SQUARED				−0.002
				(−0.339)
FDI INFLOWS CONTROLS			−1.839***	−1.798***
			(−3.597)	(−3.357)
Constant	−6.857**	−5.305	−6.316**	−6.374***
	(−2.500)	(−1.511)	(−2.014)	(−2.014)
N	78	71	68	68
R^2	0.68	0.70	0.75	0.75

Note: All regressions are ordinary least squares (OLS) cross-sectional regressions using net FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP averaged from 1990–98 as the dependent variable.
***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, *$p < .10$.

TABLE 3. *Robustness of democracy and FDI (cross-section)*

Variables	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*	*Model 9*
MARKET SIZE	0.243	0.246	0.185	0.260	0.219
	(1.445)	(1.521)	(1.162)	(1.514)	(1.344)
DEVELOPMENT LEVEL	−0.271	−0.173	0.160	−0.135	0.033
	(−0.764)	(−0.493)	(0.517)	(−0.389)	(0.117)
GROWTH	−0.361***	−0.338***	−0.277***	−0.307***	−0.293***
	(−3.561)	(−3.329)	(−3.205)	(−3.296)	(−3.149)
TRADE	0.033***	0.034***	0.033***	0.034***	0.033***
	(11.363)	(11.389)	(10.886)	(11.053)	(11.139)
NATURAL RESOURCES	5.861***	6.130***	6.025***	6.255***	6.137***
	(3.352)	(3.382)	(3.171)	(3.208)	(3.100)
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION	−0.040**	−0.042	−0.257	−0.038	−0.036
	(−1.134)	(−1.167)	(−0.734)	(−1.043)	(−0.916)
BUDGET DEFICIT	−0.114**	−0.111**	−0.112**	−0.120**	−0.115**
	(−2.523)	(−2.413)	(−2.430)	(−2.493)	(−2.329)
DEMOCRACY	0.076***	0.068***	0.084***	0.080***	0.080***
	(3.536)	(2.922)	(3.669)	(3.488)	(3.454)
GOVERNMENT REPUTATION	0.198				
	(1.552)				
EXPROPRIATION		0.165			
		(1.210)			
CORRUPTION			−0.159		
			(−1.288)		
RULE OF LAW				0.106	
				(0.836)	
BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY					−0.017
					(−0.128)
FDI INFLOWS CONTROLS	−1.816***	−1.918***	−1.840***	−1.813***	−1.841***
	(−3.943)	(−3.643)	(−3.504)	(−3.583)	(−3.579)
N	69	69	69	69	69
R^2	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.75	0.75

Note: All regressions are ordinary least squares (OLS) cross-sectional regressions using net FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP averaged from 1990–98 as the dependent variable.
***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, *$p < .10$.

Democracy and FDI: 1990-97(Jensen 2003)

TABLE 4. *Panel analysis*

Variables	*Model 10*	*Model 11*	*Model 12*
LAGGED FDI	0.364***	0.358***	0.361***
	(5.059)	(4.952)	(5.006)
MARKET SIZE	−0.554	−0.206	−0.516
	(−1.236)	(−0.438)	(−1.121)
DEVELOPMENT LEVEL	0.834*	0.419	0.803*
	(1.868)	(0.886)	(1.762)
GROWTH	0.024***	0.024***	0.024***
	(2.961)	(2.897)	(2.867)
TRADE	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(1.249)	(1.402)	(1.330)
BUDGET DEFICIT	−0.023**	−0.024**	−0.024**
	(−2.187)	(−2.272)	(−2.261)
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION	−0.039**	−0.041**	−0.042**
	(−2.357)	(−2.444)	(−2.508)
CAPITAL CONTROLS		0.054**	
		(2.441)	
FDI INFLOWS CONTROLS			0.002
			(0.014)
DEMOCRACY	0.021***	0.021***	0.019**
	(2.606)	(2.358)	(2.224)
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1630	1609	1609
Countries	114	113	113
R^2	0.72	0.72	0.72

Note: All regressions are ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions using annual net FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP as the dependent variable.
***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$, *$p < .10$.

Democracy and FDI: 1970-97 (Jensen 2003)

TABLE 1. *Effect of democratic institutions on FDI inflows to developing countries 1982–95*

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
DEMOCRACY-RELATED PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION			0.0757**	0.0761**
			(1.67)	(1.67)
DEMOCRACY-EXCLUDED PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION			0.0435***	0.0437***
			(3.01)	(3.08)
PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION	0.0522***	0.0519***		
	(3.16)	(3.33)		
LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY	−0.0878***		−0.0943***	
	(3.45)		(3.48)	
SELECTION		−0.0714		−0.0798
		(0.72)		(0.77)
CONSTRAINT		−0.0935		−0.0921*
		(1.05)		(1.33)
COMPETITION		−0.0896		−0.0976
		(1.06)		(1.17)
JOINT F-TEST		28.5***		42.2***
REGIME DURABILITY	0.0229***	0.0230***	0.0232***	0.0230***
	(2.53)	(2.93)	(2.62)	(2.97)
POLITICAL INSTABILITY	−0.0172	−0.0201	−0.0163	−0.0184
	(0.90)	(1.00)	(0.82)	(0.89)
LABOR COST CHANGE	−0.0007	−0.0007	−0.0019	−0.0019
	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.76)	(0.73)
ECONOMIC SIZE	1.0299***	1.0289***	1.0775***	1.0759***
	(3.61)	(3.72)	(3.68)	(3.76)
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT	−0.0973	−0.0858	−0.0047	0.0074
	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.02)	(0.02)
ECONOMIC GROWTH	0.0227**	0.0240**	0.0189*	0.0195*
	(1.82)	(1.87)	(1.51)	(1.54)
EXCHANGE-RATE VOLATILITY	−0.0001**	−0.0001***	−0.0001**	−0.0001**
	(2.24)	(2.12)	(2.05)	(1.95)
CAPITAL FLOW RESTRICTIONS	−0.0854**	−0.0877**	−0.0801**	−0.0815**
	(1.88)	(1.95)	(1.69)	(1.72)
WORLD FDI INFLOWS	0.0036***	0.0037***	0.0037***	0.0037***
	(3.81)	(4.05)	(3.32)	(3.42)
Constant	−25.3194***	−24.1824***	−27.3675***	−26.1584***
	(4.58)	(4.72)	(4.82)	(4.96)
Observations	483	483	458	458
R^2	0.21	0.22	0.22	0.22

Note: OLS estimates and *t*-statistics in parentheses are based on panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) with AR(1) correction.
***$p < .01$.
**$p < .05$.
*$p < .10$.

Property rights, democracy and FDI (Li and Resnick 2003)

TABLE 1 FDI, Human Rights, and Human Capital (Life Expectancy)

Variables	Model 1 *DV = FDI*	Model 2 *DV = Human Rights*	Model 3 *DV = Life Expectancy*
Human Rights	.81*	—	.37*
	(.12)		(.19)
Life Expectancy	.05*	—	—
	(.01)		
FDI	—	.20*	—
		(.05)	
Market Size	.15*	—	—
	(.06)		
Development	−.44*	−.03	9.60*
	(.15)	(.03)	(.18)
Economic Growth	.07*	−.01*	—
	(.01)	(.01)	
Trade Openness	1.30*	.001	—
	(.19)	(.10)	
Government Consumption	−.05*	—	—
	(.01)		
Resource Wealth	.01*	—	—
	(.003)		
Democracy	.01	.02*	.13*
	(.01)	(.004)	(.04)
Internal Conflict	—	−.96*	—
		(.06)	
External Conflict	—	−.12	—
		(.09)	
Population	—	−.16*	1.05*
		(.02)	(.12)
Observations	1,717	1,717	2,260
R^2	.23	.20	.58

Note: Cells contain slope coefficients, with robust (Huber-White) standard errors in parentheses. First two models are two-stage regression; third is OLS regression.
*indicates significance at the .05 level (two-tailed test).

TABLE 2 FDI, Human Rights, and Human Capital (Education)

Variables	Model 4 *DV = FDI*	Model 5 *DV = Human Rights*	Model 6 *DV = Education*
Human Rights	.98*	—	1.43*
	(.15)		(.49)
Education	.02*	—	—
	(.004)		
FDI	—	.18*	—
		(.04)	
Market Size	.20*	—	—
	(.07)		
Development	−.51*	−.04	22.90*
	(.15)	(.03)	(.50)
Economic Growth	.08*	−.01*	—
	(.01)	(.01)	
Trade Openness	1.28*	.02	—
	(.21)	(.09)	
Government Consumption	−.07*	—	—
	(.01)		
Resource Wealth	.01*	—	—
	(.003)		
Democracy	.01	.02*	.43*
	(.01)	(.004)	(.07)
Internal Conflict	—	−.95*	—
		(.06)	
External Conflict	—	−.19*	—
		(.10)	
Population	—	−.16*	1.10*
		(.02)	(.30)
Observations	1,536	1,536	2,000
R^2	.23	.25	.61

Human rights and FDI (Blanton and Blanton 2007)



FIGURE 1. *Number of bilateral investment treaties signed and mean global foreign direct investment as a proportion of GDP, by year, 1959–99*

Trends in BITs and FDI (Elkins, Guzman and Simmons 2006)



Note: Data points shown are for dyads signing BITs.

FIGURE 2. *Mean difference in GDP per capita between dyad members*



Note: Universe consists of states with more than 1 million inhabitants between 1960 and 1999. Data points shown are for dyads signing BITs.

FIGURE 3. *Mean difference in democracy between dyad members*

Trends in the difference between BIT signatories (Elkins, Guzman and Simmons 2006)

TABLE 2. *A model of BIT signings: Cox proportional hazard model*

Explanatory variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*
Competitive theory			
BITS AMONG EXPORT MARKET COMPETITORS	1.05***		
	(0.01)		
BITS AMONG EXPORT PRODUCT COMPETITORS		1.11***	
		(0.04)	
BITS AMONG INFRASTRUCTURE COMPETITORS			1.04
			(0.02)**
AVERAGE ANNUAL GLOBAL FDI FLOWS	1.32***	1.53***	1.46***
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.13)
HOST EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES/EXPORTS	0.73**	0.73**	0.72***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
PERCEPTIONS OF HOST CORRUPTION	1.03	1.01	1.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
HOST LEGAL TRADITION (COMMON LAW)	0.66***	0.65***	0.66***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Alternative diffusion explanations			
BITS AMONG THOSE WITH SAME RELIGION	0.99	0.98	0.99
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
BITS AMONG THOSE WITH SAME LANGUAGE	1.01		
	(0.06)		
BITS AMONG THOSE WITH SAME COLONIZER	0.99		
	(0.04)		
LEARNING FROM SUCCESS	1.85**	1.83*	2.13*
	(0.42)	(0.61)	(0.94)
COERCION: HOST USE OF IMF CREDITS	1.44***	1.39***	1.43***
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Host control variables			
HOST GDP (LN)	1.07*	1.03	1.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
HOST GDP/CAPITA	1.00	1.00	0.99
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
HOST GDP GROWTH	0.97***	0.97***	0.97***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
HOST NET FDI INFLOWS (% OF GDP), T−1	1.01	1.01	1.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
HOST ILLITERACY RATE	0.34***	0.30***	0.30***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
HOST CAPITAL ACCOUNT/GDP	1.01	1.01**	1.01**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
HOST LAW AND ORDER	1.34***	1.39***	1.38***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
HOST DEMOCRACY	0.99	0.99	0.99
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
HOST DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION	1.01***	1.01***	1.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
HOST PRIVATIZATION RECORD	1.05***	1.06***	1.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Home control variables			
HOME NET FDI OUTFLOWS (% OF GDP)	1.13***	1.14***	1.14***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)

(*continued*)

TABLE 2. *Continued*

Explanatory variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*
Dyadic control variables			
DYADIC TRADE (% OF HOST'S GDP)	1.59*	1.61	1.64
	(0.35)	(0.56)	(0.57)
COMMON COLONIAL HERITAGE	0.41***	0.40***	0.41***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
COMMON LANGUAGE	1.57***	1.55***	1.54***
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
ALLIANCE	1.18*	1.20*	1.18
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.14)
Common "shocks"			
COLD WAR	0.37***	0.31***	0.32***
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)
NUMBER OF BITS GLOBALLY, BY YEAR	1.03	1.00	1.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	206,766	208,610	201,073
Number of country pairs analyzed	6,781	6,831	6,828
Number of BITs	1,125	1,140	1,137
Log likelihood	−8723.114	−8858.474	−8823.590

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.

Determinants of BITs (Elkins, Guzman and Simmons 2006)



FIGURE 7a. *Survival estimates according to the average number of BITs of host's competitors (measured by export product similarity)*



Note: Estimates derived from Model 2 in Table 2. BIT = bilateral investment treaty.

FIGURE 7b. *Survival estimates according to host's percent of exports in extractive industries*

Survival estimates of BITs (Elkins, Guzman and Simmons 2006)

7．資本移動と通貨政策

テキストの要点

- Bretton Woods 体制の弛緩要因
  - オフショア市場の発達
  - ドル問題と金融政策の自律性
- 通貨政策の分析枠組
  - Mundell-Fleming 定理（unholy trinity)
    - 資本移動・自律的金融政策・為替レート安定
- Bretton Woods 以降の通貨問題の推移
  - Euro への道程
    - Snake一石油危機一EMS一プラザ合意一EMU
  - プラザ・ルーブル合意

7.1 資本自由化の規定要因

- 資本移動の国際要因
- 資本移動の政府要因
  - 政党対立
    - 資本逃避回避と租税基盤確保
  - 政権安定
    - 財政再建とインフレ税 vs. シニョリジ増大とインフレ税
  - 政策信認
    - 独立中央銀行と通貨安定
- 資本移動と国内選好
  - 生産要素モデル（Hecksher-Ohlin)
  - 産業部門モデル
    - 三部門モデル
    - Frieden モデル

7.2 通貨政策･通貨統合の規定要因

- 通貨政策の規定要因
  - 民主政治の要請
  - 政策信認の要請
    - time inconsistency problem
    - ディスインフレ政策手段
  - 外資への依存類型
- 通貨統合の規定要因
  - 国際的要因
  - 政府要因
  - 国内要因



FIGURE 1. *Synopsis of the policy preferences of various socioeconomic actors in a world of mobile capital*

Distributive consequences of capital mobility (Freiden 1991)

Figure 1. Openness, current account, capital account, 1950–88.



Source: coding of IMF Exchange Restrictions, Quinn (1992).

Figure 1. Cont.



Pattern of financial liberalization (Quinn and Inclan, 1997)

State Autonomy Hypothesis

- *Hypothesis 1: Strong governments, regardless of partisanship, are more likely to adopt capital controls.*

Conditional Partisan Effect Hypotheses

- *Hypothesis 2A: When a strong left government is in power, the positive effect of highly skilled laborers over capital liberalization is stronger.*
- *Hypothesis 2B: When a strong right government is in power, the positive effect of MNCs over capital liberalization is stronger.*
- *Hypothesis 2C: When a strong right government is in power, the positive effect of commercial banks over capital liberalization is stronger.*

Societal Capture Hypotheses

- *Hypothesis 3A: As highly skilled laborers increase in the population, capital control is more likely to be liberalized.*
- *Hypothesis 3B: As MNCs become more interested in capital liberalization, capital control is more likely to be liberalized.*
- *Hypothesis 3C: As commercial banks become more interested in capital liberalization, capital control is more likely to be liberalized.*

Determinants of capital liberalization
(Li and Smith 2002)

TABLE 1

Ordered Probit Estimates for Capital Control Liberalization in Industrial Democracies

	Expected Sign	Model 1 Coef.	Model 1 Std. Err.	Model 1 Sig.	Model 2 Coef.	Model 2 Std. Err.	Model 2 Sig.
Strong left government	−	−0.551	0.223	***			
Strong center government	−	−0.589	0.236	***			
Strong right government	−	−1.219	0.311	***			
Strong government	−				−0.813	0.201	***
Skilled Labor	+	0.117	0.052	**	0.109	0.048	**
Strong left*Skilled Labor	+	0.067	0.130		0.193	0.139	*
MNCs	+	−0.004	0.027		0.004	0.024	
Strong right*MNCs	+	0.082	0.059	*	0.061	0.047	*
Banks	+	0.014	0.007	**	0.017	0.006	***
Strong right*Banks	+	0.028	0.013	**	0.019	0.013	*
Control Variables							
Central Bank Independence	+	1.622	0.534	***	1.709	0.472	***
Bretton Woods	−	−0.427	0.201	**	−0.368	0.197	**
Managed Floating	−	−0.660	0.222	***	−0.531	0.203	***
Systemic Pressure	+	0.155	0.077	**	0.126	0.071	**
Trade Openness	−,+	−0.010	0.005	**	−0.010	0.005	**
Current Account Balance	+	−0.024	0.031		−0.024	0.029	
Policy Inertia	+	2.118	0.008	***	2.106	0.233	***
μ_0		0.151	0.299		0.352	0.249	
μ_1		3.110	0.626		3.268	0.586	
μ_2		4.798	0.799		4.965	0.769	
μ_3		8.477	0.898		8.553	0.881	
μ_4		9.782	1.077		9.819	1.067	
N		371			371		
Log likelihood		−184.21			−185.97		
Pseudo R^2		0.688			0.685		

Note: • ***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level.
• White robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering over country.



(A)

Country	*Liberalizations*	*Restrictions*	*Total Changes*
Australia	44	23	67
Austria	39	32	71
Belgium	43	39	82
Canada	13	14	27
Denmark	58	13	71
Finland	51	2	53
France	122	55	177
Germany	88	58	146
Iceland	19	7	26
Ireland	29	14	43
Israel	54	21	75
Italy	72	42	114
Japan	193	29	222
Netherlands	83	21	104
New Zealand	22	16	38
Norway	38	18	56
Sweden	50	15	65
Switzerland	68	65	133
United Kingdom	74	43	117

(B)

FIG. 1A. Data Trends over Time; FIG. 1B. Capital Controls Policy Changes by Country

Capital control policy changes
(Kastner and Rector 2003)

TABLE 3. *Constrained multinomial logit: Floating versus (Fix/MCA)*

Independent variable	*Coefficient*[a]	*SE*	*Marginal effect (Fix)*	*Marginal effect (MCA)*	*Marginal effect*[b] *(float)*
Majoritarian—low opposition influence	−4.65**	2.35	−0.32	−0.50	0.82
Proportional—low opposition influence	−4.54*	2.41	−0.31	−0.48	0.79
Electoral timing	−6.75**	2.39	−0.36	−0.56	0.91
Openness	9.13**	2.94	0.20	0.31	−0.51
Domestic credit shock	−0.01	0.01	−0.03	−0.05	0.08
Capital controls	4.84**	1.74	0.33	0.50	−0.83
International capital mobility	−6.40e-07	6.46e-06	−0.01	−0.01	0.02
Economic growth	−156.13	96.98	−0.09	−0.13	0.22
Partisanship	−0.08	1.00	−0.01	−0.01	0.01
Election year	0.01	0.73	0.01	0.01	−0.02
Pegged exchange rate $(t-1)$[c]	−3.63**	1.25	0.82	−0.23	−0.59
Member of MCA $(t-1)$[c]	1.96	1.43	0.09	0.81	−0.90
Europe[c]	0.40	1.62	0.05	0.23	−0.30
EC membership[c]	4.31**	1.59	−0.52	0.63	−0.12
Actual number of fixed	100				
Predicted number of fixed	95				
Actual number of MCA	143				
Predicted number of MCA	131				
Actual number of floats	190				
Predicted number of floats	184				
Final log likelihood χ^2	−61.73***				
Probability	0.0000				
Temporal dummy variables					
Log likelihood χ^2	41.13***				
Probability	0.0036				

[a]Coefficients are multinomial logit estimates of the probability of (Fix/MCA) versus float. The model is estimated with a set of twenty temporal dummy variables not shown.
[b]For a dummy variable, the marginal effect is calculated for a discrete change in the variable. For a continuous variable, the marginal effect is calculated for a change in one-half of one standard deviation.
[c]Variables are unconstrained. For ease of presentation, we report coefficients for the choice between pegging and joining a multilateral exchanging agreement.
***$p < .05$, χ^2-test.
**$p < .05$, two-tailed z-test.
*$p < .10$, two-tailed z-test.

TABLE 4. *Binomial logit: Fix versus floating (floating is the omitted category)*

Independent variable	*Coefficient*	*Robust SE*	*Marginal effect*[a]
Constant	−7.22**	3.08	
Majoritarian—low opposition influence	−3.55**	1.51	−0.70
Proportional—low opposition influence	−3.17**	1.56	−0.65
Electoral timing	−3.93**	1.34	−0.75
Openness	7.44**	2.58	0.36
Domestic credit shock	−0.01	0.01	−0.03
Capital controls	3.13**	0.91	0.57
International capital mobility	−4.47e-06	4.91e-06	−0.13
Economic growth	−182.68**	50.86	−0.21
Partisanship	0.45	0.54	0.03
Election year	−0.01	0.50	−0.01
Lagged dependent variable	8.22**	2.16	0.96
Europe	0.98	0.84	0.16
EC membership	3.52**	1.79	0.50
Actual number of fixed/MCA	190		
Predicted number of fixed/MCA	182		
Actual number of floats	243		
Predicted number of floats	236		
Final log likelihood	−37.72***		
Probability	0.0000		
Temporal dummy variables			
Log likelihood χ^2	36.88***		
Probability	0.0000		

Note: Robust standard errors are based on clustering according to country. The model is estimated with a set of twenty temporal dummy variables not shown.
[a]For a dummy variable, the marginal effect is calculated for a discrete change in the variable. For a continuous variable, the marginal effect is calculated for a change in one-half of one standard deviation.
***$p < .05$, χ^2-test.
**$p < .05$, two-tailed z-test.
*$p < .10$, two-tailed z-test.

Governments and fixed exchange rates (Bernhad and Leblang 1999)

TABLE 2. *Monetary regimes after 1973*

Central bank independence	*Share of time with a pegged exchange rate*	
	Below median	*Above median*
Above median	16 countries including Switzerland, United States, Mexico, and South Africa (*22.2 percent of sample*)	19 countries including Austria, Netherlands, Taiwan, and Malaysia (*26.4 percent of sample*)
Below median	20 countries including United Kingdom, Japan, Brazil, and South Korea (*27.8 percent of sample*)	17 countries including Belgium, Sweden, Venezuela, and Thailand (*23.6 percent of sample*)

Note: Countries were classified as "above median" in central bank independence if they were below the developing country sample median in turnover rate or above the developed country sample median in legal independence. Countries were classified as above the sample median (.60) in share of time with a pegged exchange rate.

TABLE 3. *Welfare effects of alternative monetary delegation schemes*

	Benefits	*Costs*
Central bank independence	• Credibility f lower inflation	• Monetary inflexibity f less stabilization
Fixed exchange rates	• Credibility f lower inflation • Exchange rate stability f more trade and capital flows	• Monetary inflexibility f less stabilization • Exchange rate inflexibility f difficulties with competitiveness

Trade offs in monetary arrangements (Bernhard, Broz and Clark 2002)

TABLE 1 Capital-Specific Preferences and the Choice of Fixed Exchange

Dependent Variable: Probability of Pursuing a Fixed Exchange-Rate Regime			
	1	2	3
Existing Fixed Exchange-Rate Regime	2.69	2.98	3.60
Presence of a Fixed Exchange-Rate Regime at t − 1	(7.89)**	(4.33)**	(3.81)**
Capital-Specific Variables			
Private Sector Reliance on Foreign Lending at t − 1	0.122	0.988	1.02
(Bank Debt PNG/GDP * 100)	(.69)	(1.90)′	(1.67)′
Government Reliance on Foreign Lending at t − 1	−0.0164	0.127	−0.0881
(Bank Debt PPG plus other public guaranteed debt/GDP * 100)	(−.11)	(.38)	(−.21)
Private Reliance on Portfolio Investment at t − 1	−0.0289	−0.0535	−.0580
((Bonds PNG + SR Debt + Portfolio Equity)/GDP * 100)	(−2.59)**	(−2.34)*	(−2.23)*
Government Reliance on Portfolio Investment at t − 1	−0.920	−2.31	−3.09
(Bonds PPG/GDP * 100)	(−2.70)**	(−2.30)*	(−2.30)*
Reliance on Foreign Direct Investment at t − 1	−0.0301	0.00408	−0.0379
(Gross FDI/GDP * 100)	(−.42)	(.04)	(−.28)
Trade-Specific Variables			
Importance of Export Dependent Sector at t − 1	−0.0264	−0.124	−.180
(X/GDP * 100)	(−.80)	(−1.85)′	(−2.23)*
Importance of Import Dependent Sector at t − 1	−.0290	−0.0317	0.0242
(M/GDP * 100)	(−.86)	(−.42)	(.29)
Proportion of Specialized Pass Through Goods at t − 1	0.00451	0.0599	0.121
(Manufacturing Exports/Merchandized Exports * 100)	0.26	(1.56)	(2.06)*
Change in the Real Exchange Rate			
Real Exchange Rate Change (Log)	−1.75	−3.49	−4.28
(REER estimated with 1990 = 100 World Bank, WDI)	(−2.18)*	(−1.81)′	(−1.95)*
Democracy Variables			
Level of Democracy		−0.532	−0.774
(Polity)		(−2.15)*	(−2.53)**
Elections this next year (t + 1)		0.266	.0580
(Dummy = 1 if yes)		(.39)	(.08)
Elections Last Year (t − 1)		0.698	1.15
(Dummy = 1 if yes)		(1.09)	(1.54)
Conservatism of Executive		−0.214	−0.425
(Left = 1, Center = 2, Right = 3)		(−.55)	(.87)
Economic Control Variables			
Controls on the Capital Account			1.86
(Dummy = 1 if yes, IMF)			(1.75)′
Controls on the Current Account			−0.00644
(Dummy = 1 if yes, IMF)			(−.01)
High Inflation in Past 5 Years Dummy			−2.22
(Dummy = 1 if CPI > 25% for any year in the past five)			(−2.24)*
Foreign Reserves			0.661
(Foreign Reserves/M2)			(.36)
Debt Crisis			0.239
(Dummy = 1 if year >= 1982 and year <= 1989)			(.23)
1990s			−1.41
(Dummy = 1 if year >= 1990 and year <= 2000)			(−1.05)
Number of Observations	431	197	196
Prob > chi^2	.000	.000	.000
Pseudo R squared	0.386	0.502	0.584

′alpha = .10, *alpha = .05, **alpha = .01

Financial dependence and exchange rate regimes (Shambaugh 2004)

8. 資本移動と通貨危機

テキストの要点

- 80年代の通貨危機拡大の背景
  - EMU圏(92)、北欧(87-94)、日本(92-94、97-98)
  - メキシコ(94)、東アジア、ロシア(98)、ブラジル(99)、トルコ、アルゼンチン(01)
  - 資本構成変化(貸出->債権)、負債不均衡(短期->長期)、銀行危機と不良債権
- IMF救済
  - 救済条件:財政金融通貨政策、銀行部門改革、構造改革
  - IMF:conditionality 批判、IMFの役割再検討、IMF組織改革
- 最貧国救済問題

8.1 通貨・銀行部門危機の規定要因

- 資本移動増大の帰結
  - 成長と金融危機のトレードオフ（成長＞危機可能性）
- 通貨危機の発生要因
  - 第１世代モデルと第２世代モデル以降
    - 通貨制度ー固定相場制（発生率抑制、深刻化増長）
  - 政策の不確実性要因と群衆行動
    - 政策規律への不信、政策期待の分散
- 通貨危機と銀行部門危機（双子危機）
- 通貨危機の波及
    - 波及要因：急速な資金移動、予想外、共通貸し手
- 銀行部門危機の解決
    - IMFの役割、独裁制の両義性

8.2 通貨・銀行部門危機と国際対応

- IMF救済の決定要因
  - アメリカ・主要国との政治経済関係
- IMF救済の国内的帰結
  - 経済成長の鈍化
    - 投資、インフレ、政府消費、貿易依存度とは関係せず
  - 財政均衡・構造改革要求＜ー批判
    - 打撃を受ける階層は？政治体制により異なるか？
    - 遵守は？
- IMF救済と直接投資
  - 変動相場制、緊縮的財政金融、市場開放・構造改革
    - 開放的経済開発戦略＜ー批判



Note: Observations are the number of country-months in which a speculative currency attack occurred. The sample includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The measure of speculative attacks is defined in the text.

FIGURE 1. *Speculative attacks in parliamentary democracies, 1970–95*



FIGURE 2. *Simulated probabilities of cabinet dissolution*

Currency crises in developed countries and variety of governments (Leblang and Bernhard 2000)

TABLE 7. *Probit models of speculative attacks*

Variable	*Baseline model*	*Political economy model*
Constant	−4.436*	−4.127*
	(1.020)	(1.089)
Speculative attack$_{t-1}$	0.546*	0.546*
	(0.216)	(0.217)
	[0.057]	[0.056]
Current account deficit (d)	0.164*	0.171*
	(0.080)	(0.086)
	[0.011]	[0.011]
Inflation	0.023*	0.022*
	(0.009)	(0.009)
	[0.007]	[0.007]
Log (exports + imports)	0.098*	0.082*
	(0.044)	(0.047)
	[0.007]	[0.006]
RER overvaluation$_{t-1}$	0.061*	0.059*
	(0.013)	(0.013)
	[0.010]	[0.010]
Capital controls (d)	0.080	0.063
	(0.107)	(0.113)
	[0.005]	[0.004]
Partisan shift to the Left	1.223*	1.252*
	(0.278)	(0.274)
	[0.005]	[0.005]
Change in unemployment	0.156*	0.154*
	(0.054)	(0.056)
	[0.001]	[0.001]
Realignment (d)	.789*	.762*
	(0.152)	(0.159)
	[0.102]	[0.096]
Member of the EMS (d)	−0.026	−0.051
	(0.056)	(0.061)
	[−0.001]	[−0.001]
Expectations		1.645*
		(0.552)
		[−0.001]
Government end (d)		0.419*
		(0.202)
		[0.039]
Expectations * end		−2.112*
		(0.651)
		[−0.017]
N	3665	3665
Model χ^2	688.10**	788.93**
Expectations variables χ^2		210.83**

Note: The dependent variable is coded 1 if the speculative attack index for country *j* exceeds that country's average speculative attack by two standard deviations; zero otherwise. Cell entries are probit estimates obtained using maximum likelihood. Numbers in parentheses are robust Huber/White standard errors. Numbers in brackets are partial effects. For dichotomous independent variables, the partial effect is computed for a one-unit change in the independent variable, holding all other variables at their means. (d) indicates that the variable is dichotomous. For continuous independent variables, the partial effect is computed for a change of one-half of one standard deviation from the mean of that variable, holding all other variables at their means. All models were initially estimated with a series of five to twelve linear splines; in no case were the splines, as a whole, statistically different from zero. The models shown here were estimated without linear splines.

*$p < .05$, two-tailed *z*-test.

**$p < .05$, joint-significance test.

TABLE 8. *Predicted probabilities of a speculative attack*

	Values of expectations variable				
Situation	*0*	*0.0168*	*0.044*	*0.10*	*0.20*
Cabinet survives (end = 0)	0.025 (0.021, 0.029)	0.027 (0.023, 0.030)	0.029 (0.025, 0.034)	0.036 (0.028, 0.044)	0.050 (0.031, 0.075)
Cabinet ends (end = 1)	0.063 (0.028, 0.12)	0.062 (0.029, 0.12)	0.061 (0.030, 0.113)	0.057 (0.031, 0.104)	0.051 (0.026, 0.09)
Difference	0.038*	0.035*	0.032*	0.021	0.001

Note: Cell entries are the predicted probability of a speculative attack. Confidence intervals are in parentheses. Probabilities, standard errors, and confidence intervals calculated using CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 1998).

*$p < .05$.

Currency crises and expectation of government collapse (Leblang and Benhard 2000)

TABLE 1. *Frankel-Rose sample*

FR variables	*Baseline*	*Democracy*	*Government turnover*	*Unified-divided government*	*Turnover and divided government*
COMMERCIAL BANK SHARE	0.001	0.002	0.005	−0.015	0.006
OF TOTAL DEBT	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.013)
CONCESSIONAL SHARE	−0.001	−0.000	0.000	−0.010	0.001
OF TOTAL DEBT	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)
VARIABLE RATE SHARE	0.009	0.007	0.005	0.020	0.002
OF TOTAL DEBT	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)
FDI/TOTAL DEBT	−0.070	−0.069	−0.064	−0.064**	−0.066
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.031)	(0.047)
SHORT-TERM SHARE	−0.007	−0.008	−0.007	−0.004	−0.008
OF TOTAL DEBT	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.016)
PUBLIC SECTOR SHARE	−0.002	−0.003	−0.001	0.001	−0.002
OF TOTAL DEBT	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)
MULTILATERIAL SHARE	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.011	−0.001
OF TOTAL DEBT	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)
TOTAL DEBT/GNP	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
RESERVES/M2	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001*	−0.001**	−0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CURRENT ACCOUNT/GDP	0.025	0.025	0.022	0.034*	0.023
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)
GOVERNMENT BUDGET DEFICIT	−0.002	−0.003	−0.003	−0.010	−0.004
(SURPLUS)/GDP	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
DOMESTIC CREDIT GROWTH	0.007*	0.007*	0.007*	0.009*	0.006*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
GROWTH RATE OF GDP	−0.076**	−0.078**	−0.076**	−0.010	−0.076**
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.017)
FOREIGN INTEREST RATE	−0.000	0.000	−0.005	0.028	−0.007
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.032)
EXCHANGE RATE	0.015*	0.015*	0.015*	0.018**	0.015*
OVERVALUATION	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)
NUMBER OF PRIOR CRISES	0.189*	0.186*	0.211**	0.085	0.207**
	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.053)	(0.098)
DEMOCRACY:		0.151			
COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS		(0.229)			
GOVERNMENT TURNOVER			0.737**		0.653
			(0.270)		(0.406)
UNIFIED DEMOCRACY				0.075	−0.048
				(0.272)	(0.303)
DIVIDED DEMOCRACY				0.516*	0.353
				(0.305)	(0.376)
TURNOVER IN DEMOCRACIES					0.165
					(0.637)
_cons	−1.826	−1.783	−1.945	−2.482**	−1.834
	(1.215)	(1.216)	(1.264)	(1.141)	(1.241)
N	1222	1222	1222	1222	1222

***$p < 0.01$.
**$p < 0.05$.
*$p < 0.10$.

TABLE 2. *Kamin, Schindler, and Samuel sample*

KSS variables	*Baseline*	*Democracy*	*Government turnover*	*Unified-divided government*	*Turnover and divided government*
REAL GDP GROWTH	0.005	0.007	−0.007	−0.007	0.003
	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.037)
GOVERNMENT DEFICIT	0.002	0.004	0.001	0.004	−0.004
(SURPLUS)/GDP	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
DOMESTIC BANK LOANS/GDP	−0.002	−0.002	−0.005	−0.004	−0.004
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE	0.029**	0.028**	0.020**	0.020**	0.022**
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
EXPORT GROWTH	−0.014	−0.015	−0.012	−0.013	−0.013
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)
CURRENT ACCOUNT/GDP	−0.025	−0.020	−0.042	−0.034	−0.032
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.034)
M2/RESERVES	0.007**	0.007**	0.005**	0.004**	0.005**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT/EXPORTS	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.006*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
RESERVES/SHORT-TERM DEBT	0.007	0.006	0.002	0.001	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
FDI/GDP	−0.119	−0.135	0.013	−0.017	−0.005
	(0.098)	(0.105)	(0.098)	(0.112)	(0.116)
TERMS OF TRADE GROWTH	−0.036**	−0.036**	−0.027**	−0.026**	−0.026**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
U.S. REAL INTEREST RATE	0.121	0.136	0.179**	0.190**	0.183**
	(0.191)	(0.188)	(0.085)	(0.076)	(0.081)
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY	−0.378*	−0.377*	−0.331**	−0.328**	−0.323**
GDP GROWTH	(0.196)	(0.197)	(0.140)	(0.137)	(0.136)
NUMBER OF PRIOR CRISES	0.092	0.121	0.010	−0.018	−0.030
	(0.259)	(0.252)	(0.113)	(0.119)	(0.120)
DEMOCRACY:		−0.319			
COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS		(0.411)			
GOVERNMENT TURNOVER			1.048**		1.736**
			(0.262)		(0.571)
UNIFIED DEMOCRACY				−0.450	−0.293
				(0.306)	(0.311)
DIVIDED DEMOCRACY				0.364	0.483
				(0.387)	(0.398)
TURNOVER IN DEMOCRACIES					−1.137
					(0.825)
_cons	−3.078*	−2.905*	−2.955**	−2.506**	−2.869**
	(1.710)	(1.736)	(0.707)	(0.723)	(0.675)
N	354	354	354	354	354

***$p < 0.01$.
**$p < 0.05$.
*$p < 0.10$.

Currency crises, political institutions, and divergent expectations (Leblang and Satyanath 2006)

TABLE 1—FREQUENCY OF CRISES OVER TIME

	Number of crises					
	1970–1995		1970–1979		1980–1995	
Type of crisis	Total	Average per year	Total	Average per year	Total	Average per year
Balance-of-payments	76	2.92	26	2.60	50	3.13
Twin	19	0.73	1	0.10	18	1.13
Single	57	2.19	25	2.50	32	2.00
Banking	26	1.00	3	0.30	23	1.44

Note: Episodes in which the beginning of a banking crisis is followed by a balance-of-payments crisis within 48 months are classified as twin crises.



FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF CRISES PER YEAR

Twin Crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999)

Table 2
Revised Estimates: Determinants of Banking Crisis Resolution

	(3)		(4)	
Δ U.S. interest rates	0.38	(0.68)	0.26	(0.71)
Economic openness	0.63	(0.41)*	0.70	(0.43)
Exchange rate regime	0.12	(0.11)	0.11	(0.12)
LogIMF credits / GDP	–0.99	(0.42)**	–0.99	(0.44)**
Balance of payments / GDP			0.03	(0.02)
International reserves / debt			0.003	(0.001)**
Rate of inflation (÷ 100)			0.09	(0.03)**
Δ Rate of inflation			0.06	(0.02)**
Crisis severity (more severe = 1)	4.22	(1.02)**	5.61	(1.32)**
Regime decisiveness	0.26	(0.14)*	0.41	(0.22)*
Crisis Severity × Regime Decisiveness	–0.58	(0.20)**	–0.80	(0.26)**
Regime instability	0.04	(0.24)	0.23	(0.23)
Δ Exchange rate	–0.0008	(0.02)	–0.03	(0.02)*
LogGNP per capita			0.43	(0.37)
Asia			–2.55	(0.55)**
Mideast			1.35	(0.65)**
Spline (less than 4 years)	–0.13	(0.20)	–0.01	(0.24)
Spline (4 to 8 years)	0.33	(0.20)	0.47	(0.23)**
Spline (8 to 11 years)	–0.73	(0.48)	–1.07	(0.53)**
Spline (11 to 15 years)	1.02	(0.56)*	1.95	(0.57)**
Number of crises	74		74	
Number of obstacles	313		313	
Log likelihood	–97.30		–82.22	
Pseudo R^2	0.13		0.26	
Resolution correctly predicted (%)	75		83	
Nonresolution correctly predicted (%)	89		91	

NOTE: IMF = International Monetary Fund. Constant not displayed. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
*$p < 0.10$. **$p < 0.05$.

Determinants of banking crisis resolution (Montinola 2003)

Table 4
Determinants of IMF loan-participation rate (cells show estimated coefficients with standard errors in parentheses)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Per capita GDP growth rate	−2.13	−2.17	−1.66	−1.69	−1.68	−1.75
	(0.70)	(0.67)	(0.72)	(0.72)	(0.71)	(0.71)
International reserves	−0.046	−0.041	−0.041	−0.042	−0.045	−0.041
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
GDP per capita	0.101	0.080	0.077	0.083	0.094	0.078
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)
GDP per capita squared	−0.0097	−0.0089	−0.0092	−0.0094	−0.0100	−0.0092
	(0.0022)	(0.0021)	(0.0022)	(0.0022)	(0.0024)	(0.0023)
Log (GDP)	0.26	0.23	0.29	0.28	0.33	0.29
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Log (GDP) squared	−0.0090	−0.0091	−0.0141	−0.0149	−0.0179	−0.0151
	(0.0064)	(0.0060)	(0.0067)	(0.0067)	(0.0068)	(0.0068)
Group of advanced OECD countries	−0.14	−0.28	−0.22	−0.27	−0.39	−0.35
	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.25)
Log (IMF quota)			0.155	0.146	0.164	0.150
			(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.080)
Log (IMF staff)		0.072		0.068	0.073	0.067
		(0.032)		(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Political proximity to the US		0.254	0.274	0.254		0.038
		(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)		(0.119)
Political proximity to major Europe					0.42	0.37
					(0.13)	(0.17)
Intensity of trade with the US		0.044	0.043	0.040		0.043
		(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)		(0.020)
Intensity of trade with major Europe					0.006	0.005
					(0.032)	(0.032)
p-value (a)		0.0009	0.0030	0.0011	0.0002	0.0016
(b)		0.0000	0.0003	0.0000	0.0001	0.0001
Number of obs.	613	613	613	613	613	613

Notes: The dependent variable is the fraction of time that a country participated in an IMF loan program during each 5-year period. Estimation was by the Tobit procedure, including allowance for within-country correlation of the error terms over time. See the notes to Tables 2 and 3 for additional information.

Determinants of IMF-loan participation (Barro and Lee 2005)

H1: The effect of IMF programs on social expenditures is conditional on the regime type of the recipient country.

H2: Under IMF programs, democracies should spend more on social services than nondemocracies.

H3: Under IMF programs, increases in levels of democracy should have smaller impacts on social expenditures.



FIGURE 1. *Effect of IMF program on education spending*



FIGURE 2. *Effect of IMF program on health spending*

IMF programs and government spending (Nooruddin and Simmons 2006)

TABLE 4

The Effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) Programs on Net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Inflows

Variable	*OLS* (t *Statistics)*		*Treatment* (t *Statistics)*	
Past FDI	0.546**	(18.330)	0.543**	(18.392)
Development level	0.179*	(2.121)	0.181*	(2.139)
Market size	–0.035	(–0.761)	–0.041	(–0.884)
Gross domestic product growth	0.040**	(3.787)	0.040**	(3.814)
Trade	0.007**	(3.351)	0.007**	(3.274)
Deficit	0.000	(0.026)	–0.003	(–0.268)
Government consumption	–0.014	(–1.158)	–0.016	(–1.298)
IMF participation	–0.129	(–1.176)	–0.360*	(–2.189)
Time dummies	Yes		Yes	
Number of countries	68		68	
Number of observations	814		814	

NOTE: rho = 0.165 (0.087), sigma = 1.480 (0.037), lambda = 0.244 (0.132). OLS = ordinary least squares.
*95% confidence level. **99% confidence level.

９. 資本移動と経済政策

テキストの要点

- 財政金融政策の政治的規定要因
  - 政治的景気循環（political business cycle)
    - Pocket book voting vs. sociotropic voting
  - 党派的財政金融政策
    - Phillips curve
    - 保守政権　インフレ抑制　（=変動相場）＞失業対策
  - 経済部門の政策選好
- 開放経済の財政金融政策制約
  - 合理的期待形成と金融政策の効果
  - ディスインフレ政策と time inconsistency - policy credibility
    - 中央銀行の独立性と通貨ペッグ

9.1 資本移動と財政金融政策

- 資本移動下の財政金融政策選択
  - 金融政策の自律性　vs. 財政出動の効果
  - ディスインフレ政策の要請
- 資本移動下の党派的財政金融政策
  - 景気循環と財政金融政策の党派性
  - 資本移動の拡大と党派的財政金融政策
- ディスインフレ政策下の財政金融政策
  - 独立中央銀行・通貨統合と財政金融政策の党派性
  - 財政規律の国内・国際要因
    - ヨーロッパ通貨統合と財政規律
    - 財政規律の国内実施手法

9.2 資本移動と労働社会政策

- 資本移動と福祉国家の財政基礎
  - 資本移動と税構造の変化
    - 「底辺への競争」
    - 投資要請と報償要請
- 資本移動と福祉国家の変容
  - 新福祉国家論　＜一福祉国家の選挙的基礎
  - 党派的福祉国家変容
    - 党派的福祉国家と平等・所得補償
    - エスピン・アンデルセン・モデルとその展開
    - アヴァセン=レン・モデル
  - 経済部門と福祉政策要求

図２　ＯＥＣＤ諸国の平均インフレ率と標準偏差 1975-2003



図３　ＯＥＣＤ諸国の平均失業率と標準偏差 1975-2003



OECD諸国のインフレと失業率
（東京大学社会科学研究所編　2006）





OECD諸国の短期金利と基礎財政収支
（東京大学社会科学研究所編　2006）

Table 1. The Partisan Hypothesis in an Open Economy

	Capital Controls	No Capital Controls
Fixed Exchange Rate	• *Fiscal Policy Is Effective* • *Monetary Policy Autonomy* **Partisan Hypothesis:** *Distinct Partisan Fiscal Policies* *Distinct Partisan Monetary Policies*	• *Fiscal Policy Is Effective* • *No Monetary Policy Autonomy* **Partisan Hypothesis:** *Distinct Partisan Fiscal Policies* *No Distinct Partisan Monetary Policies*
Floating Exchange Rate	• *Fiscal Policy Is Effective* • *Monetary Policy Autonomy* **Partisan Hypothesis:** *Distinct Partisan Monetary Policies* *Distinct Partisan Fiscal Policies*	• *Fiscal Policy Is Ineffective* • *Monetary Policy Autonomy* **Partisan Hypothesis:** *Distinct Partisan Monetary Policies* *No Distinct Partisan Fiscal Policies*

Open economy and partisan economic policy: framework (Oatley 1997)

Table 2. The Partisan Hypothesis and Fiscal Policy in an Open Economy

	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged Dependent Variable	.79 (.04)***	.79 (.04)***
Party	.10 (.10)	−.62 (.19)***
Party*Fixed Exchange Rate	−.45 (.16)***	
Party*1990	.03 (.15)	
Party*Fixed Exchange Rate*1990	.43 (.14)***	
Party*Fixed Exchange Rate and No Capital Controls		.42 (.21)***
Party*Floating Exchange Rate and Capital Controls		.76 (.22)***
Party*Floating Exchange Rate and No Capital Controls		.28 (.25)
Party*1990		.86 (.23)***
Party*Fixed Exchange Rate and No Capital Controls*1990		−.48 (.21)**
Party*Floating Exchange Rate and Capital Controls*1990		−.84 (.21)**
Party*Floating Exchange Rate and No Capital Controls*1990		−.72 (.21)***
Labor Strength	−.003 (.004)	−.003 (.004)
Inflation	.08 (.03)**	.11 (.03)***
GDP Growth (percent change)	.26 (.05)***	.28 (.04)***
1990s	−1.15 (.54)**	−1.15 (.50)**
Fixed Exchange Rate and Capital Controls		−.79 (.68)
Floating Exchange Rate and Capital Controls		−2.44 (.70)***
Floating Exchange Rate and No Capital Controls		−.02 (.79)
Fixed Exchange Rate	1.28 (.48)***	
R-Squared	.88	.89
F	103.29 (P > F .000)	87.77 (P > F .000)
N	323	323

Dependent variable is government budget balance. Method of estimation is OLS fixed effects with robust standard errors.

* significant at .1 ** significant at .05 *** significant at .01

Table 3. The Partisan Hypothesis and Monetary Policy in an Open Economy

	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged Dependent Variable	.31 (.07)***	.29 (.06)***
Party	−.37 (.14)***	−.48 (.19)***
Party*Fixed Exchange Rate	.49 (.12)***	
Party*1990	.48 (.25)**	
Party*Fixed Exchange Rate*1990	.56 (.13)***	
Party*Floating Exchange Rate and No Capital Controls		.52 (.38)
Party*Fixed Exchange Rate and No Capital Controls		1.04 (.30)***
Party*Fixed Exchange Rate and Capital Controls		.55 (.32)*
Party*1990		.39 (.26)***
Party*Floating Exchange Rate and No Capital Controls*1990		−.80 (.38)**
Party*Fixed Exchange Rate and No Capital Controls*1990		−.83 (.30)***
Party*Fixed Exchange Rate and Capital Controls*1990		−.30 (.27)
Inflation	−.61 (.10)***	−.56 (.06)***
Budget Balance	.06 (.06)	.02 (.05)
1990s	−.51 (.80)	−.52 (.82)
Fixed Exchange Rate and Capital Controls		−.91 (.90)
Fixed Exchange Rate and No Capital Controls		2.45 (.92)***
Floating Exchange Rate and No Capital Controls		1.68 (1.09)
Fixed Exchange Rate	1.51 (.50)***	
R-Squared	.75	.76
F	34.14 (P > F .000)	34.49 (P > F .000)
N	323	323

Dependent variable is the real money market interest rate. Method of estimation is OLS fixed effects with robust standard errors.

* significant at .1 ** significant at .05 *** significant at .01

Open economy and partisan economic policy (Oatley 1997)

Central Bank	Government: Left-leaning	Government: Right-leaning
Dependent	high inflation; low unemployment.	low inflation; high unemployment.
Independent	low inflation; high unemployment.	very low inflation; low unemployment.

Figure 1. **The mutually contingent effects of government partisanship conditional and central bank independence.**

Central Bank	Government: Left-leaning	Government: Right-leaning
Dependent	average inflation: 7.72 average change in unemployment: 0.14	average inflation: 6.03 average change in unemployment: 0.20
Independent	average inflation: 5.64 average change in unemployment: 0.18	average inflation: 4.53 average change in unemployment: 0.07

Figure 2. **The mutually contingent effects of government partisanship conditional and central bank independence, 1961-1991.**

Note: Inflation is change in the consumer price index. Change in unemployment is the first difference in unemployment rates. Governments are classified as left-leaning if the score on the partisanship variable was less than the mean value; those scoring higher than the mean are classified as right-leaning. Similarly, central banks scoring lower than the mean independence rating are categorized as dependent, while those above the mean are placed in the independent cells.

Partisan economic policy and central bank independence: framework (Way 2000)

Table 1
Pooled Time-Series Estimates of Inflation and Unemployment Models

Variable	Inflation (change in consumer price index)	Unemployment (first difference)
Intercept	3.03 (1.06)$^{.01}$	0.40 (0.21)$^{.03}$
Lagged dependent variable	0.58 (0.05)$^{.00}$	—
OECD average[a]	0.57 (0.07)$^{.00}$	0.58 (0.08)$^{.00}$
European Monetary System[b]	–0.84 (0.26)$^{.01}$	–0.05 (0.10)$^{.30}$
Gross domestic product growth	0.05 (0.05)$^{.17}$	–0.13 (0.02)$^{.00}$
Openness[c]	–0.09 (0.07)$^{.10}$	–0.03 (0.02)$^{.10}$
Degree of coordinated wage bargaining[d]	–0.72 (0.35)$^{.02}$	–0.03 (0.02)$^{.40}$
Cabinet partisanship[e]	–0.90 (0.27)$^{.01}$	0.13 (0.06)$^{.02}$
Central bank independence[f]	–5.43 (2.01)$^{.01}$	0.74 (0.48)$^{.06}$
Interaction term (cabinet partisanship * central bank independence)	1.14 (0.65)$^{.04}$	–0.37 (0.17)$^{.01}$
Number of observations	480	493
Adjusted R^2	0.72	0.41

Note: All entries are ordinary least squares coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Approximate *p* value from one-sided *t* test is in superscripted italics.
a. Annual Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development average of the dependent variable.
b. Dummy variable for membership in the narrow band of the European Monetary System.
c. Exports as a share of gross national product.
d. See Franzese (1994) and Franzese and Hall (1998).
e. Cabinet ideological center of gravity scores (see Cusack, 1997; Cusack & Garrett, 1993; Gross & Sigelman, 1984). Higher scores indicate more Right-leaning government.
f. Cukierman's (1992) index of central bank independence.

Partisan economic policy and central bank independence (Way 2000)



FIGURE 1. *Support for or opposition to welfare compensation in the face of greater economic openness*

HYPOTHESIS 1: COMPARED WITH GREATER OVERALL TRADE, MORE LOW-WAGE TRADE AS A PROPORTION OF OVERALL TRADE SHOULD ELICIT STRONGER POLITICAL DEMANDS FOR, BUT ROUGHLY THE SAME OPPOSITION TO, WELFARE COMPENSATION, LEADING TO GREATER EXPANSIONS OR LOWER REDUCTIONS IN WELFARE EFFORT.

HYPOTHESIS 2: GREATER OPENNESS SHOULD INSPIRE ONE-SIDED POLITICS OVER PROGRAMS FOR JOB TRAINING AND RELOCATION; VULNERABLE GROUPS SHOULD DEMAND, AND INVESTORS, PRODUCERS, AND GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD ACCOMMODATE, EXPANSION OF SUCH PROGRAMS.

HYPOTHESIS 3: GREATER OPENNESS SHOULD INSPIRE LITTLE POLITICAL STRUGGLE OVER PROGRAMS FOR GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE, DEFENSE, OR CAPITAL INVESTMENTS; OPENNESS SHOULD ELICIT FEW DEMANDS FOR SUCH PROGRAMS FROM VULNERABLE GROUPS; AND INVESTORS, PRODUCERS, AND GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD ACCEPT THE STATUS QUO.

HYPOTHESIS 4: GREATER OPENNESS SHOULD ELICIT MORE CONFLICTUAL POLITICS WITH UNCERTAIN IMPLICATIONS FOR PASSIVE LABOR-MARKET PROGRAMS AND REGULATIONS; INTERNATIONALLY VULNERABLE GROUPS SHOULD MAKE STRONG DEMANDS FOR COMPENSATION, AND INVESTORS AND OTHERS SHOULD STRONGLY OPPOSE SUCH COMPENSATION.

HYPOTHESIS 5: GREATER OPENNESS SHOULD ELICIT ONE-SIDED POLITICS, LEADING TO SOME RETRENCHMENT OF FAMILY, RETIREMENT, AND DISABILITY BENEFITS; VULNERABLE GROUPS SHOULD MAKE MODEST DEMANDS FOR COMPENSATION, AND INVESTORS AND THEIR CHAMPIONS SHOULD MAKE RELATIVELY STRONG DEMANDS FOR ROLLBACKS.

Globalization and compensation: Hypotheses (Burgoon 2001)

TABLE 5. *Varying kinds of openness and varying social expenditures, 1980–94, first estimation (t-statistics in parentheses)*

Variables	*Total social expenditures*	*Retirement cash and services*	*Health-care benefits*	*Family cash and services*	*Training and relocation benefits*
Lagged dependent variable ($t-1$)	0.536***	0.413***	0.647***	0.725***	0.588***
	(11.211)	(7.612)	(13.966)	(14.327)	(9.150)
Trade ($t-1$)	−0.042***	−0.031***	0.002	−0.002	0.001
	(−2.847)	(−3.065)	(0.374)	(−0.483)	(0.317)
Percentage low-wage imports ($t-1$)	0.014	−0.017	0.012	−0.001	0.006*
	(0.538)	(−0.948)	(1.255)	(−0.132)	(1.696)
FDI ($t-1$)	−0.036	−0.037	−0.008	−0.007	0.021***
	(−0.718)	(−1.054)	(−0.450)	(−0.504)	(4.058)
Portfolio flows ($t-1$)	0.007	0.003	−0.001	0.003†	0.001**
	(1.239)	(0.725)	(−0.613)	(1.594)	(2.129)
Deindustrialization ($t-1$)	0.010	−0.024	0.046***	0.003	0.002
	(0.252)	(−0.826)	(2.968)	(0.292)	(0.410)
Unemployment	0.239***	0.055**	−0.016	0.022**	0.006
	(5.247)	(2.039)	(−1.118)	(1.995)	(1.240)
GDP per capita ($t-1$)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000*	−0.000
	(0.118)	(0.228)	(0.802)	(1.681)	(−0.776)
Growth percentage	−0.250***	−0.087***	−0.021†	−0.022**	−0.001
	(−7.469)	(−3.706)	(−1.641)	(−2.395)	(−0.192)
Dependency rate ($t-1$)	0.279***	0.068	0.005	0.054**	−0.022
	(2.919)	(1.048)	(0.139)	(2.145)	(−0.159)
Left portfolios ($t-1$)	0.002	−0.000	−0.000	0.001	0.000
	(1.085)	(−0.084)	(−0.009)	(0.888)	(0.529)
Christian Democrat portfolio ($t-1$)	−0.002	−0.003	−0.004*	0.001	0.001
	(−0.428)	(−0.747)	(−1.705)	(0.777)	(0.949)
Constant	−4.623	1.645	−0.960	−2.441**	−0.074
	(−1.066)	(0.538)	(−0.582)	(−2.103)	(−0.162)
No. of observations	270	270	270	270	270
Wald $\chi^2(43)$	35,068.63	4,903.46	2,401.52	6,569.77	1,782.27

Note: OLS coefficients, panel-corrected standard errors, estimated using STATA 6.0 (xtgls). Country and year dummies not shown.

Source: OECD *Historical Statistics,* various years; OECD *Labour Force Statistics,* various years; OECD *National Accounts,* various years; OECD 1996 and 1998; IMF *Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook,* various years; and Swank 1995.

***$p < .01$.
**$p < .05$.
*$p < .10$.
†$p < .2$.

TABLE 6. *Varying kinds of openness and varying social expenditures, 1980–94, second estimation (t-statistics in parentheses)*

Variables	Δ *Total social expenditures*	Δ *Retirement cash and services*	Δ *Health benefits*	Δ *Family cash and services*	Δ *Training and relocation benefits*
Lagged dependent level	−0.420***	−0.628***	−0.359***	−0.262***	−0.446***
	(−7.784)	(−11.353)	(−7.704)	(−5.147)	(−9.059)
Δ Trade	−0.053**	−0.006	−0.012†	−0.007†	−0.002
	(−2.438)	(−0.453)	(−1.629)	(−1.312)	(−0.978)
Trade ($t-1$)	−0.065***	−0.030***	0.001	−0.008*	−0.002
	(−3.644)	(−2.715)	(0.117)	(−1.778)	(−0.934)
Δ% Low-wage imports	0.036	−0.014	−0.006	0.005	0.013***
	(0.810)	(−0.504)	(−0.411)	(0.461)	(3.046)
Percentage low wage ($t-1$)	−0.022	−0.036*	0.007	−0.001	0.009***
	(−0.771)	(−1.966)	(0.695)	(−0.151)	(2.914)
Δ FDI	−0.021	−0.006	0.003	0.017	0.000
	(−0.364)	(−0.169)	(0.132)	(1.179)	(0.046)
FDI ($t-1$)	−0.100†	−0.044	−0.018	−0.004	0.020***
	(−1.621)	(−1.148)	(−0.872)	(−0.229)	(3.303)
Δ Portfolio flows	−0.005	−0.004	−0.003	0.004*	−0.000
	(−0.081)	(−0.915)	(−1.113)	(1.974)	(−0.280)
Portfolio flows ($t-1$)	0.006	0.000	−0.003	0.004**	0.001†
	(0.816)	(0.093)	(−1.114)	(2.291)	(1.324)
Δ Deindustrialization	−.212***	−0.153***	0.010	−0.015	0.000
	(−4.011)	(−4.538)	(0.568)	(−1.101)	(0.061)
Deindustrialization ($t-1$)	−0.038	−0.062**	0.047***	0.002	0.004
	(−0.833)	(−2.068)	(2.967)	(0.150)	(0.773)
Unemployment ($t-1$)	0.155***	0.033	−0.017	0.020*	0.011**
	(2.940)	(1.136)	(−1.055)	(1.762)	(2.458)
GDP per capita ($t-1$)	0.000*	0.000†	0.000	0.000**	−0.000
	(1.745)	(1.633)	(1.008)	(2.181)	(−1.165)
Growth percentage ($t-1$)	−0.165***	−0.076***	−0.016	−0.008	0.003
	(−4.303)	(−3.185)	(−1.250)	(−0.879)	(0.965)
Dependency rate ($t-1$)	0.271**	0.041	0.002	0.062**	0.004
	(2.599)	(0.637)	(0.054)	(2.411)	(0.405)
Left portfolios ($t-1$)	0.006**	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.000
	(2.325)	(1.091)	(0.225)	(0.997)	(0.587)
Christian Democrat portfolios ($t-1$)	0.000	−0.001	−0.004*	0.001	0.001
	(0.073)	(−0.371)	−1.825	(0.975)	(1.044)
Constant	−4.271	3.159	−0.831	−2.718**	−0.301
	(−0.897)	(1.026)	(−0.473)	(−2.275)	(−0.633)
No. of observations	270	270	270	270	270
Wald $\chi^2(48)$	272.76	226.72	164.81	106.98	131.48

Note: OLS coefficients, panel-corrected standard errors, estimated using STATA 6.0 (xtgls). Country and year dummies not shown.

Source: OECD *Historical Statistics,* various years; OECD *Labour Force Statistics,* various years; OECD *National Accounts,* various years; OECD 1996 and 1998; IMF *Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook,* various years; and Swank 1995.

***$p < .01$.
**$p < .05$.
*$p < .10$.
†$p < .2$.

Openness and compensation: some results (Burgoon 2001)

10. 国際貿易体制

テキストの要点

- WTOの原理
  - 自由市場主義
  - 無差別主義=MFN（例外ーGSP）とNational treatment
- GATT/WTOの交渉ラウンド
  - 交渉課題の拡大
    - 関税、非関税障壁、TRIPs（trade related aspects of intellectual property）、TRIMs（trade-related investment measures）
  - 参加国の増大と利害の多様化
- WTO紛争処理制度の充実
- WTO（国際貿易体制）と地域貿易協定の関係

10.1 WTO加盟の効果

- WTOと地域貿易協定
  - 地域貿易協定の形成・拡大・深化への第三国対応
    - 域内貿易想像と域外貿易迂回
    - 第三国対応ー協定参加、対抗協定、経済制裁、WTO提訴
  - WTOの展開と地域貿易協定の形成
      - WTOでの発言力強化（WTO拡大期）
      - 貿易ラウンド展開期（失敗への防御）
      - WTO紛争処理参加・敗訴
- WTO加盟の経済効果
  - 貿易拡大、貿易安定化、貿易自由化、参加国自由度
  - 加盟、ラウンド、重複地域貿易協定の効果
    - 地位ー旧植民地加盟、猶予加盟、暫定加盟
    - 関係ー旧植民地関係、地域貿易協定

10.2　WTO紛争処理の規定要因

- WTO紛争処理制度利用と政治体制
  - パネル要求ー制度要因と政治要因
    - 1979 Understanding on dispute settlements
    - 1989 Dispute settlement procedure improvements
  - パネル設置・パネル裁定と譲歩
  - 係争点と係争国の性格とパネル設置

H1: *Trading bloc's formation will result in an increase in the number of complaints that third parties file against the bloc's members in the dispute settlement system of the GATT/WTO.*

H2: *Trading bloc's deepening will result in an increase in the number of complaints that third parties file against the bloc's members in the dispute settlement system of the GATT/WTO.*

H3: *Trading bloc's enlargement will result in an increase in the number of complaints that third parties file against the bloc's members in the dispute settlement system of the GATT/WTO.*

TABLE 2. Count Models of the Annual Complaints Filed Against EEC, Mercosur, and NAFTA, 1948–2000: Bloc Formation

Variable	*I. Basic Model*	*II. Lagged Endogenous Variable*
TBLOC	1.077***	1.031***
	(4.24)	(4.06)
BLCMEM	− 0.080**	− 0.075**
	(− 2.32)	(− 2.18)
WTO	0.513	0.477
	(1.61)	(1.49)
GATTMEM	− 0.007	− 0.009*
	(− 1.59)	(− 1.93)
BTRD	0.001***	0.001***
	(5.69)	(4.63)
LAGDSP		0.055
		(1.63)
CONSTANT	0.149	0.249
	(0.44)	(0.72)
Log likelihood	− 277.29	− 273.91
χ^2	81.14***	81.00***
N	159	159

Note: ***$p<.01$; **$p<.05$; *$p<.1$ (two-tailed). Figures in parentheses are z statistics.

TABLE 3. Count Models of the Annual Complaints Filed Against EEC, Mercosur, and NAFTA, 1948–2000: Bloc Depth

Variable	*III. Basic Model*	*IV. Lagged Endogenous Variable*
BDEPTH	0.738***	0.703***
	(4.51)	(4.30)
BLCMEM	− 0.189***	− 0.179***
	(− 3.98)	(− 3.75)
WTO	0.461	0.435
	(1.50)	(1.41)
GATTMEM	− 0.007*	− 0.009**
	(− 1.68)	(− 2.00)
BTRD	0.001***	0.001***
	(6.29)	(5.16)
LAGDSP		0.051
		(1.55)
CONSTANT	0.497	0.583
	(1.40)	(1.61)
Log likelihood	− 276.20	− 273.03
χ^2	78.10***	77.62***
N	159	159

Note: ***$p<.01$; **$p<.05$; *$p<.1$ (two-tailed). Figures in parentheses are z statistics.



Note: Small arrows point to relevant vertical axis. Squares on horizontal axis show years in which an MTN was underway. "Number of states in new disputes" counts EU as one state.

FIGURE 2. *Trends in GATT/WTO membership, disputes, and reciprocal PTAs, 1948–98*

TABLE 2. *Duration dependent logit models of PTA formation, directed dyads*

Variable	*Model 1 (1950–93)*		*Model 2 (1948–98)*		*Model 3 (1950–93)*	
Prob(PTA) = 1	*Coefficient*	*SE*	*Coefficient*	*SE*	*Coefficient*	*SE*
NUMBER OF MEMBERS, $t-1$	0.251**	0.030	0.155**	0.012	—	—
DETRENDED # OF MEMBERS, $t-1$	—	—	—	—	0.235**	0.024
MTN ROUND UNDERWAY, t	1.848**	0.154	1.900**	0.155	1.730**	0.159
NEW DISPUTE WITH 3RD PARTY, $t-1$	0.527**	0.133	0.629**	0.118	0.587**	0.133
DISPUTE LOSS WITH 3RD PARTY, $t-3$	1.183**	0.115	1.073**	0.102	1.270**	0.114
NEW DISPUTE BETWEEN i AND j, $t-1$	−0.933	0.643	−0.922	0.619	−0.809	0.640
ALLIANCE, $t-1$	0.270*	0.116	—	—	0.453**	0.117
DISTANCE, t	−0.627**	0.027	−0.665**	0.026	−0.545**	0.027
TRADE, $t-1$	14.304**	3.129	—	—	16.826**	3.459
PTA DENSITY, $t-1$	−37.658**	3.971	−23.331**	2.636	−32.651**	3.263
PTA DENSITY^2, $t-1$	−364.91**	83.59	−690.87**	70.01	−455.14**	82.62
DEMOCRACY, $t-1$	0.065**	0.006	0.047**	0.005	0.059**	0.005
GDP, $t-1$	−0.273**	0.059	−0.133*	0.054	−0.311**	0.061
PER CAPITA GDP, $t-1$	0.010*	0.004	0.016**	0.004	0.018**	0.004
GROWTH, $t-1$	−0.022**	0.008	—	—	0.006	0.008
TRADE PARTNER PTA COVERAGE, $t-1$	3.040**	0.135	2.765**	0.128	3.073**	0.142
YEAR, t	−0.503**	0.042	−0.395**	0.025	−0.040*	0.018
POSTCOMMUNIST, t	—	—	—	—	2.772**	0.209
FORMER COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP, t	—	—	—	—	1.511**	0.197
CONSTANT	968.966**	79.678	763.259**	48.358	73.128*	35.361
Number of observations	149,308		259,267		149,308	
Model χ^2	2661.9**, 22 d.o.f.		3069.4**, 19 d.o.f.		2768.6**, 24 d.o.f.	
Pseudo-R^2	0.390		0.360		0.414	

Note: Shaded rows identify the variables that are central to our argument. Two-tailed tests are conducted for all estimates. Robust standard errors (SEs) clustered over dyads. Six duration dependence splines omitted from table. PTA DENSITY is "centered" by subtracting .075 to reduce collinearity without other effects. d. o. f. = degrees of freedom.
**$p < .01$.
*$p < .05$.

WTO disputes and trading blocs formation (Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003)



Note: Horizontal axis is in logarithmic scale. For all variables that are not dichotomous and that have a positive (negative) coefficient, "relative risk" is the predicted probability of PTA formation when the variable in question equals its sample mean plus one standard deviation (sample mean), divided by the predicted probability of PTA formation when it equals its sample mean (sample mean plus one standard deviation) holding other variables at their sample means. For dichotomus variables, the comparison is between values of 1 and 0. (The ratios are inverted for GDP and DISTANCE, whose coefficients are negative.)

FIGURE 3. *Estimated substantive significance of selected variables in model (1), in terms of relative risk*

Determinants of trading blocs formation (Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003)

TABLE 1. *The apparent irrelevance of GATT/WTO membership*

	Includes year effects	*Dyad and year effects*
Both formal GATT/WTO members	−.07	.07
	(.03)	(.02)
Only one formal GATT/WTO member	−.21	−.02
	(.03)	(.02)
Reciprocal PTA	.33	.35
	(.03)	(.02)
Nonreciprocal PTA	.14	−.07
	(.03)	(.03)
GSP	−.10	−.10
	(.02)	(.02)
Currency union	1.01	.49
	(.08)	(.09)
Colonial orbit	1.75	.88
	(.10)	(.08)
Log product real GDP	.77	.67
	(.01)	(.01)
Log of distance	−.71	
	(.01)	
Common language	.36	
	(.03)	
Land border	.58	
	(.06)	
Number landlocked	−.14	
	(.02)	
Number of islands	.24	
	(.03)	
Log product land area	−.10	
	(.00)	
Standard error of the regression	1.42	.94
R^2	.61	.84
N	381,656	381,656

Notes: Estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. For both models, the unit of observation is the directed dyad and the dependent variable is the natural log of imports (measured in 1967 U.S. dollars). The data cover fifty-nine years and 17,359 directed dyads. Robust standard errors, clustered by directed dyad, appear in parentheses. Both models include year-specific dummy variables, which are not shown. The second model adds fixed effects for directed dyads.

TABLE 2. *The Effect of Participation in the GATT/WTO*

	Full model	*Restricted model*
Both participate in the GATT/WTO		
Both formal members	.34	
	(.03)	
Both nonmember participants	.45	.35
	(.07)	(.03)
Formal member and nonmember participant	.38	
	(.04)	
Only one participates in the GATT/WTO		
Formal member	.20	
	(.03)	
		.20
		(.03)
Nonmember participant	.17	
	(.04)	
Reciprocal PTA	.34	.34
	(.02)	(.02)
Nonreciprocal PTA	−.05	−.05
	(.03)	(.03)
GSP	−.10	−.10
	(.02)	(.02)
Currency union	.50	.49
	(.09)	(.09)
Colonial orbit	.81	.84
	(.08)	(.08)
Log product real GDP	.66	.66
	(.01)	(.01)
Standard error of the regression	.94	.94
R^2	.84	.84
N	381,656	381,656

Notes: Estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. For both models, the unit of observation is the directed dyad and the dependent variable is the natural log of imports (measured in 1967 U.S. dollars). The data cover fifty-nine years and 17,359 directed dyads. Robust standard errors, clustered by directed dyad, appear in parentheses. The restricted model constrains all three measures of "both participate in GATT" to have equal effects and constrains both forms of "only one participates in GATT" to have equal effects. Both models include fixed effects for directed dyads and years.

TABLE 3. *Increase in trade among GATT/WTO participants*

	Formal member	*Nonmember participant*	*Nonparticipant*
Formal member	41%	46%	22%
Nonmember participant		56%	19%
Nonparticipant			0%

Notes: Entries are the estimated percentage increase in trade for a pair of countries (with GATT/WTO participation given by the row and column labels), relative to when neither country participates. Each effect is calculated as an arc elasticity, $e^{\hat{\beta}} - 1$, where $\hat{\beta}$ is the appropriate parameter estimate from the full model in Table 2.

The effect of GATT/WTO participation (Goldstein et al. 2007

TABLE 4. *Effects by GATT/WTO negotiating round*

	Both participate in GATT/WTO	*One participates in GATT/WTO*
Before Annecy Round (1949)	.86	.15
	(.08)	(.06)
Annecy to Torquay Round (1951)	.58	.17
	(.06)	(.05)
Torquay to Geneva Round (1956)	.66	.22
	(.06)	(.06)
Geneva to Dillon Round (1961)	.48	.19
	(.05)	(.05)
Dillon to Kennedy Round (1967)	.33	.15
	(.05)	(.05)
Kennedy to Tokyo Round (1979)	.23	.13
	(.05)	(.05)
Tokyo to Uruguay Round (1994)	.21	.12
	(.06)	(.05)
After the Uruguay Round	.10	.02
	(.06)	(.05)

Notes: All estimates in the table come from a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with separate GATT coefficients for each negotiating round. The unit of observation is the directed dyad and the dependent variable is the natural log of imports (measured in 1967 U.S. dollars). The regression involved 381,656 observations, which covered fifty-nine years and 17,359 directed dyads. The model includes fixed effects for directed dyads and years, as well as controls for reciprocal PTAs, nonreciprocal PTAs, GSP, currency union, colonial orbit, and the log product of real GDP. Robust standard errors, clustered by directed dyad, appear in parentheses. The standard error of the regression was .94, and R^2 was .84.

The effects of GATT/WTO rounds (Goldstein et al. 2007)

TABLE 5. *Effects by income group*

	Only industrial countries	*Industrial with nonindustrial country*	*No industrial countries*
Both participate in the GATT/WTO	.54	.37	.28
	(.11)	(.06)	(.04)
Only one participates in the GATT/WTO	.25	.27	.13
	(.10)	(.05)	(.04)
Reciprocal PTA	.29	.32	.29
	(.05)	(.03)	(.03)
Standard error of the regression	.61	.90	1.02
R^2	.93	.83	.74
N	28,971	194,963	157,722

Notes: Each column comes from a separate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in which the unit of observation was the directed dyad and the dependent variable was the natural log of imports (measured in 1967 U.S. dollars). All regressions included fixed effects for directed dyads and years, as well as controls for nonreciprocal PTAs, GSP, currency union, colonial orbit, and the log product of real GDP. The regression for "only industrial countries" covered 594 directed dyads over fifty-nine years; the "industrial with nonindustrial country" regression covered 6,445 directed dyads over fifty-nine years; and the regression with "no industrial countries" covered 10,320 directed dyads over fifty-nine years.

TABLE 7. *Increase in trade with and without higher-order agreements*

	Colonial orbit	*Reciprocal PTA*	*Both in GATT/WTO*	*One in GATT/WTO*	*Nonreciprocal agreement*
No higher-order agreement	123%	35%	43%	25%	41%
Higher-order agreement		26%	55%	17%	−10%

Notes: Entries are the estimated percentage increase in trade when both countries have the relationship described by the column label, relative to when no such relationship exists. Each effect is calculated as an arc elasticity, $e^{\hat{\beta}} - 1$, where $\hat{\beta}$ is the appropriate parameter estimate from the full model (hierarchy tested) in Table 6.

TABLE 6. *Trade agreements—hierarchical or additive?*

	Hierarchy imposed	*Hierarchy tested*
Colonial orbit	1.10	.80
	(.08)	(.10)
Reciprocal PTA		
No colonial orbit	.65	.30
	(.04)	(.07)
With colonial orbit	—	.23
		(.09)
Both in the GATT/WTO		
Neither colonial orbit nor reciprocal PTA	.30	.36
	(.03)	(.03)
With colonial orbit and/or reciprocal PTA	—	.44
		(.07)
One in the GATT/WTO		
Neither colonial orbit nor reciprocal PTA	.19	.22
	(.03)	(.03)
With colonial orbit and/or reciprocal PTA	—	.15
		(.07)
Nonreciprocal (PTA or GSP)		
No colonial orbit, GATT/WTO, or reciprocal PTA	.39	.34
	(.11)	(.11)
With colonial orbit, GATT/WTO, or reciprocal PTA	—	−.11
		(.02)
Currency union	.51	.50
	(.08)	(.09)
Log product real GDP	.67	.66
	(.01)	(.01)
Standard error of the regression	.94	.94
R^2	.84	.84
N	381,656	381,656

Notes: Estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. For both models, the unit of observation is the directed dyad and the dependent variable is the natural log of imports (measured in 1967 U.S. dollars). The data cover fifty-nine years and 17,359 directed dyads. Both models include fixed effects for directed dyads and years. Robust standard errors, clustered by directed dyad, appear in parentheses.

GATT/WTO membership and PTAs (Goldstein et al. 2007)

Hypothesis 1.1: Cases are more likely to have been paneled after the adoption of the 1989 Improvements.

Hypothesis 1.2: Cases are more likely to have been settled early after the adoption of the 1989 Improvements.

Hypothesis 1.3: Cases are more likely to have been resolved through concessions at the panel stage after the adoption of the 1989 Improvements.

Hypothesis 2.1: Cases are more likely to have been paneled the more democratic the dyad.

Hypothesis 2.2: Cases paneled by more democratic dyads are less likely to have ended with concessions.

TABLE 2
Estimates of a Rare-Events Logit Model of Concession at the Consultation Stage

Probability (CONCESSIONS = 1)	*Coefficient*	*Robust Standard Error*
Constant	2.811***	0.95
IMPROVE	0.385	0.60
JDEM	0.087**	0.05
MULTI	–0.143*	0.11
LDCVDME	–0.089	1.11
TRADE	–0.090	0.11
C_OPEN	–0.017	0.02
D_OPEN	–0.056***	0.02
A23	0.580	0.54
Number of observations	103	
Percentage correctly predicted	85	

*$p < .1$. **$p < .05$. ***$p < .001$. One-tailed p for all variables.

TABLE 3
Estimates of a Rare-Events Logit Model of Paneling

Probability (PANEL = 1)	*Coefficient*	*Robust Standard Error*
Constant	–2.656***	0.49
IMPROVE	–0.230	0.28
JDEM	0.065***	0.02
MULTI	–0.052	0.06
LDCVDME	1.034***	0.38
TRADE	0.007	0.06
C_OPEN	0.009*	0.01
D_OPEN	0.006	0.01
A23	1.813***	0.26
Number of observations	352	
Percentage correctly predicted	72	

*$p < .1$. ***$p < .001$. One-tailed p for all variables.

TABLE 4
Estimates of a Rare-Events Logit Model of Concession at the Panel Stage

Probability (CONCESSIONS = 1)	*Coefficient*	*Robust Standard Error*
Constant	1.031	0.77
IMPROVE	0.131	0.76
JDEM	–0.010	0.04
MULTI	0.077	0.11
LDCVDME	0.214	0.64
TRADE	–0.350***	0.14
C_OPEN	0.006	0.01
D_OPEN	–0.024***	0.01
A23	0.901**	0.41
Number of observations	133	
Percentage correctly predicted	79	

*$p < .1$. **$p < .05$. ***$p < .001$. One-tailed p for all variables.

TABLE 1

STATUS OF CASES

Status	Number of Cases
Completed	42
Inactive/settled	51
Appeal and panel reports adopted	16
Active	13
Panel report appealed	5
Panel report issued	6
Pending consultation	83
Total	216

NOTE.—The World Trade Organization does not offer explicit definitions of these categories. "Completed" appears to refer to a case in which the parties have completed the panel and appeals process. "Inactive/settled" appears to refer to cases in which the parties settled without the use of a panel or in which the claimant withdrew its complaint. "Appeal and panel reports adopted" refers to the subset of completed cases in which either a panel ruling has been adopted and not appealed or else an appeal has been made and the appellate ruling has been adopted. It does not imply implementation of these rulings. "Panel report appealed" refers to those cases in which the panel report has been adopted and is in the process of being appealed by one party. "Panel report issued" refers to cases in which a panel has ruled but the report has not been adopted or appealed. "Pending consultation" refers to cases currently in the consultation process (after the written request for a consultation is submitted but prior to any move to form a panel or a statement of settlement to the mutual satisfaction of the parties).



FIGURE 1.—Defendant states



FIGURE 2.—Complainant states

Participants and cases in WTO conflict resolution
(Guzman and Simmons 2002)

TABLE 5

LOGIT COEFFICIENTS FOR THE PROPENSITY TO PROCEED TO A PANEL

Explanatory Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Constant	−1,065**	−1,196**	−1,120**	−1,131**	−1,094**
	(339)	(356)	(353)	(358.7)	(358)
Year	.534**	.601**	.563**	.569**	.550**
	(.170)	(.178)	(.177)	(.180)	(.180)
Lumpy	−1.028	−1.24	−1.34+	−1.34+	−1.33+
	(.722)	(.762)	(.779)	(.778)	(.781)
Democratic Pair	−1.19*	−1.47*	−1.33*	−1.23+	−1.20+
	(.545)	(.623)	(.631)	(.647)	(.648)
Lumpy and Democratic Pair	1.88*	2.03*	1.95*	1.86*	1.83*
	(.828)	(.882)	(.876)	(.897)	(.892)
Complainant's Exports to Defendant ($\times 10^{-7}$)	−9.94	−10.9	−20.1+	−18.6+	−15.4*
	(6.73)	(6.89)	(10.8)	(10.0)	(7.65)
Log GDP of Complainant	−.058	−.127	−.187+	−.201+	−.193+
	(.100)	(.102)	(.111)	(.112)	(.111)
LDC v. LDC		−2.70+	−2.45	−2.55+	−2.19
		(1.48)	(1.52)	(1.55)	(1.61)
Trade-Dependent Pair			.131+	.106	.106
			(.070)	(.073)	(.072)
Parliamentary Pair				−.631	
				(.771)	
Log GDP Difference					.134
					(.119)
Number of observations	151	150	150	150	150
Wald χ^2	18.16	16.13	18.47	18.74	20.35
$P > \chi^2$	.006	.024	.020	.028	.016

NOTE.—Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variables are explained in Appendix C.

+ $P > Z = .10$.

* $P > Z = .05$.

** $P > Z = .01$.

Determinants of proceeding to a panel in WTO (Guzman and Simmons 2002)

11.国際通貨体制

11.1　国際金融規制の標準化（調和）

- 銀行自己資本比率（BIS）規制
  - 経緯
    - 1974　Bankhaus Herstatt、Franklin National破綻
      - 規制主体をめぐる協定（Concord 1)
    - 1982- 債務危機とアメリカIMF増資問題
    - 1984-87 G-10　バーゼル委員会
      - 1988 銀行の自己資本比率をめぐる協定
      - 英米協定先行、日本、欧州諸国の参加（1992までに導入）
    - 1997　Basel Core Principles
      - IMFと世銀により評価（Financial sector assessment program: FSAP）

- 説明
  - 中央銀行のEpistemic Communityと英米覇権（Kapstein)
  - 外国銀行危機処理の国内・国際コスト移転（Oatley & Nabors）
  - 銀行制度信認と競争力をめぐる政治と行政（Singer)
- Basel II
  - 1999、2001、2003年　Consultative Papers
  - 銀行のリスク資産の自己評価標準化＜一一律自己資本比率
  - 補完的規制監督と市場規律
    - Minimum regulatory capital requirements (Pillar 1)
    - Supervisory review (Pillar 2)
    - Market discipline (Pillar 3)
  - 2006年導入予定も現在に至る

- 国際金融規制の標準化類型

11.2　国際金融機関参加

- IMF8条国移行問題
  - 為替自由化ー＞資本自由化のコミットメント
  - 市場主導 vs IMF主導の移行
  - コミットメントの有効性
    - 参加拡大圧力と地域圧力



FIGURE 2. *Shock to confidence*



FIGURE 3. *Shock to competitiveness*

Legislative control and regulator autonomy (Singer 2004)

Table 1. Basel Core Principles—Definitions

Chapter 1: Preconditions for effective banking supervision

Principle 1. Objectives, autonomy, powers, and resources

Principle 1(1). There should be clear responsibilities and objectives set by legislations for each supervisory agency
Principle 1(2). Each supervisory agency should possess adequate resources to meet the objective set, provided on terms that do not undermine the autonomy, integrity and independence of supervisory agency
Principle 1(3). A suitable framework of banking laws, setting bank minimum standard, including provisions related to authorization of banking establishments and their supervision
Principle 1(4). The legal framework should provide power to address compliance with laws as well as safety and soundness concerns
Principle 1(5). The legal framework should provide protection of supervisors for actions taken in good faith in the course of performing supervisory duties
Principle 1(6). There should be arrangements of interagency cooperation, including with foreign supervisors, for sharing information and protecting the confidentiality of such information

Chapter 2: Licensing and Structure

Principle 2. Definition of permissible activities
Principle 3. Right to set licensing criteria and reject applications for establishments that do meet the standard sets.
Principle 4. Authority to review and reject proposals of significant ownership changes.
Principle 5. Authority to establish criteria for reviewing major acquisitions or investments

Chapter 3: Prudential Regulations and Requirements

Principle 6. Prudent and appropriate risk adjusted capital adequacy ratios must be set
Principle 7. Supervisors should evaluate banks' credit policies
Principle 8. Banks should adhere to adequate loan evaluation and loan-loss provisioning policies
Principle 9. Supervisors should set limits to restrict large exposures, and concentration in bank portfolios should be identifiable
Principle 10. Supervisors must have in place requirements to mitigate the risks associated with related lending
Principle 11. Policies must be in place to identify, monitor and control country risks, and to maintain reserves against such risks
Principle 12. Systems must be in place to accurately measure, monitor and adequately control markets risks and supervisors should have powers to impose limits or capital charge on such exposures
Principle 13. Banks must have in place a comprehensive risk management process to identify, measure, monitor and control all other material risks and, if needed, hold capital against such risks
Principle 14. Banks should have internal control and audit systems in place.
Principle 15. Adequate policies, practices and procedures should be in place to promote high ethical and professional standards and prevent the bank being used by criminal elements

Chapter 4: Methods of On-Going Supervision

Principle 16. An effective supervisory system should consist of on-site and off-site supervision
Principle 17. Supervisors should have regular contact with bank management
Principle 18. Supervisors must have a means of collecting, reviewing and analyzing prudential reports and statistics returns from banks on a solo and consolidated basis
Principle 19. Supervisors must have a means of independent validation of supervisory information either through on-site examinations or use of external auditors
Principle 20. Supervisors must have the ability to supervise banking groups on a consolidated basis

Table 1. Basel Core Principles—Definitions (*concluded*)

Chapter 5: Information Requirements

Principle 21. Each bank must maintain adequate records that enable the supervisor to obtain a true and fair view of the financial condition of the bank of the bank, and must publish on a regular basis financial statements that fairly reflect its condition

Chapter 6: Formal Powers of Supervisors

Principle 22. Adequate supervisory measures must be in place to bring about corrective action when banks fail to meet prudential requirement when there are regulatory violations, or when depositors are threatened in any other way. This should include the ability to revoke the banking license or recommend its revocation.

Chapter 7: Cross-Border Banking

Principle 23. Supervisors must practice global consolidated supervision over internationally active banks, adequately monitor and apply prudential norms to all aspects of the business conducted by these banks.

Principle 24. Consolidated supervision should include establishing contact and information exchange with the various supervisors involved, primarily host country supervisory authorities

Principle 25. Supervisors must require the local operations of foreign banks to be conducted at the same standards as required of domestic institutions, and must have powers to share information needed by the home country supervisors of those banks

Source: *Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision*, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel, September 1997.

Appendix I. Basel Core Principles—Information Requirements of Banking Organizations

Principle 21: Banking supervisors must be satisfied that each bank maintains adequate records drawn up in accordance with consistent accounting policies and practices that enable the supervisor to obtain a true and fair view of the financial condition of the bank and the profitability of its business, and that the bank publishes on a regular basis financial statements that fairly reflect its condition.

For banking supervisors to conduct effective off-site supervision of banks and to evaluate the condition of the local banking market, they must receive financial information at regular intervals and this information must be verified periodically through on-site examinations or external audits. Banking supervisors must ensure that each bank maintains adequate accounting records drawn up in accordance with consistent accounting policies and practices that enable the supervisor to obtain a true and fair view of the financial condition of the bank and the profitability of its business. In order that the accounts portray a true and fair view, it is essential that assets are recorded at values that are realistic and consistent, taking account of current values, where relevant, and that profit reflects what, on a net basis, is likely to be received and takes into account likely transfers to loan loss reserves. It is important that banks submit information in a format that makes comparisons among banks possible although, for certain purposes, data derived from internal management information systems may also be helpful to supervisors. At a minimum, periodic reporting should include a bank's balance sheet, contingent liabilities and income statement, with supporting details and key risk exposures. Supervisors can be obstructed or misled when banks knowingly or recklessly provide false information of material importance to the supervisory process. If a bank provides information to the supervisor knowing that it is materially false or misleading, or it does so recklessly, supervisory and/or criminal action should be taken against both the individuals involved and the institution.

1. Accounting standards

In order to ensure that the information submitted by banks is of a comparable nature and its meaning is clear, the supervisory agency will need to provide report instructions that clearly establish the accounting standards to be used in preparing the reports. These standards should be based on accounting principles and rules that command wide international acceptance and be aimed specifically at banking institutions.

2. Scope and frequency of reporting

The supervisory agency needs to have powers to determine the scope and frequency of reporting to reflect the volatility of the business and to enable the agency to track what is happening at individual banks on both a solo and consolidated basis, as well as with the banking system as a whole. The supervisors should develop a series of informational reports for banks to prepare and submit at regular intervals. While some reports may be filed as often as monthly, others may be filed quarterly or annually. In addition, some reports may be "event generated", meaning they are filed only if a particular event occurs (e.g. investment in a new affiliate). Supervisors should be sensitive to the burden that reporting imposes. Consequently, they may determine that it is not necessary for every bank to file every report. Filing status can be based on the organizational structure of the bank, its size, and the types of activities it conducts.

3. Confirmation of the accuracy of information submitted

It is the responsibility of bank management to ensure the accuracy, completeness and timeliness of prudential, financial, and other reports submitted to the supervisors. Therefore, bank management must ensure that reports are verified and that external auditors determine that the reporting systems in place are adequate and provide reliable data. External auditors should express an opinion on the annual accounts and management report supplied to shareholders and the general public. Weaknesses in bank auditing standards in a particular country may require that banking supervisors become involved in establishing clear guidelines concerning the scope and content of the audit program as well as the standards to be used. In extreme cases where supervisors cannot be satisfied with the quality of the annual accounts or regulatory reports, or with the work done by external auditors, they should have the ability to use supervisory measures to bring about timely corrective action, and they may need to reserve the right to approve the issue of accounts to the public. In assessing the nature and adequacy of work done by auditors, and the degree of reliance that can be placed on this work, supervisors will need to consider the extent to which the audit program has examined such areas as the loan portfolio, loan loss reserves, nonperforming assets (including the treatment of interest on such assets), asset valuations, trading and other securities activities, derivatives, asset securitizations, and the adequacy of internal controls over financial reporting. Where it is competent and independent of management, internal audits can be relied upon as a source of information and may contribute usefully to the supervisors' understanding.

4. Confidentiality of supervisory information

Although market participants should have access to correct and timely information, there are certain types of sensitive information that should be held confidential by banking supervisors. In order for a relationship of mutual trust to develop, banks need to know that such sensitive information will be held confidential by the banking supervisory agency and its appropriate counterparts at other domestic and foreign supervisory agencies.

5. Disclosure

In order for market forces to work effectively, thereby fostering a stable and efficient financial system, market participants need access to correct and timely information. Disclosure, therefore, is a complement to supervision. For this reason, banks should be required to disclose to the public information regarding their activities and financial position that is comprehensive and not misleading. This information should be timely and sufficient for market participants to assess the risk inherent in any individual banking organization.

Basel Core Principle 21

Figure 1. Compliance With the BCPs (by region)



Figure 2. Average Compliance With the BCPs (by chapter)



Compliance with BCPs (Dermirguc-Kunt et al. 2006)

Table 7. Impact of Individual Chapters

								Dropping Countries One by One [1/]		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Foreign-owned	0.427	0.309	0.409	0.394	0.38	0.397	0.403	0.449	0.186	0.295
	[2.65]***	[1.94]*	[2.24]**	[2.52]**	[2.80]***	[2.63]***	[2.37]**	[2.37]**	[1.03]	[1.8]*
State-owned	-0.52	-0.575	-0.443	-0.381	-0.673	-0.406	-0.447	-0.498	-0.639	-0.691
	[2.07]**	[2.07]**	[1.82]*	[1.51]	[2.35]**	[1.64]	[1.75]*	[-1.86]*	[-2.16]**	[-2.14]**
Other banking institutions	0.105	0.234	0.099	0.083	0.252	0.093	0.124	0.077	0.296	0.340
	[0.56]	[1.29]	[0.50]	[0.41]	[1.25]	[0.45]	[0.62]	[0.4]	[1.64]	[1.51]
Return on equity	0.008	0.008	0.013	0.01	0.007	0.01	0.009	0.013	0.002	0.002
	[1.57]	[1.58]	[1.83]*	[1.91]*	[1.40]	[1.99]**	[1.82]*	[1.73]*	[0.31]	[0.56]
Capitalization	-0.005	-0.006	-0.006	-0.007	-0.009	-0.008	-0.005	-0.004	-0.001	0.560
	[1.00]	[1.01]	[0.98]	[1.38]	[1.61]	[1.39]	[0.95]	[-0.63]	[-0.14]	[-0.77]
Net loans-to-assets	0.03	0.036	0.03	0.035	0.028	0.038	0.039	0.027	0.013	0.013
	[1.42]	[1.60]	[1.39]	[1.60]	[1.52]	[1.70]*	[1.86]*	[1.26]	[0.54]	[0.64]
Total assets	0.2	0.211	0.195	0.221	0.212	0.205	0.206	0.210	0.184	0.184
	[3.47]***	[3.74]***	[3.04]***	[3.22]***	[3.59]***	[3.38]***	[3.52]***	[3.34]***	[2.65]***	[2.85]***
Index of rule of law	0.551	0.5	0.603	0.724	0.434	0.744	0.576	0.575	0.939	0.858
	[2.26]**	[2.03]**	[2.25]**	[3.68]***	[1.79]*	[4.05]***	[2.28]**	[2.21]**	[4.05]***	[3.85]***
Index chapter 1	1.14							1.379		
	[1.73]*							[1.07]		
Index chapter 2		2.538							1.491	
		[3.71]***							[1.39]	
Index chapter 3			0.568							
			[0.56]							
Index chapter 4				-0.632						
				[0.59]						
Index chapter 5					2.037					1.573
					[3.17]***					[2.13]**
Index chapter 6						-0.509				
						[0.90]				
Index chapter 7							0.682			
							[1.31]			
Av. chapters, excl. chapter 1								-0.399		
								[-0.26]		
Av. chapters, excl. chapter 2									0.116	
									[0.07]	
Av. chapters, excl. chapter 5										0.326
										[0.33]
Observations	203	203	189	203	203	203	203	186	166	175
Pseudo R2	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.17	0.17	0.1736	0.2432	0.25
Method of estimation	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit	Ordered probit

[1/] regression with the largest standard error for the variable of interest.

Notes: Robust z statistics in brackets, observations are clustered by country. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Impact of individual BCP chapters in bank soundness (Dermirguc-Kunt et al. 2006)

Table 10. Bank Z-Scores and BCP Compliance

	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Foreign owned	-0.057	-0.013	-0.103	-0.157	-0.027	-0.041	-0.072	-0.142	-0.122	-0.129	-0.095
	[0.20]	[0.05]	[0.36]	[0.49]	[0.10]	[0.15]	[0.26]	[0.48]	[0.36]	[0.42]	[0.33]
State owned	0.039	0.027	0.096	0.043	-0.023	-0.066	0.141	0.142	0.016	-0.007	-0.083
	[0.19]	[0.13]	[0.42]	[0.19]	[0.12]	[0.35]	[0.61]	[0.59]	[0.07]	[0.03]	[0.43]
Non commercial bank	0.161	0.112	0.143	0.064	0.188	0.324	0.098	0.121	0.062	0.107	0.346
	[0.65]	[0.45]	[0.56]	[0.30]	[0.86]	[1.45]	[0.41]	[0.52]	[0.29]	[0.56]	[1.52]
Total assets	0.064	0.073	0.1	0.095	0.064	0.088	0.106	0.1	0.089	0.082	0.081
	[1.28]	[1.94]*	[2.56]**	[1.34]	[1.61]	[2.53]**	[3.24]***	[2.62]**	[2.66]**	[2.24]**	[2.02]*
Overheads/Total assets	-10.245	-9.214	-9.171	-10.36	-9.357	-9.261	-7.603	-6.454	-10.344	-9.903	-8.275
	[2.20]**	[1.88]*	[1.85]*	[1.96]*	[1.92]*	[1.87]*	[1.38]	[1.11]	[2.11]**	[2.05]**	[1.60]
Index of rule of law	-0.143	-0.073	-0.031	-0.03	-0.275	-0.154	0.005	0.045	-0.039	-0.147	-0.14
	[0.88]	[0.44]	[0.22]	[0.20]	[1.59]	[1.20]	[0.03]	[0.31]	[0.26]	[0.93]	[1.16]
Compliance with BCPs	0.02										
	[1.48]										
Index chapter 1		1.65							0.742		
		[2.08]**							[0.68]		
Index chapter 2			0.796								
			[0.66]								
Index chapter 3				0.169							
				[0.14]							
Index chapter 4					2.137					1.332	
					[2.63]**					[1.53]	
Index chapter 5						**2.014**					**1.979**
						[3.58]* **					**[3.66]*** **
Index chapter 6							0.108				
							[0.19]				
Index chapter 7								0.066			
								[0.12]			
Compliance, excl. chapter 1									-0.158		
									[0.12]		
Compliance, excl. chapter 4										-0.43	
										[0.48]	
Compliance, excl. chapter 5											0.192
											[0.21]
Observations	160	160	160	146	160	160	160	155	146	146	155
R-squared	0.16	0.18	0.13	0.14	0.19	0.23	0.12	0.12	0.14	0.15	0.23

Notes: Robust t statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Bank z-scores and BCP complience (Dermirguc-Kunt et al. 2006)

	HIGH INCENTIVES TO EMULATE	LOW INCENTIVES TO EMULATE
SIGNIFICANT NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES	**I** **Dominant center promotes harmonization** **Followers adjust** Multilateral institutional arrangements sought; information provision, technical assistance, broad-based membership *MARKET HARMONIZATION WITH INSTITUTIONAL ASSISTANCE*	**II** **Dominant center promotes harmonization** **Followers resist** Multilateral institutions exert political pressure; technical assistance, sanctions, broad-based membership subject to expectations of noncompliance *POLITICAL HARMONIZATION THROUGH CENTRALIZED PRESSURE*
INSIGNIFICANT NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES	**III** **Dominant center pursues unilateralism** **Followers adjust** Minimal role for multilateral institutions; information provision, technical assistance, focal point legitimation, symbolic membership *DECENTRALIZED MARKET HARMONIZATION*	**IV** **Dominant center pursues unilateralism** **Followers resist** Minimal role for multilateral institutional arrangements *NO HARMONIZATION*

FIGURE 1. *Expectations: Incentives for regulatory harmonization (dominant center, followers) and likely role of international institutions*

	HIGH INCENTIVES TO EMULATE	LOW INCENTIVES TO EMULATE
SIGNIFICANT NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES	**I** **Capital adequacy** Much "voluntary accession" to G-10 rules BIS as a facilitative institution (technical expertise) Euro-centric membership, extensive cooperative relations with regional organization of bank regulators IMF as monitor in crisis cases	**II** **Anti-money laundering** U.S. unilateral political pressure through Kerry Amendment U.S. pressure on G-10 FATF monitors and sanctions by publicizing lax policies FATF limits membership to OECD but sanctions nonmembers Opposition even in the OECD to U.S.-style reporting
INSIGNIFICANT NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES	**III** **Accounting standards for public offerings** Much voluntary adoption of standards at the firm level (USGAAP or IAS) IASC legitimates a "focal point" close to USGAAP IASC provides information and technical assistance to bring accounting rules in line with international standards	**IV** **Information sharing among securities regulators** Minimal role for IOSCO (encourages bilateralism through model MOUs) Harmonization through series of bilateral agreements Reluctance of some major jurisdictions to cooperate Recent move toward multilateral information-sharing agreements

FIGURE 2. *Issue areas, harmonization processes, and institutional outcomes*

Patterns of regulatory harmonization (Simmons 2001)

IMF membership trends (Simmons 2001)

TABLE 1. Influences on the Rate of Article VIII Acceptance

Explanatory Variable	Reduced form Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Universality	1.066* (.010)	1.055* (.011)	1.247* (.089)	1.040 (.024)
Regional Norm	1.029* (.005)	1.027* (.005)	1.038* (.010)	1.028* (.005)
Use of Fund Credits	—	.534* (.160)	.577* (.241)	.548* (.169)
Flexible Exchange Rate	—	1.52 (.418)	2.659* (1.286)	1.512 (.409)
Surveillance	—	—	0.46* (.053)	.407 (.295)
Openness (Trade Dependence)	1.008* (.002)	1.009* (.003)	1.019* (.004)	1.009* (.179)
Democracy	—	—	1.028 (.034)	—
GNP/Capita	1.00007* (.00002)	1.00007* (.00003)	1.00009* (.00004)	1.00007 (.00003)
GDP Growth	1.033 (.020)	1.035 (.021)	1.021 (.041)	1.036 (.022)
Reserves/GDP	—	1.740 (.493)	.950 (1.192)	1.744 (.505)
Reserve Volatility	—	.770 (.157)	.883 (.300)	.753 (.155)
Year	—	—	—	1.052 (.051)
No. of countries	133	128	106	128
No. of acceptances	77	72	36	72
Time "at risk"	2,462.99	2,375.95	2,177.96	2,375.95
Log-likelihood	−228.089	−200.354	−88.305	−199.51
χ^2	163.58	165.36	80.20	163.61
$p > \chi^2$	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: Results of a Cox proportionate hazard model with time varying covariates; hazard ratios (robust standard errors). *$p > |z| = <.05$.

TABLE 3. Influences on the Decision to Comply with Article VIII Obligations

				Model 4	
Explanatory Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Coef.	Δprob.
Constant	−1.907* (8.56)	−2.173* (.984)	−3.154* (1.038)	−2.09* (.898)	
Regional Noncompliance	6.409* (.996)	5.973* (1.002)	6.427* (1.145)	5.90* (.966)	.62
Rule of Law	−.535* (.137)	−.572* (.148)	−.593* (.168)	−.569* (.146)	−.45
Bureaucratic Quality	.409* (.142)	.476* (.153)	.621* (.170)	.447* (.150)	.38
Democracy	—	—	−.0011 (.008)	—	
Openness	—	.051 (.301)	—	—	
Exchange Rate Flexibility	—	−.123 (.284)	—	—	
Use of Fund Credits	—	.742* (.355)	1.126* (.399)	.676* (.341)	.16
Average Balance of Payments/GDP	−.098* (.034)	−.096* (.032)	−.131* (.047)	−.091* (0.30)	−.32
Terms of Trade Volatility	.609* (.257)	.642* (.266)	.662* (.302)	.660* (.265)	.28
World Interest Rate Shocks (non-OECD countries)	−.177* (0.57)	−.208* (.061)	−.221* (.065)	−.205* (.060)	−.30
No. of cases	691	646	607		691
$p > \chi^2$	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00
Log-likelihood	−155.95	−151.76	−127.65		−154.02
Pseudo-R^2	.623	.618	.654		.628

Note: The dependent variable is current account restrictions. The range of analysis is Article VIII countries only, 1982–95. The results are for a logit model with correction for time dependence of observations coefficients (robust standard errors). Three cubic splines were included but not reported here. For model 4, Δ prob refers to the effect on the predicted probability of a restriction of an increase of two standard deviations in the variable's value (centered on its mean), with all other variables held at their means, with the exception of use of fund credits and the cubic splines, which are held at 0. For use of fund credits, Δprob is calculated moving from 0 to 1. *$p > |Z| = .05$.

Article VIII acceptance and compliance (Simmons 2001)

TABLE 4. Restrictions on Current Account: Does Article VIII Commitment Matter?

Explanatory Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	
			Coef.	Δprob.
Constant	−.699 (.413)	.680* (.331)	.598* (.355)	
Article VIII Commitment	−.903* (.136)	−1.101* (.135)	−1.111* (.130)	−.18
Regional Restrictions	4.00* (.395)	—	—	
Terms of Trade Volatility	.337* (.099)	.417* (.095)	.403* (.094)	.18
Balance of Payments/GDP	−.016* (.008)	−.022* (.008)	−019* (.007)	−.09
GNP/Capita	.00004 (.00002)	—	—	
Reservers/GDP	—	1.43* (.526)	.957* (.353)	.05
Change in GDP	−.032* (.013)	−.026* (.012)	−.027* (.011)	−.14
Openness	−.002 (.001)	−.003 (.002)	—	
Use of Fund Credits	—	.826* (.132)	.880* (.131)	.34
Flexible Exchange Rates	—	.146 (.156)	—	
Years since Last Restriction	−1.226* (.108)	−1.272* (.111)	−1.26* (.109)	−.38
No. of cases	3,053	3,060	3,100	
$p > \chi^2$	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Log-likelihood	−751.75	−805.39	−819.89	
Pseudo-R^2	.64	.62	.62	

Note: The results of a time-series cross-section logit model are reported; the dependent variable is restrictions on current accounts; coefficients are robust standard errors. Three cubic splines were included but not reported here. For model 3, Δ prob refers to the effect on the predicted probability of a restriction of an increase of two standard deviations in the variable's value (centered on its mean), with all other variables held at their means, with the exception of use of fund credits, years since last restriction, and the cubic splines, which are held at 0. For use of fund credits, Δprob is calculated moving from 0 to 1. For years since last restriction, Δprob is calculated moving from 1 to 5. *$p > |Z| = .05$.

Article VIII and capital restrictions (Simmons 2001)

12. 経済外交と安全保障

12.1　民主平和論

- 民主政、貿易、国際機関
- 貿易と武力紛争

12.2　経済援助

- 経済援助の規定要因
  - 冷戦後の変化
  - 必要性、政府効率、政治的権利、援助国戦略
  - 国際機関援助と二国援助
    - 人権要因の反転、国別人権要因
  - 経済援助の効果
    - 民主政の促進

12.3. アメリカと経済援助

- アメリカの経済援助
  - 援助要因：必要性、経済関係、政治関係
  - 援助目的：人権・民主化、戦略
  - 冷戦後の変化
- アメリカと国際機関援助
  - IMF融資とアメリカ
    - アメリカの発言（投票権）権・議会要請
    - 融資額（特に冷戦後）／対米協調の契機／融資条件
  - 世銀援助とアメリカ
    - IDA規準：IDA country performance rating
      - Country policy and institutional assessment
      - Annual report on portfolio performance
    - IDA規準か、対米関係か
      - アメリカの投票権・増資

12.4　経済制裁

- 民主政府と経済制裁の発動
  - 発動の頻度
    - 国内要因
  - 発動の目的と対象国
    - 民主化・人権擁護
    - 外交成果
    - 民主国同士の発動
    - アメリカの例外
  - 発動の効果と手段
    - 貿易手段・金融手段

Figure 1

Distribution of Average Aid



Distribution of aid (Bandyopadhyay and Wall 2007)

Figure 3

Aid Per Capita and the Explanatory Variables (country averages)



Table 2

Regression Results: Dependent Variable = Level of Real Aid

	No fixed effects			With fixed effects		
	Coefficient	Standard error	*t*-Statistic	Coefficient	Standard error	*t*-Statistic
Common intercept	564.693*	48.850	11.56	400.684*	126.088	3.18
Recipient fixed effects	No			Yes		
2000 dummy	–56.913*	12.688	–4.49	–82.195*	6.984	–11.77
2003 dummy	–18.343	12.985	–1.41	–11.714	10.667	–1.10
Real GDP per capita	–78.178*	5.955	–13.13	–116.490*	8.848	–13.17
Real GDP per capita squared	2.646*	0.268	9.86	3.927*	0.387	10.14
Infant mortality	–3.053*	0.693	–4.41	3.632*	1.291	2.81
Infant mortality squared	0.022*	0.004	5.75	–0.015*	0.008	–1.95
Civil/political rights	0.212	1.841	0.12	8.940*	2.486	3.60
Government effectiveness	114.432*	13.934	8.21	82.453*	12.856	6.41
Population (millions)	7.497*	0.394	19.01	13.419*	2.815	4.77
Population squared	–0.005*	0.000	–10.78	–0.012*	0.002	–6.95
Log likelihood		–2,563.56			–2,264.07	
Number of observations		395			395	
Number of recipient countries		135			135	
Estimated coefficients		11			145	

NOTE: Estimated using feasible generalized least squares, allowing for recipient-specific heteroskedasticity; *indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level.

$$Aid_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \beta_1 GDPpercapita_{it} + \beta_2 GDPpercapita_{it}^2 + \delta_1 InfantMortality_{it} + \delta_2 InfantMortality_{it}^2 + \lambda Civil / PoliticalRights + \omega GovernmentEffectiveness + \theta_1 Population_{it} + \theta_2 Population_{it}^2 + \varepsilon_{it}.$$

Determinants of foreign aid (Bandyopadhyay and Wall 2007)

Figure 5

Relationships with Fixed Effects



Effects on foreign aid (Bandyopadhyay and Wall 2007)

Table 1a. *Institutional and poverty selectivity estimates of aggregate aid and multilateral donors, 2000–03*

	Institutional selectivity		Poverty selectivity	Colonial dummies			
	Democracy	Rule of law	GDP per capita	France	Japan	United Kingdom	United States
Total aid	−0.562 ***	0.127	−0.443 ***	−0.145	−1.395 ***	−0.104	0.072
Bilateral aid	−0.385 ***	0.140	−0.353 ***	−0.111	−1.363 ***	−0.175 **	0.074
Multilateral aid	−0.622 ***	0.224 **	−0.679 ***	−0.172 *	−0.954 **	0.127	0.089
AfDF	−0.488	1.522 ***	−1.559 ***	0.695 **	9.657	1.235 ***	−12.235
Arab agencies	0.307	0.427 **	−0.597 ***	1.005 ***	−4.213	0.486 ***	0.549
AsDF	0.387	0.456	−0.285	−21.463	−14.607	1.666 **	0.196
EBRD	0.111	−0.488 *	0.121	−5.559	2.364	−5.418	−2.223
EC	−1.510 ***	−0.108	−0.635 ***	−0.205	−7.513	−0.148	0.534 *
GEF	−0.524 ***	−0.074	−0.068	−0.183 *	−5.223	−0.300 ***	0.075
IDA	0.390	0.849 **	−3.431 ***	−0.384	−12.117	−0.070	−0.628
IDB sp. fund	1.021 ***	0.329	−1.770 ***	−1.274 ***	3.832	0.749	1.162 ***
IFAD	0.068	0.706 ***	−0.769 ***	0.450 ***	−6.164	0.204	−0.046
Nordic dev. fund	−1.116 ***	0.768 ***	−0.799 ***	−0.897 **	2.088	0.465 *	0.561
Other United Nations	0.147	0.023	−0.048	−0.007	0.613	0.046	0.189
SAF/ESAF/PRGF	−0.452	0.708	−2.364 ***	−0.526	40.723	−0.012	−2.233
UNDP	−0.266 ***	0.042	−0.538 ***	0.169 ***	−1.049 ***	0.226 ***	0.180 *
UNFPA	−0.082	0.099 *	−0.336 ***	0.092	−2.688	0.105 **	0.149
UNHCR	0.396 ***	0.044	−0.161 **	−0.279 *	0.248	0.281 **	−0.100
UNICEF	0.004	0.106 **	−0.575 ***	0.153 ***	−4.236	0.151 ***	0.084
UNTA	−0.169 ***	0.018	−0.136 ***	0.230 ***	−0.463 ***	0.163 ***	−0.196 ***
WFP	0.634 ***	0.355 **	−0.818 ***	−0.065	−3.013	0.228	0.160

	Export shares				Log distance				Number of observations	Pseudo-R^2
	France	Japan	United Kingdom	United States	France	Japan	United Kingdom	United States		
Total aid	68.152 ***	−9.298 **	−30.190	−9.844 ***	−1.330 *	−0.454 ***	1.441 *	−0.100	405	0.396
Bilateral aid	62.433 ***	−9.613 **	−44.050 *	−9.421 ***	−1.710 *	−0. 557 ***	2.138 **	−0.177	405	0.346
Multilateral aid	110.342 ***	−14.845 ***	−25.233	−8.472 ***	0.634	−0.185	−0.997	−0.005	405	0.326
AfDF	5.063	175.572	−444.821 **	−20.433	17.621 ***	12.854 ***	−23.124 ***	6.594 ***	405	0.487
Arab agencies	−67.673	−38.323	62.699	−39.132	−9.231 ***	−0.759 ***	10.290 ***	−0.512 **	405	0.210
AsDF	−399.912	−144.805 *	−305.593	−147.618	−17.022 ***	−10.424 ***	8.572	25.837 ***	405	0.687
EBRD	61.649	−365.177 ***	−142.224	13.562	1.726 *	−1.955 ***	−3.149 ***	0.154	405	0.681
EC	242.189 ***	−8.247	−146.452 ***	−15.453 ***	1.972	0.626 ***	−3.154 **	0.301 *	405	0.241
GEF	61.375 ***	6.485	−78.801 ***	2.143	1.879 **	−0.020	−2.055 **	0.030	405	0.249
IDA	−424.750 ***	102.362 **	331.768 **	−248.471 *	−2.681	−1.477 ***	3.234	−1.012 *	405	0.305
IDB sp. fund	291.238 *	−163.924 ***	385.624	11.929 *	172.642 ***	9.389 ***	−171.131 ***	2.340 ***	405	0.666
IFAD	−81.352 **	7.683	−94.228 *	−21.561	−3.146 *	−0.984 ***	3.746 *	−0.859 ***	405	0.312
Nordic dev. fund	313.978 ***	5.043	−939.321 ***	−154.150 *	−9.635 *	−0.558 *	11.308 *	−1.217 ***	405	0.334
Other United Nations	−16.497	−7.745 *	32.918	1.654	1.269	0.589 ***	−1.128	0.254 **	405	0.275
SAF/ESAF/PRGF	−421.634	144.398	−1340.971	−1802.362 ***	−3.187	−1.030	3.666	−3.010 **	405	0.247
UNDP	−50.315 ***	5.653 **	14.852	−1.913	−1.162 **	−0.173 **	1.132 **	0.013	405	0.649
UNFPA	−6.270	−5.534 **	−37.293 ***	1.378	−0.097	−0.197 ***	0.310	−0.103 *	405	0.636
UNHCR	−27.016	4.248	−56.087 *	11.353 ***	−1.126	0.635 ***	0.628	0.969 ***	405	0.209
UNICEF	−36.658 ***	4.111	30.132 **	−2.337	−4.280 ***	0.045	4.846 ***	−0.124 *	405	0.723
UNTA	0.356	0.802	−33.549 ***	−1.433	−0.793 **	−0.154 ***	1.043 ***	−0.030	405	1.063
WFP	25.458	29.518 **	−106.609 **	−74.891 **	1.933	0.463 **	−1.750	−0.408 **	405	0.326

Note: Estimates from pooled tobit regressions with year dummies (* significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level).

Determinants of multilateral aid (Dollar and Levin 2006)

Table 1b. *Institutional and poverty selectivity estimates of bilateral donors, 2000–03*

	Democracy	Rule of law	GDP per capita	Colonial dummy	Export share	Distance	Number of observations	Pseudo-R^2
Bilateral donors with former colonies								
Australia	−0.230 *	0.241 *	−0.218 ***	0.450	−11.190 **	−3.534 ***	405	0.406
Belgium	−0.389 ***	0.080	−0.552 ***	2.645 ***	−0.784	0.162 **	405	0.182
France	−0.245 **	−0.033	−0.315 ***	1.882 ***	141.556 ***	−0.078	405	0.298
Germany	−0.545 ***	0.443 ***	−0.334 ***	1.036 ***	−2.468	−0.096 *	405	0.280
Italy	0.349 **	−0.092	−0.335 ***	1.749 ***	27.394	−0.206 **	405	0.091
Japan	−0.554 ***	0.256	−0.388 ***	−1.857 **	12.456 *	−0.761 ***	405	0.168
Netherlands	−0.933 ***	−0.100	−0.809 ***	1.404 ***	−86.118 **	0.039	405	0.240
Portugal	−0.585 ***	−0.077	−0.250 ***	1.900 ***	107.157 ***	−0.223 **	405	0.271
Spain	0.179	−0.121	−0.202 ***	2.203 ***	8.879	−0.429 ***	405	0.193
United Kingdom	−1.172 ***	0.174	−0.716 ***	1.375 ***	−58.215 *	−0.170 *	405	0.222
United States	−0.851 ***	−0.102	−0.736 ***	0.456	−13.187 **	−0.949 ***	405	0.105
Bilateral donors without former colonies								
Austria	−0.264 **	0.230 *	−0.354 ***		37.812 ***	−0.283 ***	405	0.172
Canada	−0.519 ***	−0.070	−0.447 ***		−111.509 ***	−0.647 ***	405	0.222
Denmark	−1.230 ***	0.459 **	−0.865 ***		75.636 *	−0.248 **	405	0.102
Finland	−0.382 ***	0.551 ***	−0.421 ***		43.882 ***	0.078	405	0.190
Greece	0.089	−0.241 ***	−0.116 ***		18.724 ***	−0.589 ***	405	0.472
Ireland	−0.358 ***	0.371 ***	−0.571 ***		−65.521 *	0.451 ***	405	0.216
Luxembourg	−0.388 ***	0.435 ***	−0.328 ***		−1.581	−0.005	405	0.090
New Zealand	−0.133 ***	0.061	−0.140 ***		−5.325 *	−1.573 ***	405	0.695
Norway	−0.398 ***	0.274 *	−0.648 ***		−18.363	0.083	405	0.155
Sweden	−0.732 ***	0.204	−0.621 ***		−14.174	−0.237 ***	405	0.108
Switzerland	−0.517 ***	0.052	−0.252 ***		−78.784 ***	−0.154 **	405	0.159

Note: Estimates from pooled tobit regressions with year dummies (* significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level).

Determinants of bilateral aid (Dollar and Levin 2007)

Table 2. *The changes in institutional and poverty selectivity estimates, 1984–2003*

	Institutional elasticity								Poverty elasticity			
	Democracy				Rule of law				GDP per capita			
	1984–89	1990–94	1995–99	2000–03	1984–89	1990–94	1995–99	2000–03	1984–89	1990–94	1995–99	2000–03
Aggregate aid												
Total aid	−0.677 ***	−0.289 ***	−0.383 ***	−0.562 ***	−0.220 ***	−0.127	0.139	0.127	−0.549 ***	−0.401 ***	−0.377 ***	−0.443 ***
Bilateral aid	−0.692 ***	−0.256 **	−0.289 ***	−0.385 ***	−0.174 **	−0.097	0.074	0.140	−0.520 ***	−0.347 ***	−0.272 ***	−0.353 ***
Multilateral aid	−0.450 ***	−0.304 ***	−0.429 ***	−0.622 ***	−0.193 ***	−0.074	0.322 ***	0.224 **	−0.623 ***	−0.592 ***	−0.639 ***	−0.679 ***
Multilateral donors												
AfDF	0.460	0.471	0.197	−0.488	0.430 **	0.266	1.498 ***	1.522 ***	−0.986 ***	−1.312 ***	−1.579 ***	−1.559 ***
Arab agencies	−0.473 **	0.199	0.228	0.307	−0.337 **	0.081	0.774 ***	0.427 **	−0.377 ***	−0.615 ***	−0.582 ***	−0.597 ***
AsDF	−0.320	−0.542	−0.067	0.387	−1.619 ***	−1.243 ***	−2.410 **	0.456	0.792	−0.182	−0.900	−0.285
EBRD	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	0.190	0.111	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	−0.582	−0.488 *	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	−0.288	0.121
EC	−0.662 ***	−0.544 ***	−1.248 ***	−1.510 ***	−0.092	0.039	0.095	−0.108	−1.155 ***	−0.540 ***	−0.506 ***	−0.635 ***
GEF	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	−0.524 ***	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	−0.074	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	−0.068
IDA	−0.217	−0.203	0.683	0.390	−1.129 ***	−1.012 ***	1.251 ***	0.849 **	−2.781 ***	−3.610 ***	−3.758 ***	−3.431 ***
IDB sp. fund	−0.798 **	0.448	0.912 ***	1.021 ***	−0.502 *	0.670	0.262	0.329	−0.924 **	−2.351 ***	−2.642 ***	−1.770 ***
IFAD	−0.703 ***	−0.207	0.239 *	0.068	−0.286 ***	−0.022	0.811 ***	0.706 ***	−0.700 ***	−0.598 ***	−0.725 ***	−0.769 ***
Nordic dev. fund	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	−0.295	−1.116 ***	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	0.594	0.768 ***	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	−0.331 **	−0.799 ***
Other United Nations	−0.269 ***	−0.245 ***	0.076	0.147	0.078	0.101 *	0.197 *	0.023	−0.484 ***	−0.383 ***	0.032	−0.048
SAF/ESAF/PRGF	n.a. n.a.	−0.670	0.834	−0.452	n.a. n.a.	−0.841	2.062 **	0.708	n.a. n.a.	−1.084	−2.880 ***	−2.364 ***
UNDP	−0.321 ***	−0.052	−0.141 *	−0.266 ***	−0.103 **	0.033	0.144	0.042	−0.480 ***	−0.697 ***	−0.605 ***	−0.538 ***
UNFPA	−0.179 ***	0.051	0.031	−0.082	−0.040	0.128 ***	0.236 ***	0.099 *	−0.254 ***	−0.320 ***	−0.268 ***	−0.336 ***
UNHCR	0.316	0.541 ***	0.323 ***	0.396 ***	0.228	−0.012	−0.106	0.044	−0.217 *	−0.172 *	−0.017	−0.161 **
UNICEF	−0.282 ***	−0.037	0.062	0.004	−0.271 ***	−0.240 ***	−0.014	0.106 **	−0.699 ***	−0.653 ***	−0.483 ***	−0.575 ***
UNTA	−0.127 ***	−0.060	−0.007	−0.169 ***	−0.019	0.052 *	0.037	0.018	−0.172 ***	−0.145 ***	−0.065 ***	−0.136 ***
WFP	−0.316	0.429 **	0.473 ***	0.634 ***	−0.470 ***	−0.452 ***	0.302	0.355 **	−0.887 ***	−0.792 ***	−0.744 ***	−0.818 ***

(*continued next page*)

Table 2—*continued*

	Institutional elasticity								Poverty elasticity			
	Democracy				Rule of law				GDP per capita			
	1984–89	1990–94	1995–99	2000–03	1984–89	1990–94	1995–99	2000–03	1984–89	1990–94	1995–99	2000–03
Bilateral donors with former colonies												
Australia	−0.167	−0.025	−0.152	−0.230 *	0.028	0.186 *	0.572 ***	0.241 *	−0.449 ***	−0.289 ***	−0.292 ***	−0.218 ***
Belgium			−0.189	−0.389 ***			0.058	0.080			−0.366 ***	−0.552 ***
France	0.157	−0.085	−0.010	−0.245 **	0.149 *	0.047	−0.379 ***	−0.033	−0.414 ***	−0.606 ***	−0.235 ***	−0.315 ***
Germany	−0.677 ***	−0.301 **	−0.354 ***	−0.545 ***	0.042	0.185	0.499 ***	0.443 ***	−0.253 ***	−0.319 ***	−0.315 ***	−0.334 ***
Italy	−0.655 ***	−0.064	0.191	0.349 **	0.033	−0.204	−0.319	−0.092	−0.892 ***	−0.450 ***	−0.327 ***	−0.335 ***
Japan	−0.926 ***	−0.849 ***	−0.615 ***	−0.554 ***	−0.119	0.215	0.218	0.256	−0.601 ***	−0.647 ***	−0.472 ***	−0.388 ***
Netherlands	−0.860 ***	−1.022 ***	−0.830 ***	−0.933 ***	−0.240 **	−0.208	0.022	−0.100	−0.814 ***	−0.658 ***	−0.732 ***	−0.809 ***
Portugal	n.a. n.a.	1.012 **	−0.213	−0.585 ***	n.a. n.a.	−0.119	−0.735 ***	−0.077	n.a. n.a.	−0.213	−0.166	−0.250 ***
Spain	n.a. n.a.	0.365 *	0.411 ***	0.179	n.a. n.a.	−0.160	−0.235	−0.121	n.a. n.a.	−0.366 ***	−0.138 *	−0.202 ***
United Kingdom	−0.418 ***	−0.717 ***	−1.127 ***	−1.172 ***	0.188 **	0.066	0.273	0.174	−0.733 ***	−0.494 ***	−0.594 ***	−0.716 ***
United States	−1.894 ***	−1.201 ***	−0.994 ***	−0.851 ***	−1.137 ***	−0.786 ***	−0.293	−0.102	−1.098 ***	−0.571 ***	−0.661 ***	−0.736 ***
Bilateral donors without former colonies												
Austria	0.201	0.054	−0.010	−0.264 **	−0.037	0.141	0.221 *	0.230 *	0.080	−0.090	−0.195 ***	−0.354 ***
Canada	−0.389 ***	−0.333 **	−0.434 ***	−0.519 ***	−0.198 *	−0.167	0.111	−0.070	−0.686 ***	−0.470 ***	−0.373 ***	−0.447 ***
Denmark	−0.410 *	−0.795 ***	−1.099 ***	−1.230 ***	0.182	0.604 ***	0.893 ***	0.459 **	−1.496 ***	−1.357 ***	−1.066 ***	−0.865 ***
Finland	−0.162	−0.032	−0.175	−0.382 ***	0.006	0.246 *	1.015 ***	0.551 ***	−0.671 ***	−0.413 ***	−0.458 ***	−0.421 ***
Greece				0.089				−0.241 ***				−0.116 ***
Ireland	−0.165 *	−0.037	−0.248 **	−0.358 ***	−0.037	0.120 *	0.464 ***	0.371 ***	−0.385 ***	−0.288 ***	−0.590 ***	−0.571 ***
Luxembourg	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	−0.256 **	−0.388 ***	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	0.099	0.435 ***	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	−0.157 ***	−0.328 ***
New Zealand	−0.007	0.119 **	−0.002	−0.133 ***	−0.030	0.134 ***	0.244 ***	0.061	−0.075 ***	−0.055 **	−0.126 ***	−0.140 ***
Norway	−0.507 ***	−0.955 ***	−0.665 ***	−0.398 ***	0.146	−0.114	0.577 ***	0.274 *	−1.009 ***	−0.833 ***	−0.811 ***	−0.648 ***
Sweden	−0.713 **	−0.616 ***	−0.787 ***	−0.732 ***	−0.241	−0.134	0.153	0.204	−0.963 ***	−0.487 ***	−0.613 ***	−0.621 ***
Switzerland	−0.412 ***	−0.577 ***	−0.707 ***	−0.517 ***	−0.150 **	−0.181	−0.246 *	0.052	−0.525 ***	−0.534 ***	−0.297 ***	−0.252 ***

Note. Estimates from pooled tobit regressions with year dummies (* significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level).

Trends in foreign aid (Dollar and Levin 2007)

Table 1. Selection and Allocation Equations, 1960–97

Dependent variable	*(1) Selection equation Receives US aid*	*(2) Selection equation with regions Receives US aid*	*(3) Allocation equation US aid share*
Small donor $aid_{i,t}$	72.419	66.049	0.234
	(3.11)**	(3.09)**	(12.70)**
US $exports_{i,t-1}$	7.864	4.824	0.256
	(1.09)	(0.80)	(6.00)**
US $imports_{i,t-1}$	–1.182	–2.713	–0.074
	(0.35)	(0.93)	(2.50)*
UN $voting_{i,t-1}$	1.361	1.209	–0.001
	(2.45)*	(2.00)*	(0.31)
$Democracy_{i,t-1}$	0.020	0.013	0.00002
	(1.73)	(0.89)	(0.19)
$GDP_{i,t-1}$	–0.13883	–0.12658	–0.00125
	(4.55)**	(3.82)**	(2.89)**
$Population_{i,t-1}$	–8.91606	–4.44211	1.28353
	(1.17)	(0.44)	(13.57)**
Observations	2,907	2,907	2,565
Number of countries	119	119	111
Pseudo *R*-squared	0.204	0.227	
R-squared (within)			0.301
Estimation method	Probit with PCSEs	Probit with PCSEs	OLS with FE

Notes: *t*-statistics in parentheses; *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%.
Year dummies included.

US domestic politics and aid allocation
(Fleck and Kilby 2006)

Table 2. Selection and Allocation Equations with Political Interactions, 1960–97

Dependent variable	*(1) Selection equation Receives US aid*	*(2) Selection equation with regions Receives US aid*	*(3) Allocation equation US aid share*
Small donor $aid_{i,t}$	31.744	27.839	0.088
	(1.46)	(1.56)	(2.92)**
Small donor $aid_{i,t}$*Cons $Pres_{t-1}$	–62.422	–59.339	–0.134
	(2.05)*	(1.92)	(4.60)**
Small donor $aid_{i,t}$*Cons $Cong_{t-1}$	–1,190.471	–1,115.153	–1.843
	(2.87)**	(3.13)**	(4.65)**
US $exports_{i,t-1}$	11.934	12.720	0.425
	(1.02)	(1.14)	(5.28)**
US $exports_{i,t-1}$*Cons $Pres_{t-1}$	1.659	0.329	0.012
	(0.23)	(0.05)	(0.20)
US $exports_{i,t-1}$*Cons $Cong_{t-1}$	69.213	97.510	3.057
	(0.66)	(0.98)	(3.43)**
US $imports_{i,t-1}$	–8.524	–11.842	–0.271
	(0.99)	(1.42)	(3.92)**
US $imports_{i,t-1}$*Cons $Pres_{t-1}$	3.291	3.714	0.043
	(0.79)	(0.94)	(0.76)
US $imports_{i,t-1}$*Cons $Cong_{t-1}$	–109.023	–123.457	–2.617
	(1.30)	(1.53)	(3.42)**
UN $voting_{i,t-1}$	0.605	0.751	–0.004
	(1.17)	(1.17)	(0.82)
UN $voting_{i,t-1}$*Cons $Pres_{t-1}$	0.002	–0.264	0.012
	(0.00)	(0.56)	(2.34)*
UN $voting_{i,t-1}$*Cons $Cong_{t-1}$	–14.838	–8.461	–0.076
	(1.63)	(1.04)	(1.04)
$Democracy_{i,t-1}$	0.038	0.028	0.00012
	(2.36)*	(1.62)	(0.80)
$Democracy_{i,t-1}$*Cons $Pres_{t-1}$	0.010	0.007	–0.00006
	(0.89)	(0.57)	(0.46)
$Democracy_{i,t-1}$*Cons $Cong_{t-1}$	0.279	0.241	0.00191
	(1.18)	(1.02)	(1.08)
$GDP_{i,t-1}$	–0.139	–0.129	–0.00114
	(4.60)**	(3.93)**	(2.66)**
$Population_{i,t-1}$	–8.385	–5.548	1.49698
	(1.38)	(0.88)	(15.19)**
Observations	2,907	2,907	2,565
Number of countries	119	119	111
Pseudo *R*-squared	0.224	0.244	
R-squared (within)			0.325
Estimation method	Probit with PCSEs	Probit with PCSEs	OLS with FE

Notes: *t*-statistics in parentheses; *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%.
Year dummies included.

H1a: States important to US security are more likely to receive foreign assistance if they did not receive aid in the previous year.

H1b: States important to US security are likely to receive more assistance than other states.

H2a: States with electoral institutions are more likely to receive US foreign assistance if they did not receive aid in the previous year.

H2b: States with electoral institutions are likely to receive more US foreign assistance than other states.

H3a: Democracies that are important to US national security are more likely to receive US foreign assistance if they did not receive aid in the previous year.

H3b: Democracies that are important to US national security are likely to receive more US foreign assistance than other states.

H4a: Democracies facing instability are more likely to receive US foreign assistance if they did not receive aid in the previous year.

H4b: Democracies facing instability are likely to receive more US foreign assistance than other states.

Table I. Gatekeeping (Probit) Model of Who Initially Gets Aid (Onset Only)

Variable	*Model 1 Cold War 1982–90*	*Model 2 Post-Cold War (PCW), 1991–96*	*Model 3 PCW, HR measured as 0 or 1*	*Model 4 PCW, test of H2a*	*Model 5 PCW, test of H4a*	*Model 6 PCW, test of H3a*
Proximity to threat	.429+	.794*	.802*	1.04**	1.16*	.773**
	(.254)	(.350)	(.331)	(.351)	(.510)	(.278)
Troops	−.748*	−.041	−.113	−.060	−.087	−.112
	(.299)	(.419)	(.386)	(.411)	(.441)	(.380)
Alliance	−.016	−.523	−.356	−.512	−.567	−.373
	(.217)	(.557)	(.541)	(.524)	(.512)	(.541)
Human rights abuses	−.317+	−.127	–	–	–	–
	(.175)	(.210)				
Human rights abuses dummy	–	–	−.318	−.350	−.627	−.289
			(.491)	(.610)	(.479)	(.516)
Polity	−.036	.015	.037	–	–	.034
	(.044)	(.046)	(.033)			(.032)
Electoral institutions	–	–	–	.621		
				(.405)		
Full institutions	–	–	–	1.52*	–	–
				(.750)		
LN Exports	−.061	.067	.070	.075+	−.019	.07
	(.038)	(.047)	(.046)	(.046)	(.045)	(.046)
LN GDP/capita	−.245*	−.418*	−.401*	−.589*	−.302*	−.384*
	(.098)	(.215)	(.185)	(.241)	(.138)	(.201)
Instability	–	–	–	–	−.040	–
					(.035)	
Democracy* instability	–	–	–	–	.099*	–
					(.049)	
Democracy* threat	–	–	–	–	–	.103
						(1.16)
Years since aid	−.033	−.126*	−.114+	−.117+	−.156**	−.117+
	(.063)	(.049)	(.054)	(.062)	(.051)	(.070)
Constant	1.83	3.18	2.55+	3.37+	2.71*	2.42
	(1.32)	(2.36)	(1.55)	(1.79)	(1.15)	(1.72)
Spline1	−.522	−.148	.141	.031	.021	.076
	(.340)	(.560)	(.754)	(.684)	(.555)	(.841)
Spline2	.611	1.49	.889	1.12	1.42	1.01
	(.578)	(1.01)	(1.47)	(1.40)	(1.03)	(1.63)
Spline3	−.249	−4.04***	−3.33+	−3.60*	−4.45***	−3.47*
	(.497)	(1.15)	(1.76)	(1.83)	(1.23)	(1.88)
Spline4	−.008	4.45***	3.97**	4.14**	5.06***	4.07**
	(.723)	(.883)	(1.26)	(1.41)	(.934)	(1.30)
	N = 364	N = 205	N = 205	N = 205	N = 198	N = 205
	LL = - 136.8	LL = - 114.47	LL = - 113.2	LL = - 111.2	LL = - 105.5	LL = - 112.9
	Chi^2 = 24.9	Chi^2 = 26.4	Chi^2 = 25.1	Chi^2 = 30.3	Chi^2 = 14.0	Chi^2 = 27.1

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$, + $p < .1$
All significance tests are two-tailed. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Determinants of U.S foreign assistance onset after the Cold War (1990-96)(Lai 2003)

Table II. Allocation (OLS) Model of How Much Aid a State Initially Receives

Variable	Model 1 Cold War 1982–90	Model 2 Post-Cold War (PCW), 1991–96	Model 3 PCW HR measured as 0 or 1	Model 4 PCW test of H2b	Model 5 PCW test of H4b	Model 6 PCW test of H3b
Proximity to threat	−.611	.794	.939	.896	.488	.652
	(2.43)	(.758)	(.835)	(.849)	(.969)	(1.04)
Troops	3.32*	−.557	−.810	−.831	.113	−.636
	(1.48)	(1.16)	(1.39)	(1.48)	(1.31)	(1.50)
Alliance	−1.6+	4.83**	5.26*	5.37*	3.78**	4.66+
	(.916)	(1.75)	(2.44)	(2.35)	(1.30)	(2.58)
Human rights abuses	.368	−.447	–	–	–	–
	(.527)	(.315)				
Human rights abuses dummy	–	–	−2.04**	−1.88**	−.127	−1.92*
			(.797)	(.735)	(.871)	(.832)
Polity	.071	−.253**	−.209***	–	–	.215***
	(.126)	(.085)	(.061)			(.062)
Electoral institutions	–	–	–	2.34***	–	–
				(.705)		
Full institutions	–	–	–	−3.98***	–	–
				(1.20)		
LN Exports	−.120	−.232	−.179	−.0056	−.283	−.204
	(.356)	(.231)	(.288)	(.389)	(.248)	(.336)
LN Population	.583*	.261	.236	−.0044	.212	.300
	(.291)	(.317)	(.404)	(.582)	(.331)	(.476)
Instability	–	–	–	–	.164	–
					(.178)	
Democracy* instability	–	–	–	–	−.074	–
					(.200)	
Democracy*threat	–	–	–	–	–	.939
						(1.63)
Constant	3.07	7.09**	6.12+	8.92+	5.33**	5.62
	(2.27)	(2.60)	(3.61)	(5.18)	(2.15)	(4.41)
	N = 337	N = 174	N = 174	N = 174	N = 168	N = 174
	Rho Chi² = .33	Rho Chi² = .72	Rho Chi² = .68	Rho Chi² = .59	Rho Chi² = 1.86	Rho Chi² = .33

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$,*** $p < .001$, + $p < .1$
All significance tests are two-tailed. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
DV = log of Allocated Aid (thousands of 1987 US dollars).

Table III. Allocation (OLS) Model of How Much Aid a State Receives

Variable	Model 1 Cold War 1982–90	Model 2 Post-Cold War (PCW), 1991–96	Model 3 PCW HR measured as 0 or 1	Model 4 PCW dummy year variable model	Model 5 PCW test of H2b	Model 6 PCW test of H4b	Model 7 PCW test of H3b
Proximity to threat	−.020	.0094	.004	−.583	−.008	−.007	.067
	(.072)	(.110)	(.109)	(.345)	(.113)	(.115)	(.114)
Troops	.0066	−.216	−.217	.238	−.206	−.203	−.226
	(.127)	(.233)	(.225)	(.742)	(.219)	(.238)	(.220)
Alliance	.156	−.125	−.118	.583	−.102	−.110	−.099
	(.099)	(.178)	(.175)	(.605)	(.174)	(.175)	(.175)
Human rights abuses	.162	−.023	–	.125	–	–	–
	(.095)	(.072)		(.204)			
Human rights abuses dummy	–	–	−.035	–	−.120	−.233	−.013
			(.141)		(.134)	(.130)	(.141)
Polity	.033	.019	.023**	.020	–	–	.028**
	(.022)	(.017)	(.009)	(.043)			(.009)
Electoral institutions	–	–	–	–	.230	–	–
					(.124)		
Full Institutions	–	–	–	–	.199	–	–
					(.184)		
LN Exports	.0077	−.115**	−.112**	.160	−.104**	−.080*	−.111**
	(.027)	(.036)	(.037)	(.116)	(.039)	(.038)	(.036)
LN Population	.041	.132***	.126***	.205	.121**	.110*	.125***
	(.023)	(.039)	(.039)	(.140)	(.043)	(.049)	(.038)
Instability	–	–	–	–	–	−.0056	–
						(.0213)	
Democracy* instability	–	–	–	–	–	.032	–
						(.027)	
Democracy* threat	–	–	–	–	–	–	−.201
							(.171)
Lag DV	.919***	.767***	.767***	–	.767***	.765***	.768***
	(.021)	(.045)	(.046)		(.047)	(.045)	(.046)
Constant	−.330	1.68***	1.62***	5.77***	1.56**	1.70***	1.61***
	(.385)	(.462)	(.449)	(1.2)	(.497)	(.478)	(.436)
Rho	−.129	−.779**	−.771**	−.668**	−.792**	−.827**	−.774**
	(.137)	(.132)	(.141)	(.143)	(.138)	(.135)	(.142)
	N = 645	N = 593	N = 593	N = 635	N = 593	N = 589	N = 593
	Rho Chi2 = .87	Rho Chi2 = 9.57	Rho Chi2 = 8.63	Rho Chi2 = 9.73	Rho Chi2 = 8.45	Rho Chi2 = 7.56	Rho Chi2 = 8.43

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$
All significance tests are two-tailed. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
DV = log of Allocated Aid (thousands of 1987 US dollars).

Determinants of U.S foreign assistance trend after the Cold War (1990-96)(Lai 2003)

Hypothesis 1. The IMF will set conditions on the basis of domestic economic conditions, including the growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP), the government's consumption, the budget deficit, the rate of monetary expansion, and the current account balance.

Hypothesis 2. The IMF will specify fewer conditions for countries that are closely allied with the United States.

Hypothesis 3. The IMF will set more conditions during the period prior to democratic elections.

Hypothesis 4. For countries closely allied with the United States, the IMF will set fewer conditions during the period prior to democratic elections.

Table 2
Total Number of International Monetary Fund (IMF) Conditions

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Voting with United States ($t-1$)		−23.74** (4.30)	−8.62* (2.34)	−26.86** (4.76)	−9.75** (2.61)	−26.50** (4.66)	−9.56* (2.56)
Election within next 6 months				−.44** (2.97)	−.15+ (1.80)	−.19 (.39)	.21 (.98)
Voting with United States × election variable						−.92 (.54)	−1.47+ (1.81)
Real GDP ($t-1$)	−.03** (4.19)	−.02** (3.84)	−.01** (3.00)	−.02** (3.70)	−.01** (2.93)	−.02** (3.70)	−.01** (2.88)
Real GDP growth ($t-1$)	−.004 (.60)	.003 (.40)		.001 (.13)		.001 (.16)	
Real per capita GDP growth in OECD countries ($t-1$)	.59** (5.07)	.58** (4.95)	.50** (4.92)	.60** (5.15)	.48** (4.72)	.60** (5.10)	.48** (4.71)
LIBOR ($t-1$)	.12* (2.06)	.22** (3.39)	.13** (2.85)	.24** (3.71)	.14** (3.07)	.23** (3.65)	.14** (2.98)
Government consumption (% GDP; $t-1$)	−.01 (.37)	−.04 (1.12)		−.04 (1.17)		−.04 (1.13)	
Government budget deficit (% GDP; $t-1$)	−.01 (.93)	−.002 (.35)		−.01 (1.00)		−.01 (.78)	
Monetary expansion (%; $t-1$)	.01** (4.53)	.01** (4.08)	.01** (4.80)	.01** (3.53)	.01** (4.96)	.01** (3.56)	.01** (4.92)
Change in international reserves ($t-1$)	−.002 (.69)	−.003 (.98)		−.002 (.96)		−.002 (.93)	
Current account balance (% GDP; $t-1$)	−.004 (.50)	−.01 (1.18)		−.01 (1.27)		−.01 (1.26)	
New net IMF credit (% quota; $t-1$)	−.001+ (1.71)	−.001 (1.57)		−.001+ (1.94)		−.001+ (1.88)	
Log likelihood	−254.25	−244.93	−398.01	−240.26	−396.35	−240.11	−394.70
Number of countries	19	19	29	19	29	19	29
Number of observations	92	92	139	92	139	92	139

Note. Values are based on a Poisson regression analysis of quarterly panel data, April 1997 to February 2003. Fixed country and time dummy variables were included; z-statistics are in parentheses. GDP = gross domestic product; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; LIBOR = London Interbank Offer Rate.

+ Significant at the 10% level.
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.

IMF conditions and the U.S. (Dreher and Jensen 2007)

Table 3

Total Number of International Monetary Fund Conditions, by Sector

Variable	Monetary Conditions (1)		(2)		(3)		Public Sector Conditions (4)		(5)		(6)	
Voting with United States ($t-1$)	−3.11	(.44)	−2.17	(.30)	−1.02	(.14)	−28.88**	(3.53)	−29.52**	(3.56)	−28.89**	(3.58)
Election within next 6 months			.13	(.78)	.94*	(1.99)			−.07	(.46)	.61	(1.47)
Voting with United States × election variable					−3.23+	(1.81)					−2.96+	(1.73)
Real GDP ($t-1$)	−.01+	(1.77)	−.01+	(1.78)	−.01+	(1.79)	−.02	(1.25)	−.02	(1.24)	−.02	(1.24)
Real per capita GDP growth in OECD countries ($t-1$)	.61**	(2.69)	.63**	(2.77)	.65**	(2.85)	.28	(1.53)	.28	(1.49)	.28	(1.49)
LIBOR ($t-1$)	.16	(1.58)	.15	(1.46)	.14	(1.34)	.06	(.69)	.07	(.76)	.06	(.72)
Monetary expansion (%; $t-1$)	.01*	(2.50)	.01	(1.08)	.01*	(2.54)	.01*	(1.97)	.01*	(2.01)	.01*	(1.99)
Log likelihood	−224.41		−146.94		−222.71		−232.09		−231.98		−230.45	

Note. Values are based on a Poisson regression analysis of quarterly panel data, April 1997 to February 2003. Fixed country and time dummy variables are included; z-statistics are in parentheses. For each column, the number of countries is 29, and the number of observations is 139. GDP = gross domestic product; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; LIBOR = London Interbank Offer Rate.

+ Significant at the 10% level.
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.

Table 5

Total Number of International Monetary Fund Conditions, by Voting with Group of 7 Countries in UN General Assembly

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Voting with United States ($t-1$)							−13.46* (2.15)
Voting with Canada ($t-1$)	−6.20** (3.65)						−19.32 (1.30)
Voting with United Kingdom ($t-1$)		−5.72** (2.87)					70.83** (2.70)
Voting with France ($t-1$)			−5.63** (2.82)				−7.98 (.41)
Voting with Germany ($t-1$)				−5.91** (3.58)			−54.86* (2.05)
Voting with Italy ($t-1$)					−5.62** (3.48)		13.48 (.44)
Voting with Japan ($t-1$)						−5.12** (3.42)	5.36 (.56)
Election within next 6 months	.54 (1.58)	.51+ (1.60)	.51 (1.57)	.54+ (1.62)	.56+ (1.66)	.45 (1.27)	.15 (.64)
Voting with United States × election variable							−1.06 (1.08)
Voting with Canada × election variable	−1.35* (2.16)						
Voting with United Kingdom × election variable		−1.48* (2.20)					
Voting with France × election variable			−1.48* (2.17)				
Voting with Germany × election variable				−1.38* (2.19)			
Voting with Italy × election variable					−1.38* (2.22)		
Voting with Japan × election variable						−1.14+ (1.75)	
Real GDP ($t-1$)	−.02** (3.52)	−.01** (3.45)	−.01** (3.39)	−.01** (3.45)	−.01** (3.52)	−.02** (3.77)	−.01* (2.42)
Real per capita GDP growth in OECD countries ($t-1$)	.48** (4.78)	.49** (4.85)	.49** (4.81)	.50** (4.88)	.49** (4.81)	.50** (4.96)	.48** (4.27)
LIBOR ($t-1$)	.12** (2.71)	.11* (2.45)	.12** (2.67)	.10* (2.41)	.11* (2.61)	.10* (2.22)	.17* (2.16)
Monetary expansion (%; $t-1$)	.01** (4.65)	.01** (4.78)	.01** (4.78)	.01** (4.69)	.01** (4.66)	.01** (4.60)	.01** (4.58)
Log likelihood	−391.21	−393.87	−394.01	−391.60	−366.39	−392.70	−378.38

Note. Values are based on a Poisson regression analysis of quarterly panel data, April 1997 to February 2003. Fixed country and time dummy variables are included; z-statistics are in parentheses. For each column, the number of countries is 29, and the number of observations is 139. GDP = gross domestic product; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; LIBOR = London Interbank Offer Rate.

+ Significant at the 10% level.
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.

IMF sector conditions, the U.S, and the G7 (Dreher and Jensen 2007)

Table 1. Heckit and least squares results for IDA commitments to developing countries

Dependent variable:	IDA commitments (log)			
	Heckit			OLS
Model:	1	2	3	4
Log (population)	0.449***	0.578***	0.649***	0.634***
	(0.087)	(0.122)	(0.113)	(0.091)
Log (GDP per capita)	0.037	−0.202	−0.195	−0.178
	(0.224)	(0.220)	(0.177)	(0.169)
Physical quality of life	0.007	0.011*	0.010*	0.012***
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Former Western colony	0.001	−0.002	−0.003	−0.001
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Log (DAC export to recipient)	0.102	0.037	0.060	0.026
	(0.106)	(0.120)	(0.110)	(0.093)
Percentage Christian	0.003	0.003	0.003*	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Political freedom	−0.099***	−0.110***	−0.095***	−0.046**
	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.022)
Human rights		0.156**	0.137*	0.198***
		(0.079)	(0.075)	(0.068)
Military expenditures		0.004	−0.004	−0.004
		(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Trade openness		−0.224	−0.136	−0.336**
		(0.198)	(0.177)	(0.161)
External debt		0.118	0.104*	0.171***
		(0.074)	(0.062)	(0.053)
Corruption			0.200	0.052
			(0.178)	(0.134)
Rule of law			0.041	0.191
			(0.177)	(0.161)
Regulatory burden			−0.252	−0.020
			(0.174)	(0.129)
UN voting on key issues	0.782**	1.191***	1.208***	1.324***
	(0.382)	(0.404)	(0.444)	(0.395)
Constant	−4.113	−4.075	−5.288*	−4.371
	−2.911	−3.441	(3.153)	−2.860
Total number of observations	553	420	389	299
Number of uncensored observations	362	312	299	299
Number of countries	76	60	54	51

Note: Autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses; Asterisks *, **, *** denote significantce at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

Determinants of World Bank IDA commitments (Andersen et al. 2006)

Monadic:

H1: Democracies impose sanctions more often than other regime types.

H2: Democracies prefer to impose financial sanctions alone, rather than combinations that include import or export sanctions. By contrast, autocracies will be less reserved in their sanctions policy, preferring comprehensive packages of sanctions including both import and export sanctions.

H3: Democracies are more likely than autocracies to impose minor sanctions.

Dyadic:

H1: Jointly democratic dyads will experience fewer episodes of sanctions than other types of dyads.

H2: Jointly democratic dyads will experience shorter and less severe sanctions than other types of dyads.

Monadic determinants of sanctions
(Lektzian and Souva 2003)

Table III. Determinants of State Initiation of Sanctions, 1950–90

	Model 1: Monadic analysis	
Variable	β *S.e.*	*First differences*[a]
Democratic initiator	1.044 *** .333	+ 184%
Monadic trade dependence/openness	–.030 *** .012	–70.85%
GDP per capita	.0002 *** .00003	+ 89.39%
Major power	2.214 *** .385	
USA	.763 * .426	
Constant	–5.391 *** .520	
N	4,228	
Wald	245.60 ***	

[a] The first differences reflect changes in the predicted probability of event occurrence relative to a baseline model where democracy, USA, and major power are set equal to zero, and openness and GDP per capita are set at their mean values.
*** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; p-values reflect one-tailed tests.

Table IV. Type of Sanctions by Regime Type

Regime type	*Trade sanctions only*	*Financial sanctions only*	*Trade and financial sanctions*
Non-democracies	5	0	7
Democracies	12	28	35

Chi-square: 8.26, $p < .05$.

Table V. Goal of Sanctions by Regime Type

Regime type	*Minor goal*	*Major goal*
Non-democracy	4	14
Democracy	48	38

There is a slight difference in the number of cases between Tables IV and V, owing to incomplete information on sanctions type.
Chi-square = 6.72, $p < .05$.

Table VII. Determinants of the Onset of Dyadic Sanctions, 1950–90

	Model 2: Dyadic analysis β *S.e.*	*First differences*[a] *%*
Variable		
Joint democracy	–0.707 **	–50.69
	0.337	
Dyadic trade dependence, weak link	–211.155 **	–77.41
	88.016	
Ln relative capabilities	–0.515 ***	–59.61
	0.091	
Allies	0.672 **	
	0.333	
Ln distance	0.094	
	0.089	
USA	3.724 ***	
	0.542	
Constant	–6.382 ***	
	0.490	
N	26,514	
Wald	136.83 ***	

[a] The first differences reflect changes in the predicted probability of event occurrence relative to a baseline model where democracy, USA, and major power are set equal to zero, and openness and GDP per capita are set at their mean values.
*** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; p-values reflect one-tailed tests.

Table VIII. Length of Sanctions by Dyad Type

Dyad type	*Mean length of sanctions in years*
Jointly democratic	5.0
Mixed dyads	6.42
Jointly autocratic	9.8

Dyadic determinants of sanctions
(Lektzian and Souva 2003)

Table I. Estimating Sanction Onset

	Exports		*Imports*	
Democratic dyad	–1.845**	–1.479**	–1.767**	–1.412**
	(–0.323)	(–0.317)	(–0.31)	(–0.31)
Democratic sender	3.332**	2.283*	3.576**	2.584*
	(–1.011)	(–1.022)	(–1.015)	(–1.027)
Logged exports	0.520**	0.305**	0.398**	0.191**
	(–0.044)	(–0.049)	(–0.043)	(–0.045)
Relative power	0.060**	0.035**	0.056**	0.029**
	(–0.006)	(–0.008)	(–0.006)	(–0.008)
Year	0.037	0.008	0.029	0.01
	(–0.025)	(–0.026)	(–0.026)	(–0.026)
Alliance between dyad members	1.253**	0.307	1.432**	0.47
	(–0.297)	(–0.298)	(–0.285)	(–0.294)
United States		3.207**		3.396**
		(–0.324)		(–0.329)
Time since last sanction	–0.476**	–0.364*	–0.474**	–0.358*
	(–0.148)	(–0.145)	(–0.148)	(–0.143)
Spline1	–0.013	–0.011	–0.014	–0.011
	(–0.007)	(–0.007)	(–0.007)	(–0.007)
Spline2	0.006	0.005	0.007	0.005
	(–0.007)	(–0.007)	(–0.007)	(–0.007)
Spline3	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002
	(–0.004)	(–0.004)	(–0.004)	(–0.004)
Constant	–84.462	–26.573	–68.141	–29.179
	(–50.184)	(–51.498)	(–50.683)	(–50.666)
Observations	149,255	149,255	150,042	150,042

Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.

Determinants of economic sanctions (Cox and Drury 2006)